The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.
Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf
Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms
Falconair Ltd: http://www.regosearch.com/GTBI
Location: Green Bay, WI
Accident Number: CEN17LA076
Date & Time: 01/11/2017, 1015 CST
Registration: C-GTBI
Aircraft: Cessna 182T
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Structural icing
Injuries: 1 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Business
Analysis
The private pilot reported that, during a cross-country flight, the airplane encountered ice that began to accumulate on the wing and landing gear. He then attempted to divert to another airport. Subsequently, ice accumulated rapidly on the windshield and obscured the pilot's vision. The pilot maneuvered the airplane near the diversion airport for about 45 minutes; however, the weather deteriorated, so the pilot diverted to another airport. The pilot stated that, while attempting to land while looking out the side window, the airplane stalled about 30 ft above the ground, which resulted in a hard landing.
A review of weather information for the area where the reported icing encounter occurred revealed no probability of icing at the reported time and altitude of the encounter and only about a 10% chance of trace icing during the hour following the encounter. Based on the available information, the airplane likely encountered unforecast icing during the flight, which resulted in structural icing that obscured the pilot's vision and increased the airplane's stall speed. When the pilot attempted to land, the airplane stalled at a higher-than-expected speed, which resulted in a hard landing.
Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The airplane's encounter with unforecast icing conditions, which led to structural icing that obscured the pilot's vision, an aerodynamic stall, and a subsequent hard landing.
Findings
Aircraft
Angle of attack - Capability exceeded (Cause)
Airspeed - Not attained/maintained (Cause)
Environmental issues
Conducive to structural icing - Effect on equipment (Cause)
Conducive to structural icing - Effect on personnel (Cause)
Factual Information
On January 11, 2017, about 0913 central standard time (all times cst), a Cessna 182T bearing Canadian registration C-GTBI, was substantially damaged during landing on runway 18 at the Green Bay-Austin Straubel International Airport (GRB), Green Bay, Wisconsin, following an in-flight structural icing encounter. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was not injured. The airplane incurred structural damage to the forward fuselage and firewall. The aircraft was registered to Falconair Ltd., and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not on a flight plan. The flight originated from Sawyer International Airport (SAW), Marquette, Michigan about 0505, with Falls International Airport-Einarson Field (INL), International Falls, Minnesota as the intended destination.
About 30 minutes into the flight, controllers advised the pilot that moderate icing was reported over Houghton County Memorial Airport (CMX), near Hancock, Michigan. The pilot advised controllers that he would alter his course more to the southwest. About one hour into the flight he noticed ice accumulation on the wing and landing gear and advised controllers that he wanted to divert the flight. He stated that heavier ice accumulation came on quickly and obscured his vision through the windshield.
The pilot diverted to Lakeland Airport/Noble F. Lee Memorial Field (ARV), near Woodruff, Wisconsin. He circled ARV in preparation for landing, but the weather conditions at ARV deteriorated to instrument meteorological conditions. He then advised controllers that he was proceeding south to reach visual meteorological conditions. He opted to land at GRB and received approach guidance from GRB approach controllers. He stated that when 30 ft above the runway, he applied flaps for landing, the airplane stalled, and a hard landing occurred.
Radar track data for the final portion of the accident flight showed the airplane made a left turn near Manitowish Waters, Wisconsin, and proceeded on a south-southeast heading toward ARV at an altitude about 2,700 ft. above mean sea level (msl). The airplane maneuvered near ARV, at altitudes varying from 3,000 ft. msl to 1,900 ft. msl, for about 45 minutes before proceeding south. The airplane ultimately turned east toward GRB before making an approach to runway 18 at GRB.
Current Icing Potential (CIP) product information for the area where the pilot reported the icing encounter showed no icing at 3,000 ft. msl. The one-hour Forecast Icing Potential (FIP) icing forecast, valid at 0700 and applicable to 3,000 ft. msl, showed the icing severity as trace ice, an icing probability of about 10%, with the supercooled liquid drop potential as unknown.
For the same location and time, but at a higher altitude of 5,000 ft. msl, the CIP icing severity was light to moderate, the icing probability was 40-50%, with the supercooled liquid drop threat was unknown. The one-hour FIP icing forecast, valid at 0700 and applicable to 5,000 ft. msl, showed the icing severity as light, an icing probability of about 30%, with the supercooled liquid drop potential as unknown.
An Area Forecast that included the state of Wisconsin, Lake Superior and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan was issued at 0445. With regard to the approximate location of the accident aircraft's initial icing encounter: the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the northwestern portion of Wisconsin forecasted overcast clouds at 3,000 ft msl with cloud tops to 25,000 ft., visibility of three statute miles, light snow; the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the northeastern portion of Wisconsin forecasted overcast clouds at 6,000 ft. msl with cloud tops to 27,000 ft., broken clouds at 2,500 ft. msl beginning at 0700; the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the western portion of Lake Superior and Upper Peninsula of Michigan forecasted overcast clouds at 2,000 ft. msl with cloud tops to 25,000 ft., visibility of three statute miles, scattered light snow showers.
Pilot Information
Certificate: Private
Age: 57, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used:
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed:
Medical Certification: Unknown
Last FAA Medical Exam:
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
Flight Time: 970 hours (Total, all aircraft)
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Manufacturer: Cessna
Registration: C-GTBI
Model/Series: 182T T
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2005
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 18281667
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 4
Date/Type of Last Inspection: Unknown
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3100 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time:
Engine Manufacturer: Lycoming
ELT:
Engine Model/Series: IO-540-AB1A5
Registered Owner: On file
Rated Power: 230 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: GRB
Observation Time: 1553 UTC
Distance from Accident Site: 0 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 0°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Temperature/Dew Point: -7°C / -11°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility: 10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 3 knots, 270°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting: 29.82 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: MARQUETTE, MI (SAW)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: VFR
Destination: INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN (INL)
Type of Clearance: VFR
Departure Time:
Type of Airspace: Class C
Airport Information
Airport: GREEN BAY-AUSTIN STRAUBEL INTL (GRB)
Runway Surface Type: Concrete
Airport Elevation: 694 ft
Runway Surface Condition:
Runway Used: 18
IFR Approach: ASR
Runway Length/Width: 8699 ft / 150 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Full Stop; Precautionary Landing; Straight-in
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries: 1 None
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 None
Latitude, Longitude: 44.484722, -88.129722
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Icing. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Icing. Sort by date Show all posts
Wednesday, February 21, 2018
Thursday, January 12, 2017
Cessna 182T Skylane, C-GTBI, registered to Falconair Ltd and operated by the pilot: Accident occurred January 11, 2017 at Green Bay-Austin Straubel International Airport (KGRB), Brown County, Wisconsin
The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.
Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf
Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms
Falconair Ltd: http://www.regosearch.com/GTBI
Location: Green Bay, WI
Accident Number: CEN17LA076
Date & Time: 01/11/2017, 1015 CST
Registration: C-GTBI
Aircraft: Cessna 182T
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Structural icing
Injuries: 1 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Business
Analysis
The private pilot reported that, during a cross-country flight, the airplane encountered ice that began to accumulate on the wing and landing gear. He then attempted to divert to another airport. Subsequently, ice accumulated rapidly on the windshield and obscured the pilot's vision. The pilot maneuvered the airplane near the diversion airport for about 45 minutes; however, the weather deteriorated, so the pilot diverted to another airport. The pilot stated that, while attempting to land while looking out the side window, the airplane stalled about 30 ft above the ground, which resulted in a hard landing.
A review of weather information for the area where the reported icing encounter occurred revealed no probability of icing at the reported time and altitude of the encounter and only about a 10% chance of trace icing during the hour following the encounter. Based on the available information, the airplane likely encountered unforecast icing during the flight, which resulted in structural icing that obscured the pilot's vision and increased the airplane's stall speed. When the pilot attempted to land, the airplane stalled at a higher-than-expected speed, which resulted in a hard landing.
Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The airplane's encounter with unforecast icing conditions, which led to structural icing that obscured the pilot's vision, an aerodynamic stall, and a subsequent hard landing.
Findings
Aircraft
Angle of attack - Capability exceeded (Cause)
Airspeed - Not attained/maintained (Cause)
Environmental issues
Conducive to structural icing - Effect on equipment (Cause)
Conducive to structural icing - Effect on personnel (Cause)
Factual Information
On January 11, 2017, about 0913 central standard time (all times cst), a Cessna 182T bearing Canadian registration C-GTBI, was substantially damaged during landing on runway 18 at the Green Bay-Austin Straubel International Airport (GRB), Green Bay, Wisconsin, following an in-flight structural icing encounter. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was not injured. The airplane incurred structural damage to the forward fuselage and firewall. The aircraft was registered to Falconair Ltd., and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not on a flight plan. The flight originated from Sawyer International Airport (SAW), Marquette, Michigan about 0505, with Falls International Airport-Einarson Field (INL), International Falls, Minnesota as the intended destination.
