Struggling with serious financial issues, the Fayette County Airport Authority decided to move quickly Wednesday evening to hire a new airport manager and to advertise to hire an assistant manager.
In a split decision, the authority voted 3-2 to name John “Bud” Neckerauer as airport manager at an annual salary of $42,000, effective immediately. Neckerauer, who will receive health insurance benefits, is expected to start his new position before the end of the week.
Authority chairman Fred Davis and members Samuel Cortis and Matt Thomas voted to hired Neckerauer, a pilot who owns an airplane and leases hangar space at the Joseph A. Hardy Connellsville Airport in Dunbar Township.
Voting against the hiring were authority members Jesse Wallace and Myrna Giannopoulos.
When asked why she voted against hiring Neckerauer, Giannopoulos said, “I just felt it was the best move I could make.”
Neckerauer, who works for a trucking company, has a CDL (commercial drivers license), one of the qualifications listed recently when the authority advertised the position.
Thomas said Neckerauer has no experience with airport management.
“We feel that Neckerauer will be a good fit for the position because he is on the same page with authority members,” said Thomas, indicating that board members plan to make a fresh start.
The authority plans to advertise for an assistant manager who has experience with data entry, bookkeeping, the QuickBooks accounting program and Microsoft Word and Excel.
“We would like to hire someone to fill that position as soon as possible,” said Davis, indicating the authority is struggling to figure out its financial situation.
The authority wants to hire McClure & Wolf, a Uniontown accounting firm, to complete an audit of its financial records to determine its financial state, but the authority owes the firm between $4,600 and $8,200. Authority members said they plan to talk to McClure & Wolf to see if the firm is willing to help.
“We really don't even know how much we owe them right now because we haven't had an airport manager since January,” Davis said. “We need to figure out what's going on with our financial situation.”
The airport recently received a shut-off notice from the North Fayette County Municipal Authority because it owes the water company at least $3,000, according to Davis. An additional $3,000 is owed to West Penn Power Co., and the airport is about $14,000 behind in recent bills it received from Columbia Gas.
“We paid over $9,000 in utility bills, but we still owe a lot more money,” Giannopoulos said.
Davis, Thomas and Cortis said they have no idea how much money the airport has in its bank accounts. Nor did Giannopoulos know.
When asked if authority members believe funding could have been misappropriated, authority members denied any possibility of wrongdoing.
“We don't think any money is missing. We just don't know where the money is right now,” Davis said. “We haven't been able to keep track of our books since our previous airport manager (Mary Lou Fast) resigned.”
After Fast resigned in January, Giannopoulos volunteered to assume the airport manager duties until the authority hired a new airport manager.
“When I volunteered for the office duties, I told you I didn't have any experience with QuickBooks,” Giannopoulos said. “I've been doing the best I can do.”
Wallace said he supports Giannopoulos and commended her for helping out the authority in a time of need.
Thursday, March 21, 2013
Aircraft buy made easier
New Delhi, March 21: The government today relaxed the condition for the import of planes by airlines and other operators in a bid to remove bureaucratic hurdles and delays faced by the companies.
So long, carriers had to take the permission of the civil aviation ministry’s aircraft acquisition committee (AAC) to buy aircraft. The government has scrapped this committee and entrusted the directorate general of civil aviation (DGCA) to carry out the formalities for scheduled and non-scheduled operators, private operators and flying training institutes to get their fleet of planes and helicopters.
The AAC was set up in the late 1990s but, with increasing imports, airlines have been complaining of delays in getting clearances because of red tape and long queues.
The move can help local carriers such as IndiGo, SpiceJet and GoAir, who have a huge backlog of pending approvals to bring in new aircraft faster. Most of these airlines have acquired the rights to increase their international flights through bilateral pacts India has signed with the Gulf and Southeast Asian countries.
