On April 27 a crash
killed Air Force Capt. Brandon Cyr and three others aboard an MC-12W spy
plane that Cyr commanded in Afghanistan. It was the first crash to
occur since the Air Force launched the highly successful MC-12W program
more than four years ago.
But shortcomings in aircrew training,
especially in how to avoid and recover from an orbital stall, had led to
four previous near-stalls, according to an Air Force report on the
crash.
The fatal crash and four near-stalls stemmed, in large
part, from the Air Force's sense of urgency to get the highly valued spy
planes into the skies over Afghanistan.
The Air Force's haste
with regard to MC-12W crew training "led to several aspects of the
program not being normalized, which created increased risk, particularly
aircrew inexperience and lack of instructors in the combat zone," wrote
Brig. Gen. Donald J. Bacon, the investigation board president.
This
problem was most acute regarding the relative lack of aircrew training
regarding stalls, which occur when the aircraft wing is no longer
creating enough lift to support the aircraft's weight, causing the nose
to pitch down.
The relative lack of stall training for MC-12W
crews is significant because "a typical mission sortie includes
substantially more time in orbit than in any other phase of flight, and
the orbit is flown relatively close to stall speed," according to the
report.
What's more, "Four previous MC-12W orbit stalls that
resulted in significant, near-catastrophic altitude loss highlight this
limited training," according to the report.
The official cause of
the crash of Independence 08, the call sign of the MC-12W Liberty under
Cyr's command, was a stall caused by low airspeed.
The report
called Cyr, the mission commander, the pilot, Capt. Reid Nishizuka, and
the sensor operators, staff sergeants Richard Dickson and Daniel Fannin,
"highly respected airmen and combat veterans with 4,845 combat flying
hours and 836 combat sorties between them."
The report noted that
Cyr had logged 1,749 flight hours in the KC-135 air tanker, and was on
temporary duty from Scott Air Force Base with the MC-12W. Nishizuka had
logged 2,434 hours in the EC-130H Compass Call aircraft, a C-130
Hercules transport plane modified to carry an arsenal of electronic gear
to disrupt enemy communications.
While Nishizuka had deep
experience as an EC-130H pilot, he had relatively little experience
flying the much smaller MC-12W -- only 41.7 flying hours, according to
the report.
In addition, at the time of the crash, Nishizuka had
not flown into combat in a MC-12W before, and it was his first sortie of
any kind in 45 days, Bacon wrote.
Nishizuka's lack of
familiarity with the MC-12W's controls affected "his visual scan and
instrument crosscheck proficiency..." Bacon wrote. "This delayed
detection of the pitch, the decreasing airspeed, and the imminent
stall."
Nishizuka's inexperience also delayed his ability to
respond effectively to the spin the MC-12W went into and delayed the
prompt reduction of power, Bacon wrote.
Finally, it was also
Cyr's "first flight as a newly qualified certifier who was just
completing his second month of his first MC-12W deployment," Bacon
wrote. "This explains his delayed intervention in both preventing the
stall and recovering the MA (mishap aircraft)."
Bacon noted that
20 percent of MC-12W pilots rotate into and out of Afghanistan each
month, making it "not uncommon for pilots to fly together for the first
time on a combat sortie, such as happened in this mishap."
Unfamiliarity
hampers crew coordination, and "the result of this program risk is
inexperienced MC-12W pilots deployed in combat, and inexperience
substantially contributed to this mishap."
In response to
questions from the News-Democrat, the U.S. Air Force announced a list of
changes to MC-12W air crew flight training. A special emphasis will be
placed on ensuring that aircrews learn how to detect and recover as
quickly as possible from flight stalls, said Col. Phillip Stewart,
commander of the 9th Reconnaissance Wing, at Beale Air Force Base,
Calif., which oversee MC-12W training.
"We're trying to give our
students more robust stall awareness and recovery training," Stewart
said. "So we're tryng to give them better training on how to recognize
an impending stall."
The changes call for the Air Force to:
* Provide more flight hours and additional sorties for aircrew "spin-up" training, prior to deployment.
*
Provide more stall training in all three phases of training: initial
qualification on simulators at Beale AFB; mission qualification during
actual flights at Beale; and continuation training after the end of
Beale training.
* Deploy more instructor pilots to and training teams to Afghanistan.
*
Teach pilots in Afghanistan to increase minimum orbit speeds to at
least 140 knots per hour, to provide a larger margin above the stall
speed.
Read more here: http://www.bnd.com