About 30 minutes into the flight, controllers advised the pilot that moderate icing was reported over Houghton County Memorial Airport (CMX), near Hancock, Michigan. The pilot advised controllers that he would alter his course more to the southwest. About one hour into the flight he noticed ice accumulation on the wing and landing gear and advised controllers that he wanted to divert the flight. He stated that heavier ice accumulation came on quickly and obscured his vision through the windshield.
The pilot diverted to Lakeland Airport/Noble F. Lee Memorial Field (ARV), near Woodruff, Wisconsin. He circled ARV in preparation for landing, but the weather conditions at ARV deteriorated to instrument meteorological conditions. He then advised controllers that he was proceeding south to reach visual meteorological conditions. He opted to land at GRB and received approach guidance from GRB approach controllers. He stated that when 30 ft above the runway, he applied flaps for landing, the airplane stalled, and a hard landing occurred.
Radar track data for the final portion of the accident flight showed the airplane made a left turn near Manitowish Waters, Wisconsin, and proceeded on a south-southeast heading toward ARV at an altitude about 2,700 ft. above mean sea level (msl). The airplane maneuvered near ARV, at altitudes varying from 3,000 ft. msl to 1,900 ft. msl, for about 45 minutes before proceeding south. The airplane ultimately turned east toward GRB before making an approach to runway 18 at GRB.
Current Icing Potential (CIP) product information for the area where the pilot reported the icing encounter showed no icing at 3,000 ft. msl. The one-hour Forecast Icing Potential (FIP) icing forecast, valid at 0700 and applicable to 3,000 ft. msl, showed the icing severity as trace ice, an icing probability of about 10%, with the supercooled liquid drop potential as unknown.
For the same location and time, but at a higher altitude of 5,000 ft. msl, the CIP icing severity was light to moderate, the icing probability was 40-50%, with the supercooled liquid drop threat was unknown. The one-hour FIP icing forecast, valid at 0700 and applicable to 5,000 ft. msl, showed the icing severity as light, an icing probability of about 30%, with the supercooled liquid drop potential as unknown.
An Area Forecast that included the state of Wisconsin, Lake Superior and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan was issued at 0445. With regard to the approximate location of the accident aircraft's initial icing encounter: the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the northwestern portion of Wisconsin forecasted overcast clouds at 3,000 ft msl with cloud tops to 25,000 ft., visibility of three statute miles, light snow; the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the northeastern portion of Wisconsin forecasted overcast clouds at 6,000 ft. msl with cloud tops to 27,000 ft., broken clouds at 2,500 ft. msl beginning at 0700; the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the western portion of Lake Superior and Upper Peninsula of Michigan forecasted overcast clouds at 2,000 ft. msl with cloud tops to 25,000 ft., visibility of three statute miles, scattered light snow showers.
Pilot Information
Certificate: Private
Age: 57, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used:
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed:
Medical Certification: Unknown
Last FAA Medical Exam:
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
Flight Time: 970 hours (Total, all aircraft)
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Manufacturer: Cessna
Registration: C-GTBI
Model/Series: 182T T
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2005
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 18281667
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 4
Date/Type of Last Inspection: Unknown
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3100 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time:
Engine Manufacturer: Lycoming
ELT:
Engine Model/Series: IO-540-AB1A5
Registered Owner: On file
Rated Power: 230 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: GRB
Observation Time: 1553 UTC
Distance from Accident Site: 0 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 0°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Temperature/Dew Point: -7°C / -11°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility: 10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 3 knots, 270°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting: 29.82 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: MARQUETTE, MI (SAW)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: VFR
Destination: INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN (INL)
Type of Clearance: VFR
Departure Time:
Type of Airspace: Class C
Airport Information
Airport: GREEN BAY-AUSTIN STRAUBEL INTL (GRB)
Runway Surface Type: Concrete
Airport Elevation: 694 ft
Runway Surface Condition:
Runway Used: 18
IFR Approach: ASR
Runway Length/Width: 8699 ft / 150 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Full Stop; Precautionary Landing; Straight-in
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries: 1 None
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 None
Latitude, Longitude: 44.484722, -88.129722
Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf
Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms
Falconair Ltd: http://www.regosearch.com/GTBI
Location: Green Bay, WI
Accident Number: CEN17LA076
Date & Time: 01/11/2017, 1015 CST
Registration: C-GTBI
Aircraft: Cessna 182T
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Structural icing
Injuries: 1 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Business
Analysis
The private pilot reported that, during a cross-country flight, the airplane encountered ice that began to accumulate on the wing and landing gear. He then attempted to divert to another airport. Subsequently, ice accumulated rapidly on the windshield and obscured the pilot's vision. The pilot maneuvered the airplane near the diversion airport for about 45 minutes; however, the weather deteriorated, so the pilot diverted to another airport. The pilot stated that, while attempting to land while looking out the side window, the airplane stalled about 30 ft above the ground, which resulted in a hard landing.
A review of weather information for the area where the reported icing encounter occurred revealed no probability of icing at the reported time and altitude of the encounter and only about a 10% chance of trace icing during the hour following the encounter. Based on the available information, the airplane likely encountered unforecast icing during the flight, which resulted in structural icing that obscured the pilot's vision and increased the airplane's stall speed. When the pilot attempted to land, the airplane stalled at a higher-than-expected speed, which resulted in a hard landing.
Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The airplane's encounter with unforecast icing conditions, which led to structural icing that obscured the pilot's vision, an aerodynamic stall, and a subsequent hard landing.
Findings
Aircraft
Angle of attack - Capability exceeded (Cause)
Airspeed - Not attained/maintained (Cause)
Environmental issues
Conducive to structural icing - Effect on equipment (Cause)
Conducive to structural icing - Effect on personnel (Cause)
Factual Information
On January 11, 2017, about 0913 central standard time (all times cst), a Cessna 182T bearing Canadian registration C-GTBI, was substantially damaged during landing on runway 18 at the Green Bay-Austin Straubel International Airport (GRB), Green Bay, Wisconsin, following an in-flight structural icing encounter. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was not injured. The airplane incurred structural damage to the forward fuselage and firewall. The aircraft was registered to Falconair Ltd., and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not on a flight plan. The flight originated from Sawyer International Airport (SAW), Marquette, Michigan about 0505, with Falls International Airport-Einarson Field (INL), International Falls, Minnesota as the intended destination.
About 30 minutes into the flight, controllers advised the pilot that moderate icing was reported over Houghton County Memorial Airport (CMX), near Hancock, Michigan. The pilot advised controllers that he would alter his course more to the southwest. About one hour into the flight he noticed ice accumulation on the wing and landing gear and advised controllers that he wanted to divert the flight. He stated that heavier ice accumulation came on quickly and obscured his vision through the windshield.
The pilot diverted to Lakeland Airport/Noble F. Lee Memorial Field (ARV), near Woodruff, Wisconsin. He circled ARV in preparation for landing, but the weather conditions at ARV deteriorated to instrument meteorological conditions. He then advised controllers that he was proceeding south to reach visual meteorological conditions. He opted to land at GRB and received approach guidance from GRB approach controllers. He stated that when 30 ft above the runway, he applied flaps for landing, the airplane stalled, and a hard landing occurred.
Radar track data for the final portion of the accident flight showed the airplane made a left turn near Manitowish Waters, Wisconsin, and proceeded on a south-southeast heading toward ARV at an altitude about 2,700 ft. above mean sea level (msl). The airplane maneuvered near ARV, at altitudes varying from 3,000 ft. msl to 1,900 ft. msl, for about 45 minutes before proceeding south. The airplane ultimately turned east toward GRB before making an approach to runway 18 at GRB.
Current Icing Potential (CIP) product information for the area where the pilot reported the icing encounter showed no icing at 3,000 ft. msl. The one-hour Forecast Icing Potential (FIP) icing forecast, valid at 0700 and applicable to 3,000 ft. msl, showed the icing severity as trace ice, an icing probability of about 10%, with the supercooled liquid drop potential as unknown.
For the same location and time, but at a higher altitude of 5,000 ft. msl, the CIP icing severity was light to moderate, the icing probability was 40-50%, with the supercooled liquid drop threat was unknown. The one-hour FIP icing forecast, valid at 0700 and applicable to 5,000 ft. msl, showed the icing severity as light, an icing probability of about 30%, with the supercooled liquid drop potential as unknown.