Local carriers will now require just an initial no-objection certificate from the civil aviation ministry to start operations. The ministry’s approval is not required “for the actual import or replacement of aircraft and all such cases will be dealt by the DGCA for the completion of necessary formalities”, the ministry spokesperson said.
In October last year, civil aviation minister Ajit Singh had constituted a new AAC to consider, examine and make recommendations on all proposals for permitting the import or acquisition of aircraft.
Ministry officials said Singh felt the AAC should be abolished as it was “no more relevant”.
Till 1997, the DGCA used to clear civilian aircraft acquisition.
Airlines are upbeat about the decision. “IndiGo welcomes this move to liberalise aircraft acquisition norm. This is a significant step towards unleashing the true potential of aviation in India, whereby the demand-supply anomaly may be addressed over time and millions more may be able to fly one day at lower fares,” said Aditya Ghosh, president of IndiGo Airlines.
Aviation experts said the move would smoothen the process of aircraft acquisition.
“Paperwork will be reduced. An airline, at present, has to wait till the AAC gives its final nod before it brings in an aircraft. This process sometimes takes a lot of time as there are times when the AAC does not hold meetings for months,” said U.K. Bose, former president and CEO of Sahara Airlines.
First Turkish trainer airplane to be tested in June
First Turkish training aircraft HÜRKUŞ will be tested in June this year, "Anatolia" agency reported on Thursday, referring to the Turkish Scientific and Research Centre for Aerospace Technologies (TUSAŞ).
According to the agency, the aircraft was developed with participation of domestic engineers.
TUSAŞ was established in May 1985 with foreign capital. In 2005, it bought the shares owned by Lockheed Martin of Turkey (42 percent) and General Electric International (7 percent).
TUSAŞ produces parts for the F-16 fighter, A380 passenger and military A400M airbus. Since last year, it also has been producing diffusers for A350 airbuses.
Story and Photo: http://en.trend.az
According to the agency, the aircraft was developed with participation of domestic engineers.
TUSAŞ was established in May 1985 with foreign capital. In 2005, it bought the shares owned by Lockheed Martin of Turkey (42 percent) and General Electric International (7 percent).
TUSAŞ produces parts for the F-16 fighter, A380 passenger and military A400M airbus. Since last year, it also has been producing diffusers for A350 airbuses.
Story and Photo: http://en.trend.az
Accident at Livermore Municipal Airport (KLVK) caused when pilot's foot got stuck underneath plane's steering pedals, officials
An 84-year-old man suffered a lower-back injury after crashing a plane at the Livermore airport Thursday afternoon, Livermore-Pleasanton Fire Department Battalion Chief Jack Neiman-Kimel said.
The crash was reported just before 3 p.m. when a Cessna 170 plane, attempting to land at the airport, made a hard left turn away from the runway and crashed into the dirt, Neiman-Kimel said.
The pilot's foot got stuck underneath one of the plane's steering pedals, which caused the plane to veer to the left, Neiman-Kimel said
"The plane was pretty trashed," Neiman-Kimel said of the damage, adding that the plane was traveling at around 60 mph at the time of the accident. "It ended up facing the opposite direction when it landed."
The pilot was the only passenger in the plane and no other injuries were reported.
The crash was reported just before 3 p.m. when a Cessna 170 plane, attempting to land at the airport, made a hard left turn away from the runway and crashed into the dirt, Neiman-Kimel said.
The pilot's foot got stuck underneath one of the plane's steering pedals, which caused the plane to veer to the left, Neiman-Kimel said
"The plane was pretty trashed," Neiman-Kimel said of the damage, adding that the plane was traveling at around 60 mph at the time of the accident. "It ended up facing the opposite direction when it landed."
The pilot was the only passenger in the plane and no other injuries were reported.
Dassault Falcon 50, F-GXMC: More senior officers named in Dominican Republic drug bust
El cargamento de 682 paquetes de cocaína fue presentado ayer en la sede de la DNCD.