An Area Forecast that included the state of Wisconsin, Lake Superior and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan was issued at 0445. With regard to the approximate location of the accident aircraft's initial icing encounter: the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the northwestern portion of Wisconsin forecasted overcast clouds at 3,000 ft msl with cloud tops to 25,000 ft., visibility of three statute miles, light snow; the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the northeastern portion of Wisconsin forecasted overcast clouds at 6,000 ft. msl with cloud tops to 27,000 ft., broken clouds at 2,500 ft. msl beginning at 0700; the portion of the Area Forecast directed toward the western portion of Lake Superior and Upper Peninsula of Michigan forecasted overcast clouds at 2,000 ft. msl with cloud tops to 25,000 ft., visibility of three statute miles, scattered light snow showers.
Pilot Information
Certificate: Private
Age: 57, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used:
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed:
Medical Certification: Unknown
Last FAA Medical Exam:
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
Flight Time: 970 hours (Total, all aircraft)
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Manufacturer: Cessna
Registration: C-GTBI
Model/Series: 182T T
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2005
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 18281667
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 4
Date/Type of Last Inspection: Unknown
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3100 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time:
Engine Manufacturer: Lycoming
ELT:
Engine Model/Series: IO-540-AB1A5
Registered Owner: On file
Rated Power: 230 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: GRB
Observation Time: 1553 UTC
Distance from Accident Site: 0 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 0°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Temperature/Dew Point: -7°C / -11°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility: 10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 3 knots, 270°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting: 29.82 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: MARQUETTE, MI (SAW)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: VFR
Destination: INTERNATIONAL FALLS, MN (INL)
Type of Clearance: VFR
Departure Time:
Type of Airspace: Class C
Airport Information
Airport: GREEN BAY-AUSTIN STRAUBEL INTL (GRB)
Runway Surface Type: Concrete
Airport Elevation: 694 ft
Runway Surface Condition:
Runway Used: 18
IFR Approach: ASR
Runway Length/Width: 8699 ft / 150 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Full Stop; Precautionary Landing; Straight-in
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries: 1 None
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 None
Latitude, Longitude: 44.484722, -88.129722
Saturday, February 15, 2014
Cirrus SR22, ZBA LLC, N18DN: Accident occurred February 14, 2014 in Gunnison, Colorado
http://registry.faa.gov/N18DN
NTSB Identification: CEN14IA139
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Incident occurred Friday, February 14, 2014 in Gunnison, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/12/2015
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N18DN
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators used data provided by various sources and may not have traveled in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft incident report.
About 90 minutes before the flight, the pilot received a preflight weather briefing, which included an advisory for moderate icing between the freezing level (expected to be at or below 10,000 ft mean sea level [msl]) and 22,000 ft msl. The pilot reported that the airplane encountered instrument meteorological conditions with light icing accumulation about 45 minutes into the flight. The pilot advised an air traffic controller of the situation when the airplane was operating about 15,900 ft msl; however, before he had decided on an alternate route of flight, the icing conditions worsened, and the airplane was unable to maintain altitude. The controller noted that this was the first icing report in that vicinity although there had been earlier reports of light to moderate icing about 50 miles west of the airplane's position. Unsure of the height of the cloud bases in relation to the mountainous terrain below the airplane’s flightpath, the pilot chose to deploy the parachute system. The airplane impacted a mountainside in about 10 ft of snow at an elevation of 11,000 ft msl. The pilot reported no preincident failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Available weather data at the time of the accident indicated that the freezing level was about 10,000 ft msl with clouds tops about 18,000 ft msl around the incident site.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
The pilot's improper decision to initiate the flight into an area with forecast icing conditions, which resulted in an encounter with in-flight icing conditions that prevented the airplane from being able to maintain altitude.
On February 14, 2014, at 1423 mountain standard time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR-22 airplane, N18DN, sustained minor damage when it impacted terrain following an intentional airframe parachute deployment near Gunnison, Colorado. The pilot reported that the airplane had encountered structural icing during cruise flight at 16,000 feet mean sea level (msl) that ultimately prevented the airplane from maintaining altitude. The pilot subsequently activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and the airplane landed in mountainous terrain about 24 miles north-northeast of Gunnison, Colorado. The pilot was not injured. The airplane was registered to ZBA LLC and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from the Centennial Airport (APA), Denver, Colorado at 1345. The intended destination was the Colorado City Municipal Airport (AZC), Colorado City, Arizona.
The pilot reported that he had departed under clear sky conditions with no precipitation or icing forecast. About 45 minutes into the flight, he encountered instrument meteorological conditions with light icing accumulation. He advised the air traffic controller of the situation; however, before he had decided on an alternate route of flight, the icing conditions worsened. The pilot stated that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude. Unsure of the height of the cloud bases in relation to the mountainous terrain below his flight path, he elected to deploy the CAPS. The airplane ultimately landed on a mountain side in about 10 feet of snow at an elevation of approximately 11,000 feet.
Radar track data depicted the airplane on a west-southwest course at 15,900 feet msl until 1423:49 (hhmm:ss). The final radar data point was recorded at 1423:51, with an associated altitude of 15,400 feet msl. A review of air traffic control communications revealed that the pilot initially informed the controller of light icing conditions at 1421:07. The controller noted that this was the first icing report in that vicinity; although there had been earlier reports of light to moderate icing about 50 miles west of the airplane's position. The pilot declared an emergency at 1423:52, and 13 seconds later he advised that he had "pulled the parachute." He subsequently informed the controller that he had "lost control." No further communications were received from the pilot.
The pilot reported that there were no failures or malfunctions associated with the airplane prior to the incident. A postaccident examination revealed minor damage to the landing gear, engine cowling, and right wingtip. Effects on the airframe due to CAPS deployment alone consisted of minor damage.
The closest weather reporting facility was at the Aspen-Pitkin County Airport (ASE), located about 19 miles north of the incident site at an elevation of 7,838 feet. At 1453, the recorded weather conditions included: wind from 360 degrees at 11 knots, visibility 10 miles, and overcast cloud ceiling at 5,000 feet above ground level (agl).
Conditions at the Gunnison-Crested Butte Regional Airport (GUC), located about 24 miles south of the incident site at an elevation of 7,680 feet, recorded at 1435, included: variable wind from 200 degrees to 260 degrees at 11 knots, gusting to 14 knots; broken cloud ceiling at 4,600 feet agl, with an overcast cloud layer at 5,000 feet agl.
Infrared satellite imagery depicted cloud temperatures in the vicinity of the incident site of -16 degrees Celsius, which corresponded to cloud tops at about 18,000 feet msl. Visible satellite imagery data depicted stratiform clouds obscuring the incident site. A review of individual images surrounding the incident time depicted little movement in the cloud cover over the region, which was consistent with altocumulus standing lenticular clouds associated with mountain wave activity. This corresponds with the wave information contained in the sounding data.
An upper air sounding from the National Weather Service site at Grand Junction (GJT), Colorado, located about 84 miles west of the incident site and taken at 1700, identified the freezing level to be about 9,720 feet mean sea level (msl). A predominant mountain wave was identified at 14,480 feet msl, which is consistent with enhanced icing potential in the atmospheric layer. Atmospheric modeling obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Air Resources Laboratory (ARL) suggested the freezing level at 10,900 feet msl, with icing through 14,500 feet msl. The model wind and temperature profiles also expected mountain wave conditions, with stable atmosphere and strong wind at the ridge level.
Airman's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisories warning of IFR conditions, turbulence, and icing conditions were issued by the NWS at 1345. The incident site was included within the boundaries of each of the advisories. AIRMET Zulu, Update 7, valid until 2000, warned of moderate icing conditions from the freezing level to 22,000 feet msl.
Four pilot reports indicating light rime and mixed icing conditions in the vicinity of Aspen, Colorado, were received between 1330 and 1439. The associated altitudes ranged from 15,000 feet msl to 18,500 feet msl. One additional pilot report was received at 1507 (after the incident) indicating the presence of moderate rime icing at 12,000 feet about 15 miles west-southwest of ASE.
The pilot received a preflight weather briefing and filed a flight plan using the ForeFlight application about 1251. The weather briefing included AIRMET Zulu, Update 6, issued at 1235, warning of moderate icing between the freezing level and 22,000 feet. The freezing level was expected to be at or below 10,000 feet msl within the advisory area. The icing conditions were expected to continue through 2000. The briefing information did not include any pilot reports related to icing conditions.
NTSB Identification: CEN14LA139
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, February 14, 2014 in Gunnison, CO
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N18DN
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On February 14, 2014, about 1423 mountain standard time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR-22 airplane, N18DN, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain following an intentional airframe parachute deployment near Gunnison, Colorado. The pilot reported that the airplane had encountered structural icing during cruise flight at 16,000 feet mean sea level (msl) that ultimately prevented the airplane from maintaining altitude. The pilot subsequently activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and the airplane landed in mountainous terrain about 24 miles north-northeast of Gunnison, Colorado. The pilot was not injured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to ZBA LLC and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from the Centennial Airport (APA), Denver, Colorado at 1345. The intended destination was the
Colorado City Municipal Airport (AZC), Colorado City, Arizona.
GUNNISON, Colo. - A pilot flying from the Denver area to Arizona was forced to deploy his plane's parachute system when the aircraft encountered light icing northeast of Gunnison, Colo., Friday afternoon.
The pilot issued a mayday distress call before his plane went down.
The single-engine Cirrus SR22 landed by parachute about 21 miles northeast of Gunnison, according to Ian Gregor, Public Affairs Manager of the FAA's Pacific Division.
The plane was substantially damaged but the pilot was not injured, Gregor said.
The unidentified pilot was flying from Centennial Airport to Colorado City Municipal Airport in Colorado City, Ariz.
The FAA and NTSB will investigate this accident. NTSB is the lead investigative agency, Gregor said.
NTSB Identification: CEN14IA139
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Incident occurred Friday, February 14, 2014 in Gunnison, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/12/2015
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N18DN
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators used data provided by various sources and may not have traveled in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft incident report.
About 90 minutes before the flight, the pilot received a preflight weather briefing, which included an advisory for moderate icing between the freezing level (expected to be at or below 10,000 ft mean sea level [msl]) and 22,000 ft msl. The pilot reported that the airplane encountered instrument meteorological conditions with light icing accumulation about 45 minutes into the flight. The pilot advised an air traffic controller of the situation when the airplane was operating about 15,900 ft msl; however, before he had decided on an alternate route of flight, the icing conditions worsened, and the airplane was unable to maintain altitude. The controller noted that this was the first icing report in that vicinity although there had been earlier reports of light to moderate icing about 50 miles west of the airplane's position. Unsure of the height of the cloud bases in relation to the mountainous terrain below the airplane’s flightpath, the pilot chose to deploy the parachute system. The airplane impacted a mountainside in about 10 ft of snow at an elevation of 11,000 ft msl. The pilot reported no preincident failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Available weather data at the time of the accident indicated that the freezing level was about 10,000 ft msl with clouds tops about 18,000 ft msl around the incident site.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
The pilot's improper decision to initiate the flight into an area with forecast icing conditions, which resulted in an encounter with in-flight icing conditions that prevented the airplane from being able to maintain altitude.
On February 14, 2014, at 1423 mountain standard time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR-22 airplane, N18DN, sustained minor damage when it impacted terrain following an intentional airframe parachute deployment near Gunnison, Colorado. The pilot reported that the airplane had encountered structural icing during cruise flight at 16,000 feet mean sea level (msl) that ultimately prevented the airplane from maintaining altitude. The pilot subsequently activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and the airplane landed in mountainous terrain about 24 miles north-northeast of Gunnison, Colorado. The pilot was not injured. The airplane was registered to ZBA LLC and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from the Centennial Airport (APA), Denver, Colorado at 1345. The intended destination was the Colorado City Municipal Airport (AZC), Colorado City, Arizona.
The pilot reported that he had departed under clear sky conditions with no precipitation or icing forecast. About 45 minutes into the flight, he encountered instrument meteorological conditions with light icing accumulation. He advised the air traffic controller of the situation; however, before he had decided on an alternate route of flight, the icing conditions worsened. The pilot stated that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude. Unsure of the height of the cloud bases in relation to the mountainous terrain below his flight path, he elected to deploy the CAPS. The airplane ultimately landed on a mountain side in about 10 feet of snow at an elevation of approximately 11,000 feet.
Radar track data depicted the airplane on a west-southwest course at 15,900 feet msl until 1423:49 (hhmm:ss). The final radar data point was recorded at 1423:51, with an associated altitude of 15,400 feet msl. A review of air traffic control communications revealed that the pilot initially informed the controller of light icing conditions at 1421:07. The controller noted that this was the first icing report in that vicinity; although there had been earlier reports of light to moderate icing about 50 miles west of the airplane's position. The pilot declared an emergency at 1423:52, and 13 seconds later he advised that he had "pulled the parachute." He subsequently informed the controller that he had "lost control." No further communications were received from the pilot.
The pilot reported that there were no failures or malfunctions associated with the airplane prior to the incident. A postaccident examination revealed minor damage to the landing gear, engine cowling, and right wingtip. Effects on the airframe due to CAPS deployment alone consisted of minor damage.
The closest weather reporting facility was at the Aspen-Pitkin County Airport (ASE), located about 19 miles north of the incident site at an elevation of 7,838 feet. At 1453, the recorded weather conditions included: wind from 360 degrees at 11 knots, visibility 10 miles, and overcast cloud ceiling at 5,000 feet above ground level (agl).
Conditions at the Gunnison-Crested Butte Regional Airport (GUC), located about 24 miles south of the incident site at an elevation of 7,680 feet, recorded at 1435, included: variable wind from 200 degrees to 260 degrees at 11 knots, gusting to 14 knots; broken cloud ceiling at 4,600 feet agl, with an overcast cloud layer at 5,000 feet agl.
Infrared satellite imagery depicted cloud temperatures in the vicinity of the incident site of -16 degrees Celsius, which corresponded to cloud tops at about 18,000 feet msl. Visible satellite imagery data depicted stratiform clouds obscuring the incident site. A review of individual images surrounding the incident time depicted little movement in the cloud cover over the region, which was consistent with altocumulus standing lenticular clouds associated with mountain wave activity. This corresponds with the wave information contained in the sounding data.
An upper air sounding from the National Weather Service site at Grand Junction (GJT), Colorado, located about 84 miles west of the incident site and taken at 1700, identified the freezing level to be about 9,720 feet mean sea level (msl). A predominant mountain wave was identified at 14,480 feet msl, which is consistent with enhanced icing potential in the atmospheric layer. Atmospheric modeling obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Air Resources Laboratory (ARL) suggested the freezing level at 10,900 feet msl, with icing through 14,500 feet msl. The model wind and temperature profiles also expected mountain wave conditions, with stable atmosphere and strong wind at the ridge level.
Airman's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisories warning of IFR conditions, turbulence, and icing conditions were issued by the NWS at 1345. The incident site was included within the boundaries of each of the advisories. AIRMET Zulu, Update 7, valid until 2000, warned of moderate icing conditions from the freezing level to 22,000 feet msl.
Four pilot reports indicating light rime and mixed icing conditions in the vicinity of Aspen, Colorado, were received between 1330 and 1439. The associated altitudes ranged from 15,000 feet msl to 18,500 feet msl. One additional pilot report was received at 1507 (after the incident) indicating the presence of moderate rime icing at 12,000 feet about 15 miles west-southwest of ASE.
The pilot received a preflight weather briefing and filed a flight plan using the ForeFlight application about 1251. The weather briefing included AIRMET Zulu, Update 6, issued at 1235, warning of moderate icing between the freezing level and 22,000 feet. The freezing level was expected to be at or below 10,000 feet msl within the advisory area. The icing conditions were expected to continue through 2000. The briefing information did not include any pilot reports related to icing conditions.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, February 14, 2014 in Gunnison, CO
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N18DN
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On February 14, 2014, about 1423 mountain standard time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR-22 airplane, N18DN, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain following an intentional airframe parachute deployment near Gunnison, Colorado. The pilot reported that the airplane had encountered structural icing during cruise flight at 16,000 feet mean sea level (msl) that ultimately prevented the airplane from maintaining altitude. The pilot subsequently activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and the airplane landed in mountainous terrain about 24 miles north-northeast of Gunnison, Colorado. The pilot was not injured. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to ZBA LLC and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from the Centennial Airport (APA), Denver, Colorado at 1345. The intended destination was the
Colorado City Municipal Airport (AZC), Colorado City, Arizona.
GUNNISON, Colo. - A pilot flying from the Denver area to Arizona was forced to deploy his plane's parachute system when the aircraft encountered light icing northeast of Gunnison, Colo., Friday afternoon.
The pilot issued a mayday distress call before his plane went down.
The single-engine Cirrus SR22 landed by parachute about 21 miles northeast of Gunnison, according to Ian Gregor, Public Affairs Manager of the FAA's Pacific Division.
The plane was substantially damaged but the pilot was not injured, Gregor said.
The unidentified pilot was flying from Centennial Airport to Colorado City Municipal Airport in Colorado City, Ariz.
The FAA and NTSB will investigate this accident. NTSB is the lead investigative agency, Gregor said.
Saturday, December 03, 2011
Loss of Control in Flight: Beechcraft F90 King Air, N90QL; accident occurred December 02, 2011 in Midland, Texas
Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Lubbock, Texas
Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board:
Location: Midland, Texas
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On December 2, 2011, about 0810 central standard time, a Beech F90, N90QL, collided with terrain while on an instrument approach to the Midland Airpark (MDD), near Midland, Texas. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by Quality Lease Air Services LLC., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the cross-country flight. The flight originated from the Wharton Regional Airport (ARM), Wharton, Texas, about 0626.