MÁS FOTOS DE LA GALERÍA
The shipment of 682 packages of cocaine was presented yesterday at the headquarters of the DNCD.
Santo Domingo.- A drug ring that includes five military and National Police colonels shipped drugs through Punta Cana Airport, where 682 packages of cocaine seized on Wednesday, reports elcaribe.com.do, citing confidential documents, where the National Drug Control Agency (DNCD) describes the officers as an "escort service."
The document on the year-long investigation to trap the officers identifies Army colonels Marino of Jesus Tejada and Nelson of Jesus Viloria Otáñez, José Anastacio Brea Román, of the Police and Carlos Samuel Rodríguez Díaz, of the Air Force.
The authorities seized 682 packages of drugs which the DNCD and the Justice Ministry link to Air Force colonel José Brazobán Adames, assigned to the Airport Security Corp (CESAC), and Army captain Bolívar Alberto Mercado Díaz, considered the ringleaders of the senior officers who were hired as an "escort service" to various drug trafficking networks.
Mercado Diaz was reportedly paid two million dollars to protect the drug shipped to Europe, with a stop at the Azores islands.
The captain’s experience
According to the report rendered to DNCD president Rolando Rosado, Mercado Díaz has a long history as an "escort" of drug shipments through Punta Cana Airport, where antinarcotics agents took part in various criminal activities.
This document quotes Mercado Díaz and Police Capt. Rafael Aníbal de la Rosa Tapia, as saying that they made the colonels Fermín Tejada and Brea Román "millionaires."
Source: http://www.dominicantoday.com
Five colonel gave protection to drug delivery
In the file there are 35 people, mostly military, linked to at least four drug shipments
The shipment of drugs by the Punta Cana International Airport, which recently seized 682 packages of cocaine, involving a drug ring that includes five colonels and military institutions Nacional.Este Police had daily access to a confidential document that identifies five senior officers who served in "franqueadores" a major drug shipments by that terminal.
This report on intelligence work to catch the military and police linked to drug trafficking organizations, prepared by the National Drug Control (DNCD) last year, identifies Marine colonels Jesus Tejada, National Army, Joseph Anastacio Brea Román, Police, Carlos Samuel Rodriguez Diaz, Air Force, and Jesus Viloria Otáñez Nelson, also of the National Army.
In the operation where the 682 packages were seized drugs and was released on Wednesday, the DNCD and the Justice Department linked the colonel of the Air Force (FAD) Brazobán Jose Adames, assigned to the Specialized Airport Security Corps and Civil Aviation (CESAC), and Army Captain Alberto Mercado Bolivar Diaz as ringleaders of senior and junior officers who sold their "services" franqueadores to different drug ring.
This plan to take drugs in the country by the air terminal was frustrated by DNCD agents and CESAC. Reporters were informed that elCaribe Diaz Mercado would have charged two million dollars to protect the shipment of that amount of drugs into the Portuguese islands of Azores.
The experience of a captain
Captain Diaz Mercado, according to the report, has an extensive criminal record as "franchiser" drug by the Punta Cana International Airport, as stated in the report submitted to the president of the DNCD, Major General Rolando Rosado Mateo, about the adventures criminals of important drug agents assigned to the International Airport of Punta Cana This document cites Market Diaz and Rafael Police Capt. Anibal de la Rosa Tapia, saying they both made "millionaires" the colonels Fermin Roman Tejada and Brea.
The statement that made "millionaires" are these Colonels product shipments of cocaine shipments to foreign countries, "which they did in combination with personal DNCD the CESAC as well as security guards and tank Loading Punta Cana airport itself. "
According to the intelligence report, these colonels played, at different times, in charge of the office of Information and Coordination Center Joint DNCD (CICC), which is the most important department in the narcotics agency, after the president's role of that entity.