The pilot obtained a weather briefing for the flight to MDD. The briefing forecasted light freezing drizzle for the proposed time and route of flight.
While on approach to MDD, the airplane was experiencing an accumulation of moderate to severe icing and the pilot stated that he had all the deicing equipment on. According to the pilot, the autopilot was flying the airplane to a navigational fix called JIBEM. He switched the autopilot to heading mode and flew to the final approach fix called WAVOK. He deployed the deice boots twice before approaching WAVOK.
An Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) controller informed the pilot, that according to radar, he appeared to be flying to JIBEM. The pilot responded that he was correcting back and there was something wrong with the GPS. The controller canceled the airplane's approach clearance and the controller issued the pilot a turning and climbing clearance to fly for another approach. The pilot stated that his copilot's window iced up at that point.
The pilot was vectored for and was cleared for another approach attempt. The pilot said that his window was "halfway iced up." About two minutes after being cleared for the second approach, the controller advised the pilot that the airplane appeared to be "about a half mile south of the course." The pilot responded, "Yep ya uh I got it." The pilot was given heading and climb instructions in case of a missed approach and was subsequently cleared to change to an advisory frequency. The pilot responded with, "Good day."
The pilot had configured the aircraft with approach flaps and extended the landing gear prior to reaching the final approach fix. The pilot stated the aircraft remained in this configuration and he did not retract the gear and flaps.
The pilot stated that he descended to 3,300 feet and was just under the cloud deck where he was looking for the runway. The pilot's accident report, in part, said:
Everything was flying smooth until I accelerated throttles from about halfway to about three quarters. At this point I lost roll control and the airplane rolled approximately 90 degrees to the left. I disengaged autopilot and began to turn the yoke to the right and holding steady. It was slow to respond and when I thought that I had it leveled off the airplane continued to roll approximately 90 degrees to the right. At this time I was turning the yoke back to the left and pulling back to level it off, but it continued to roll to the left again. I was turning the yoke to the right again as I continued to pull back and the airplane rolled level, and the stall warning horn came on seconds before impact on the ground.
The pilot stated he maintained a target airspeed speed of 120 knots on approach and 100 knots while on final approach. He stated he was close to 80 knots when the aircraft was in the 90-degree right bank.
Witnesses in the area observed the airplane flying. A witness stated that the airplane's wings were "rocking." Other witnesses indicated that the airplane banked to the left and then nosed down. The airplane impacted a residential house, approximately 1 mile from the approach end of runway 25, and a postcrash fire ensued. The pilot was able to exit the airplane and there were no reported ground injuries.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The 53-year old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with instrument airplane and airplane single and multi-engine land ratings. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate was issued on August 3, 2011, with limitations for corrective lenses. The pilot reported having accrued 4,600 hours of total flight time and 25 hours of flight time in the same make and model as the accident airplane. He also reported that he had accumulated 224 hours of total flight time in actual instrument weather conditions and 5 hours of flight time in actual instrument weather conditions in the 90 days prior to the accident
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
N90QL was a 1979 Beech, King Air, F90, twin-engine, T-tailed, seven-seat airplane with serial number LA-2. On June 6, 2011, the airplane received a phase three and four inspection. An airplane logbook entry in reference to that inspection showed that the Hobbs meter indicated 8,253 hours and the airplane's total time was the same. Two Pratt and Whitney Canada model PT6A-135 engines powered the airplane. Each engine drove their respective four-bladed Hartzell propeller. The airplane had two exits (viewed from the aft looking forward): the air stair door in the aft cabin on the left, and the overwing emergency exit on the right. The pilot reported that the airplane's maximum gross weight was 10,950 pounds and that the weight of the airplane at the time of the accident was 10,000 pounds.
The airplane's maximum flap extension speed for the approach flap position was 184 knots indicated airspeed (IAS). The airplane's maximum landing gear extended speed was 184 knots IAS. According to the airplane's "Stall Speeds - Power Idle" chart, the calculated stall speed for the airplane weighing 10,000 pounds with approach flaps extended was about 81 knots IAS at zero degrees of bank and was about 114 knots IAS at 60 degrees of bank.
The airplane's pilot operating handbook (POH) limitations section, in part, stated:
ICING LIMITATIONS...
Minimum Airspeed for Sustained Icing Flight...140 knots
Sustained flight in icing conditions with flaps extended is
prohibited except for approach and landings. ...
LIMITATIONS WHEN ENCOUNTERING SEVERE ICING CONDITIONS (Required By FAA AD 98-04-24)
WARNING
Severe icing may result from environmental conditions outside of those for which the airplane is certificated. Flight in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, or mixed icing conditions (supercooled liquid water and ice crystals) may result in ice build-up on protected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system, or may result in ice forming aft of the protected surfaces. This ice may not be shed using the ice protections systems, and may seriously degrade the performance and controllability of the airplane.
1. During flight, severe icing conditions that exceed those for which the airplane is certificated shall be determined by the following visual cues. If one or more of these visual cues exists, immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the icing conditions.
a. Unusually extensive ice accumulation of the airframe and windshield in areas not normally observed to collect ice.
b. Accumulation of ice on the upper surface of the wing, aft of the protected area.
c. Accumulation of ice on the engine nacelles and propeller spinners farther aft than normally observed.
2. Since the autopilot, when installed and operating, may mask tactile cues that indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics, use of the autopilot is prohibited when any of the visual cues specified above exist, or when unusual lateral trim requirements or autopilot trim warnings are encountered while the airplane is in icing conditions.
3. All wing icing inspection lights must be operative prior to flight into known or forecast icing conditions at night. [NOTE: This supersedes any relief provided by the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL).]
The airplane's POH normal procedures section, in part, stated: This airplane is approved for flight in icing conditions as defined in FAR 25, Appendix C. These conditions do not include, nor were tests conducted in, all conditions that may be encountered (e.g., freezing rain, freezing drizzle, mixed conditions, or conditions defined as severe). Some icing conditions not defined in FAR 25 have the potential of producing hazardous ice accumulations, which: 1) exceed the capabilities of the airplane's ice protection equipment; and/or 2) create unacceptable airplane performance. Flight into icing conditions which lie outside the FAR-defined conditions is not prohibited; however, pilots must be prepared to divert the flight promptly if hazardous ice accumulations occur.
WARNING
Due to distortion of the wing airfoil, ice accumulations on the leading edges can cause a significant loss in rate of climb and in speed performance, as well as increases in stall speed. Even after cycling deicing boots, the ice accumulation remaining on the boots and unprotected areas of the airplane can cause large performance losses. For the same reason, the aural stall warning system may not be accurate and should not be relied upon. Maintain a comfortable margin of airspeed above the normal stall airspeed. In order to minimize ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces of the wing, maintain a minimum of 140 knots during operations in sustained [deicing] conditions. ... Prior to a landing approach, cycle the deicing boots to shed any accumulated ice.
The airplane's POH emergency procedures section, in part, stated:
THE FOLLOWING WEATHER CONDITIONS MAY BE CONDUCIVE TO SEVERE IN-FLIGHT ICING:
Visible rain at temperatures below 0 degrees Celsius ambient air temperature.
Droplets that splash or splatter on impact at temperatures below 0 degrees Celsius ambient air temperature.
PROCEDURES FOR EXITING THE SEVERE ICING ENVIRONMENT:
These procedures are applicable to all flight phases from takeoff to landing. Monitor the ambient air temperature.
While severe icing may form at temperatures as cold as -18 degrees Celsius, increased vigilance is warranted at temperatures around freezing with visible moisture present.
If the visual cues specified in the Limitations Section for identifying severe icing conditions are observed, accomplish the following:
1. Immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the severe icing conditions in order to avoid extended exposure to flight conditions more severe than those for which the airplane has been certificated.
2. Avoid abrupt and excessive maneuvering that may exacerbate control difficulties.
3. Do not engage the autopilot.
4. If the autopilot is engaged, hold the control wheel firmly and disengage the autopilot.
5. If an unusual roll response or uncommanded roll control movement is observed, reduce the angle-of-attack.
6. Do not extend flaps when holding in icing conditions. Operation with flaps extended can result in a reduced wing angle-of-attack, with the possibility of ice forming on the upper surface further aft on the wing than normal, possibly aft of the protected area.
7. If the flaps are extended, do not retract them until the airframe is clear of ice.
8. Report these weather conditions to Air Traffic Control.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
A National Transportation Safety Board senior meteorologist produced a meteorology factual report. The report, in part, showed that at 0815, the automated weather observing system at MDD, reported wind from 030 degrees at 9 knots, visibility 1 and 3/4 statute miles, present weather mist, scattered clouds at 300 feet, overcast at 800 feet, temperature 1 degree C, dew point 1 degrees C, and a barometric pressure setting of 30.31 inches of mercury. Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) Sierra was issued as an advisory for IFR conditions and AIRMET Tango issued as an advisory for moderate turbulence below 8,000 feet over the route of flight to include the destination. AIRMET Zulu was issued indicating the possibility for moderate icing between the freezing level and 9,000 feet current for northwestern Texas.
AIRMET Zulu's boundary did not extend over the destination. The 0600 Midland upper air sounding observation was plotted by the senior meteorologist. The plotted sounding depicted a moist low-level environment with the relative humidity greater than 80 percent from the surface through 10,000 feet and supported low nimbus type clouds with light precipitation; with precipitable water value was 0.46 inches. The freezing level was identified at 451 feet above ground level with a defined temperature inversion associated with the frontal zone south of the area at 6,576 feet above mean sea level (MSL), where temperatures rose above freezing again between 6,000 and 9,000 feet. Severe icing warnings were not found in any published advisories for the destination area. The meteorology factual report is appended to the docket associated with this investigation.
AIDS TO NAVIGATION
Three instrument approach procedures (IAPs) were published for use at MDD. These included:
RNAV (GPS) RWY 25
RNAV (GPS) RWY 34
VOR/DME RWY 25
VOR-A
The RNAV approach to runway 25 at MDD included an inbound course of 248 degrees. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) was 3,220 feet MSL. The weather minimums for the RNAV (GPS) runway 25 approach were a MDA of 500-feet and 1-mile visibility for the straight-in approach. The approach plate is appended to the docket material associated with the case.
COMMUNICATIONS
The pilot was under radar and radio contact with Midland ATCT, Approach Control and he initially reported on that approach control frequency, about 0749, that the airplane was descending to 8,000 feet. About 0750, the controller gave the pilot a clearance to descend to 6,000 feet and proceed direct to the initial approach fix named CIRIT. About 0751, another airplane reported that there was light clear icing at 5,000 feet and the accident pilot affirmed that he copied the icing report. The controller indicated that the pilot could remain at 7,000 feet if the pilot wanted. About 0755, the controller issued an approach clearance for the RNAV runway 25 approach. About 0758, the controller inquired if the pilot was heading to a fix named JIBEM and the pilot confirmed and indicated that he was correcting back. About 0800, the controller canceled the approach clearance. The pilot was vectored at 4,500 feet for a second approach and about 0804, the controller issued another approach clearance to the pilot for the RNAV runway 25 approach. About 0806, the controller advised the pilot that he appeared to be off course and the pilot acknowledged the advisement. About 0807, the controller gave the pilot an approval to change to an advisory frequency, which was acknowledged by the pilot. No further communications with the pilot were recorded on the approach frequency. A transcript of the approach frequency communications associated with the flight is appended to the docket material associated with the case.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
MDD is a public, non-towered airport located about 3 miles north of Midland, Texas, and it has a surveyed elevation of 2,803 feet MSL. The airport is serviced by two asphalt runways, Runway 16/34 and 7/25.
Runway 7/25 was 5,022 foot by 75-foot asphalt runway, which had non-precision runway markings. The runway was equipped with a 4-light, 3-degree glide path, vertical approach slope indicator.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane crashed into a house in a residential area, located northeast of the intersection of Trevino Street and Casper Court, Midland, Texas. A post-impact ground fire occurred. The fire melted the icing that the airplane had collected during the flight and the fire consumed the majority of the airplane.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
The pilot was accustomed to flying a 1974 Beech, King Air, E90, twin-engine, conventional-tailed airplane. According to the pilot, the avionics installed in both the F90 and E90 were different. The F90 had conventional avionics with a HSI and the E90 had Avidyne avionics installed. The F90 had a different type autopilot installed than the S-TEC autopilot, which was installed in the E90.
During an interview with a FAA inspector, the pilot stated that he believed the loss of control was "primarily due to ice."
Accident Number: CEN12LA095
Date & Time: December 2, 2011, 08:10 Local
Registration: N90QL
Aircraft: Beech F90
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Loss of control in flight
Injuries: 1 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Positioning
Analysis
The pilot obtained a weather briefing for the flight, during which light freezing drizzle was forecast for the proposed time and route. However, no advisories, either before or during the flight, were issued for the potential of hazardous icing conditions.
The pilot stated that he had all of the airplane's deicing equipment on; however, the airplane accumulated moderate to severe airframe icing. The airplane was cleared for a GPS approach to the airport, and the pilot reported that he used the autopilot to fly the airplane to a navigational fix. An air traffic controller saw that the airplane was off course and subsequently canceled the flight's approach clearance. The copilot's window iced up. The flight was then cleared for another approach attempt, during which the pilot's window became "halfway iced up." The controller advised that the airplane appeared to be "about a half mile south of the course" for runway 25. The pilot configured the airplane with approach flaps and extended the landing gear before the final approach fix. The airplane descended under the cloud deck, and the pilot began to look for the runway. The pilot stated when he advanced the throttles, the airplane rolled about 90 degrees to the left. He disengaged the autopilot and attempted to use the yoke to level the airplane. The airplane then rolled about 90 degrees to the right. The pilot was unable to regain airplane control, and the stall warning horn came on seconds before the airplane impacted the ground. The pilot stated that he believed the loss of control was "primarily due to ice."
The pilot stated that he maintained a target airspeed of 120 knots on approach, 100 knots "close to the ground," and was close to 80 knots when the airplane was in the 90-degree right bank. The airplane's recommended minimum airspeed for sustained flight in icing was 140 knots. The airplane's pilot operating handbook (POH) advises pilots to immediately request priority handling from air traffic control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the icing conditions. Additionally, the handbook cautions the pilot that autopilot usage masks tactile cues, which indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics, and that use of the autopilot is prohibited when any specified visual cues exist in icing conditions.
While the National Weather Service (NWS) issued an icing advisory over an area bordering the destination to the north, no NWS icing advisory extended over the area where the accident occurred. While the pilot would have been aware of potential icing from his weather briefings, he may not have expected the hazard due to the absence of an icing advisory over his route. If the pilot relied upon the graphic presentation provided in the icing advisory, which did not extend to his intended route, he may have been led to believe that he could accomplish the flight safely.
The pilot stated that he had all of the airplane's deicing equipment on; however, the airplane accumulated moderate to severe airframe icing. The airplane was cleared for a GPS approach to the airport, and the pilot reported that he used the autopilot to fly the airplane to a navigational fix. An air traffic controller saw that the airplane was off course and subsequently canceled the flight's approach clearance. The copilot's window iced up. The flight was then cleared for another approach attempt, during which the pilot's window became "halfway iced up." The controller advised that the airplane appeared to be "about a half mile south of the course" for runway 25. The pilot configured the airplane with approach flaps and extended the landing gear before the final approach fix. The airplane descended under the cloud deck, and the pilot began to look for the runway. The pilot stated when he advanced the throttles, the airplane rolled about 90 degrees to the left. He disengaged the autopilot and attempted to use the yoke to level the airplane. The airplane then rolled about 90 degrees to the right. The pilot was unable to regain airplane control, and the stall warning horn came on seconds before the airplane impacted the ground. The pilot stated that he believed the loss of control was "primarily due to ice."
The pilot stated that he maintained a target airspeed of 120 knots on approach, 100 knots "close to the ground," and was close to 80 knots when the airplane was in the 90-degree right bank. The airplane's recommended minimum airspeed for sustained flight in icing was 140 knots. The airplane's pilot operating handbook (POH) advises pilots to immediately request priority handling from air traffic control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the icing conditions. Additionally, the handbook cautions the pilot that autopilot usage masks tactile cues, which indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics, and that use of the autopilot is prohibited when any specified visual cues exist in icing conditions.
While the National Weather Service (NWS) issued an icing advisory over an area bordering the destination to the north, no NWS icing advisory extended over the area where the accident occurred. While the pilot would have been aware of potential icing from his weather briefings, he may not have expected the hazard due to the absence of an icing advisory over his route. If the pilot relied upon the graphic presentation provided in the icing advisory, which did not extend to his intended route, he may have been led to believe that he could accomplish the flight safely.
Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to maintain the recommended airspeed for icing conditions and his subsequent loss of airplane control while flying the airplane under autopilot control in severe icing conditions, contrary to the airplane's handbook. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to divert from an area of severe icing. Also contributing to the accident was the lack of an advisory for potential hazardous icing conditions over the destination area.
Findings
Aircraft (general) - Incorrect use/operation
Personnel issues Use of automation - Pilot
Personnel issues Incorrect action selection - Pilot
Environmental issues (general) - Contributed to outcome
Organizational issues Between groups/organizations - Meteorological service
Factual Information
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On December 2, 2011, about 0810 central standard time, a Beech F90, N90QL, collided with terrain while on an instrument approach to the Midland Airpark (MDD), near Midland, Texas. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by Quality Lease Air Services LLC., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the cross-country flight. The flight originated from the Wharton Regional Airport (ARM), Wharton, Texas, about 0626.
The pilot obtained a weather briefing for the flight to MDD. The briefing forecasted light freezing drizzle for the proposed time and route of flight.
While on approach to MDD, the airplane was experiencing an accumulation of moderate to severe icing and the pilot stated that he had all the deicing equipment on. According to the pilot, the autopilot was flying the airplane to a navigational fix called JIBEM. He switched the autopilot to heading mode and flew to the final approach fix called WAVOK. He deployed the deice boots twice before approaching WAVOK.
An Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) controller informed the pilot, that according to radar, he appeared to be flying to JIBEM. The pilot responded that he was correcting back and there was something wrong with the GPS. The controller canceled the airplane's approach clearance and the controller issued the pilot a turning and climbing clearance to fly for another approach. The pilot stated that his copilot's window iced up at that point.
The pilot was vectored for and was cleared for another approach attempt. The pilot said that his window was "halfway iced up." About two minutes after being cleared for the second approach, the controller advised the pilot that the airplane appeared to be "about a half mile south of the course." The pilot responded, "Yep ya uh I got it." The pilot was given heading and climb instructions in case of a missed approach and was subsequently cleared to change to an advisory frequency. The pilot responded with, "Good day."
The pilot had configured the aircraft with approach flaps and extended the landing gear prior to reaching the final approach fix. The pilot stated the aircraft remained in this configuration and he did not retract the gear and flaps.
The pilot stated that he descended to 3,300 feet and was just under the cloud deck where he was looking for the runway. The pilot's accident report, in part, said:
Everything was flying smooth until I accelerated throttles from about halfway to about three quarters. At this point I lost roll control and the airplane rolled approximately 90 degrees to the left. I disengaged autopilot and began to turn the yoke to the right and holding steady. It was slow to respond and when I thought that I had it leveled off the airplane continued to roll approximately 90 degrees to the right. At this time I was turning the yoke back to the left and pulling back to level it off, but it continued to roll to the left again. I was turning the yoke to the right again as I continued to pull back and the airplane rolled level, and the stall warning horn came on seconds before impact on the ground.
The pilot stated he maintained a target airspeed speed of 120 knots on approach and 100 knots while on final approach. He stated he was close to 80 knots when the aircraft was in the 90-degree right bank.
Witnesses in the area observed the airplane flying. A witness stated that the airplane's wings were "rocking." Other witnesses indicated that the airplane banked to the left and then nosed down. The airplane impacted a residential house, approximately 1 mile from the approach end of runway 25, and a postcrash fire ensued. The pilot was able to exit the airplane and there were no reported ground injuries.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The 53-year old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with instrument airplane and airplane single and multi-engine land ratings. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate was issued on August 3, 2011, with limitations for corrective lenses. The pilot reported having accrued 4,600 hours of total flight time and 25 hours of flight time in the same make and model as the accident airplane. He also reported that he had accumulated 224 hours of total flight time in actual instrument weather conditions and 5 hours of flight time in actual instrument weather conditions in the 90 days prior to the accident
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
N90QL was a 1979 Beech, King Air, F90, twin-engine, T-tailed, seven-seat airplane with serial number LA-2. On June 6, 2011, the airplane received a phase three and four inspection. An airplane logbook entry in reference to that inspection showed that the Hobbs meter indicated 8,253 hours and the airplane's total time was the same. Two Pratt and Whitney Canada model PT6A-135 engines powered the airplane. Each engine drove their respective four-bladed Hartzell propeller. The airplane had two exits (viewed from the aft looking forward): the air stair door in the aft cabin on the left, and the overwing emergency exit on the right. The pilot reported that the airplane's maximum gross weight was 10,950 pounds and that the weight of the airplane at the time of the accident was 10,000 pounds.
The airplane's maximum flap extension speed for the approach flap position was 184 knots indicated airspeed (IAS). The airplane's maximum landing gear extended speed was 184 knots IAS. According to the airplane's "Stall Speeds - Power Idle" chart, the calculated stall speed for the airplane weighing 10,000 pounds with approach flaps extended was about 81 knots IAS at zero degrees of bank and was about 114 knots IAS at 60 degrees of bank.
The airplane's pilot operating handbook (POH) limitations section, in part, stated:
ICING LIMITATIONS...
Minimum Airspeed for Sustained Icing Flight...140 knots
Sustained flight in icing conditions with flaps extended is
prohibited except for approach and landings. ...
LIMITATIONS WHEN ENCOUNTERING SEVERE ICING CONDITIONS (Required By FAA AD 98-04-24)
WARNING
Severe icing may result from environmental conditions outside of those for which the airplane is certificated. Flight in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, or mixed icing conditions (supercooled liquid water and ice crystals) may result in ice build-up on protected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system, or may result in ice forming aft of the protected surfaces. This ice may not be shed using the ice protections systems, and may seriously degrade the performance and controllability of the airplane.
1. During flight, severe icing conditions that exceed those for which the airplane is certificated shall be determined by the following visual cues. If one or more of these visual cues exists, immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the icing conditions.
a. Unusually extensive ice accumulation of the airframe and windshield in areas not normally observed to collect ice.
b. Accumulation of ice on the upper surface of the wing, aft of the protected area.
c. Accumulation of ice on the engine nacelles and propeller spinners farther aft than normally observed.
2. Since the autopilot, when installed and operating, may mask tactile cues that indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics, use of the autopilot is prohibited when any of the visual cues specified above exist, or when unusual lateral trim requirements or autopilot trim warnings are encountered while the airplane is in icing conditions.
3. All wing icing inspection lights must be operative prior to flight into known or forecast icing conditions at night. [NOTE: This supersedes any relief provided by the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL).]
The airplane's POH normal procedures section, in part, stated: This airplane is approved for flight in icing conditions as defined in FAR 25, Appendix C. These conditions do not include, nor were tests conducted in, all conditions that may be encountered (e.g., freezing rain, freezing drizzle, mixed conditions, or conditions defined as severe). Some icing conditions not defined in FAR 25 have the potential of producing hazardous ice accumulations, which: 1) exceed the capabilities of the airplane's ice protection equipment; and/or 2) create unacceptable airplane performance. Flight into icing conditions which lie outside the FAR-defined conditions is not prohibited; however, pilots must be prepared to divert the flight promptly if hazardous ice accumulations occur.
WARNING
Due to distortion of the wing airfoil, ice accumulations on the leading edges can cause a significant loss in rate of climb and in speed performance, as well as increases in stall speed. Even after cycling deicing boots, the ice accumulation remaining on the boots and unprotected areas of the airplane can cause large performance losses. For the same reason, the aural stall warning system may not be accurate and should not be relied upon. Maintain a comfortable margin of airspeed above the normal stall airspeed. In order to minimize ice accumulation on unprotected surfaces of the wing, maintain a minimum of 140 knots during operations in sustained [deicing] conditions. ... Prior to a landing approach, cycle the deicing boots to shed any accumulated ice.
The airplane's POH emergency procedures section, in part, stated:
THE FOLLOWING WEATHER CONDITIONS MAY BE CONDUCIVE TO SEVERE IN-FLIGHT ICING:
Visible rain at temperatures below 0 degrees Celsius ambient air temperature.
Droplets that splash or splatter on impact at temperatures below 0 degrees Celsius ambient air temperature.
PROCEDURES FOR EXITING THE SEVERE ICING ENVIRONMENT:
These procedures are applicable to all flight phases from takeoff to landing. Monitor the ambient air temperature.
While severe icing may form at temperatures as cold as -18 degrees Celsius, increased vigilance is warranted at temperatures around freezing with visible moisture present.
If the visual cues specified in the Limitations Section for identifying severe icing conditions are observed, accomplish the following:
1. Immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the severe icing conditions in order to avoid extended exposure to flight conditions more severe than those for which the airplane has been certificated.
2. Avoid abrupt and excessive maneuvering that may exacerbate control difficulties.
3. Do not engage the autopilot.
4. If the autopilot is engaged, hold the control wheel firmly and disengage the autopilot.
5. If an unusual roll response or uncommanded roll control movement is observed, reduce the angle-of-attack.
6. Do not extend flaps when holding in icing conditions. Operation with flaps extended can result in a reduced wing angle-of-attack, with the possibility of ice forming on the upper surface further aft on the wing than normal, possibly aft of the protected area.
7. If the flaps are extended, do not retract them until the airframe is clear of ice.
8. Report these weather conditions to Air Traffic Control.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
A National Transportation Safety Board senior meteorologist produced a meteorology factual report. The report, in part, showed that at 0815, the automated weather observing system at MDD, reported wind from 030 degrees at 9 knots, visibility 1 and 3/4 statute miles, present weather mist, scattered clouds at 300 feet, overcast at 800 feet, temperature 1 degree C, dew point 1 degrees C, and a barometric pressure setting of 30.31 inches of mercury. Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) Sierra was issued as an advisory for IFR conditions and AIRMET Tango issued as an advisory for moderate turbulence below 8,000 feet over the route of flight to include the destination. AIRMET Zulu was issued indicating the possibility for moderate icing between the freezing level and 9,000 feet current for northwestern Texas.
AIRMET Zulu's boundary did not extend over the destination. The 0600 Midland upper air sounding observation was plotted by the senior meteorologist. The plotted sounding depicted a moist low-level environment with the relative humidity greater than 80 percent from the surface through 10,000 feet and supported low nimbus type clouds with light precipitation; with precipitable water value was 0.46 inches. The freezing level was identified at 451 feet above ground level with a defined temperature inversion associated with the frontal zone south of the area at 6,576 feet above mean sea level (MSL), where temperatures rose above freezing again between 6,000 and 9,000 feet. Severe icing warnings were not found in any published advisories for the destination area. The meteorology factual report is appended to the docket associated with this investigation.
AIDS TO NAVIGATION
Three instrument approach procedures (IAPs) were published for use at MDD. These included:
RNAV (GPS) RWY 25
RNAV (GPS) RWY 34
VOR/DME RWY 25
VOR-A
The RNAV approach to runway 25 at MDD included an inbound course of 248 degrees. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) was 3,220 feet MSL. The weather minimums for the RNAV (GPS) runway 25 approach were a MDA of 500-feet and 1-mile visibility for the straight-in approach. The approach plate is appended to the docket material associated with the case.
COMMUNICATIONS
The pilot was under radar and radio contact with Midland ATCT, Approach Control and he initially reported on that approach control frequency, about 0749, that the airplane was descending to 8,000 feet. About 0750, the controller gave the pilot a clearance to descend to 6,000 feet and proceed direct to the initial approach fix named CIRIT. About 0751, another airplane reported that there was light clear icing at 5,000 feet and the accident pilot affirmed that he copied the icing report. The controller indicated that the pilot could remain at 7,000 feet if the pilot wanted. About 0755, the controller issued an approach clearance for the RNAV runway 25 approach. About 0758, the controller inquired if the pilot was heading to a fix named JIBEM and the pilot confirmed and indicated that he was correcting back. About 0800, the controller canceled the approach clearance. The pilot was vectored at 4,500 feet for a second approach and about 0804, the controller issued another approach clearance to the pilot for the RNAV runway 25 approach. About 0806, the controller advised the pilot that he appeared to be off course and the pilot acknowledged the advisement. About 0807, the controller gave the pilot an approval to change to an advisory frequency, which was acknowledged by the pilot. No further communications with the pilot were recorded on the approach frequency. A transcript of the approach frequency communications associated with the flight is appended to the docket material associated with the case.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
MDD is a public, non-towered airport located about 3 miles north of Midland, Texas, and it has a surveyed elevation of 2,803 feet MSL. The airport is serviced by two asphalt runways, Runway 16/34 and 7/25.
Runway 7/25 was 5,022 foot by 75-foot asphalt runway, which had non-precision runway markings. The runway was equipped with a 4-light, 3-degree glide path, vertical approach slope indicator.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane crashed into a house in a residential area, located northeast of the intersection of Trevino Street and Casper Court, Midland, Texas. A post-impact ground fire occurred. The fire melted the icing that the airplane had collected during the flight and the fire consumed the majority of the airplane.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
The pilot was accustomed to flying a 1974 Beech, King Air, E90, twin-engine, conventional-tailed airplane. According to the pilot, the avionics installed in both the F90 and E90 were different. The F90 had conventional avionics with a HSI and the E90 had Avidyne avionics installed. The F90 had a different type autopilot installed than the S-TEC autopilot, which was installed in the E90.
During an interview with a FAA inspector, the pilot stated that he believed the loss of control was "primarily due to ice."
A plane scheduled to land at Midland Airpark Friday morning crashed into a residential area, engulfed one home in flames and sent the pilot to the hospital with minor injuries.
Authorities identified the pilot as 53-year-old Page Mund of Needville. Mund was transported and released from Midland Memorial Hospital by Friday afternoon.
Officials at the Midland County Sheriff’s Office said Mund suffered a broken arm.
Midland Public Information Officer Tasa Watts said Quality Lease Air Service owns the airplane and Mobley flew into Midland to assess the damage from the crash.
“Right now we can’t comment, but the pilot is alive and everything else can be replaced,” Quality Lease Air Service owner David Mike Mobley said during a phone interview.
The Midland Fire Department responded to the call around 8:10 a.m. after a King Air F-90 GT that left from Wharton Regional Airport outside of El Campo crashed into the home at 4500 Trevino Street, Watts said. Flying out of the east, Mund was scheduled to land at Midland Airpark runway 25, Esterly said.
The owner of the house the plane crashed into, 81-year-old Estela Trowbridge, was able to get out of her house unharmed. James Parks with the American Red Cross said Trowbridge was also transported to the hospital, due to high blood pressure.
After the crash, people at the scene helped remove Mund from the plane. John Holguin said in an interview with CBS 7 that he ran to the wreckage to see if anyone was alive. Once he heard Mund’s screams for help, Holguin helped pull him from the plane.
“I picked him up and drug him to the alley and waited there for the EMS to come," Holguin told CBS 7 reporters.
Two nearby houses also suffered heavy damage from the fire, and Parks said the Red Cross would be assisting eight people and four dogs total from the incident. Only Trowbridge was home during the crash.
Meanwhile 32 area residents lost power Friday after the plane also knocked down two polls, several wires and a transformer, Area Manager for Oncor Electric Delivery Sue Mercer said. She said Friday afternoon the company was hoping to have all electricity restored to the area by midnight.
The cause of the plane crash is still unknown. Lynn Lunsford, a spokesman with the Federal Aviation Administration said in an email that the organization had started looking into the crash and investigators would “conduct a thorough examination of the wreckage.”
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality personnel were also on the scene to make sure jet fuel and water runoff from the firefighters’ hoses did not get in the city’s water supply. TCEQ spokeswoman Andrea Morrow said the jet fuel was vacuumed up and would be disposed of in an authorized facility.
Sandra Porter, who identified Trowbridge as her mother-in-law, said she did not know about the crash into Trowbridge’s house until her’s daughter called her and told her about it. Though Porter said she and Trowbridge’s son were no longer married, she said she rushed to the house after she learned about the crash.
“We’re still family,” Porter said.
Kellen Mackey with TruGreen said he made the initial 9-1-1 call after he heard the plane crash. Scheduled to work in Trowbridge’s backyard Friday morning, Mackey said he went to his truck when he heard a loud noise.
“It was like a missile coming down,” he said. “It made my ears ring.”
After the crash, Mackey called for help and he and another person began to knock on doors to warn others about the fire. Mackey, visibility shaken up from incident, said he was concerned about the fire spreading because of engine fuel. He said he was also still coming to grips with the fact he was slated to work in Trowbridge’s backyard.
“If I was there minutes earlier, I would have been in that backyard,” he said.
Dozens of planes fly over the neighborhood near Midland Airpark every day. But now Friday's crash is raising questions for the residents about how safe they are, and if something like Friday’s event could happen again.
"It was surreal. You normally see this stuff on television happening to somebody else, but not in your own backyard," said Cary Love, who lives near the site of the crash. More than 24 hours after a plane crashes into their neighborhood, Midlanders are already analyzing what could have been done to prevent it. "The planes coming back seem to be really low and sometimes you can pick up a rock and throw it at them. It's kind of scary," Love said.
"The planes fly too low. There are some planes that come through here. If I'm in my backyard, I swear to God that I can touch the wheels," said Ann Mussinan, who also lives in the neighborhood.
But others say the chances of it happening again are highly unlikely.
"Airplane crashes are a very rare occurrence and one crashing into a house is unbelievable. There's an old movie quote about a house being hit by a plane. You should buy here now because the odds of it happening again are astronomical," said Grant Guess, who lives near the site.
"That's going to remain in this neighborhood. Maybe the community will come together now and push who ever controls the airport to correct the problem," Mussinan said.
As they try to pick up the pieces from Friday’s chaos, many say they're now ready to move on.
"It happened. I think the neighborhoods attitude is let's get back to normal," said Mussinan.
Administrators with Midland International Airport tell CBS 7 this isn't the first time a plane has crashed into a building in Midland. They say the last time it happened was in the mid 90's. The plane crashed near the staples building on North Loop 250.
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