According to the intelligence report dated November 30, 2012, Colonel Rodriguez Diaz worked for the Department of Internal Affairs in the headquarters of the DNCD, and complicity with Joan Army First Lieutenant Daniel Antonio Rosario, who worked on the area of International Affairs, reported to Colonel Fermin alerted Tejada to Market Diaz and De la Rosa Tapia to not be surprised by any operation executed by the Staff of the anti-drug agency.
Viloria Colonel remained Otañez Sub-Assistant Supervisor of CICC in Punta Cana and "was the person through which Colonel Fermin Tejada maintained direct contact with the narcos, why the latter never showed his face."
Wanderings
In the report, Market Diaz appears as head of the protection of four major drug shipment operations outwards. The first had to do with 145 kilos of pure cocaine brought into the aircraft made the JAF303304 flight, the airline Condor, which started at 3:50 pm on October 17, 2010, by the International Airport of Punta Cana bound for Curacao.
For this "service" provided to drug traffickers, said Captain received payment of $ 26,000. But also participated as franqueadores Wascar Army Captain Francisco Ramirez Zapata, who also received $ 26,000, the officer Rafael Anibal de la Rosa Tapia, $ 26,000; Army First Lieutenant Daniel Joan Antonio Rosario, 600 thousand dollars, the second lieutenant of the Dominican Air Force, Fernando Ruby (40,000 pesos) and Edinson ensign Alvino Peña, received 40,000 pesos.
Also participated Ensign Anthony Nunez and Antonio Santana Arencio Guevara Guevara, who received 40,000 and 70,000 pesos, respectively Arismendy Villamán Sergeant, 200,000 pesos; Andrison Police Officer Antonio Reyes Serum, 90 thousand dollars, and Messrs. Poached Jesus and John Lazala, managers and Personal Deposit, respectively, who received the sum of $ 80,000. The report noted that the responsibility for receiving and distributing the money among its partners Diaz was the market itself.
The second major drug operation protected by Captain Diaz Mercado occurs November 14, 2012. It was an operation that had mafia through 50 packets of pure cocaine, weighing approximately 250 kilograms. This drug left the country in the JAF flight company Transavia 303-304, bound for Brussels.
That shipment was protected by 20 officers of various state security agencies and seven civilians. Market Diaz received for this "service" the sum of $ 50,000.
The report also mentioned as participants Lieutenant Commander José Manuel Celedonio Castro, who was paid $ 40,000, and the captains of the army Bolivar Wascar Alberto Mercado and Francisco Díaz Ramírez Zapata, each with $ 50,000.
The third major shipment that had as its main protector Mercado Diaz was executed between 27 and 28 November 2012. For this "work", the officer would have given Colonel Brazobán 3 million 750 thousand pesos, "to be divided between him and all personnel under his command (in CESAC) who participated in the operation of postage". That protection work as participants had a 15 police and military officers and seven civilians.
The fourth major operation occurred between 4 and 5 December 2012. It was a load of 500 kilograms of pure cocaine, guarded by Diaz Mercado.
In addition to those members of the military and National Police, among the 35 arrested were, also, the three crew members and fourth modern passenger Falcon 50 aircraft, registration F-GXMC, model 1989.
Foreigners, all French nationals, were identified as Jean Pascal Furet, Victor Bruno Ados Armand, Paul Marie Castany Marc Alain and Nicolas Christopher Pisapia. The 682 packages were distributed in 26 suitcases. The dismantling of the network is the result of an operation started seven months ago, but the DNCD has documented other cases of shipments of hundreds of kilograms of cocaine to various European countries, especially Germany and France, which contain other senior that at any moment they would be expelled from the institution. The arrest warrants were issued by Judge Carlos Morales Peguero Yohan Instruction.
Attorney subjected to 35 involved
The Attorney General's Office yesterday ordered to submit to justice for 35 soldiers, police and customs personnel, including a lieutenant colonel, a major and four captains, linked to a failed drug operation in which 682 packs were occupied cocaine to be sent to France, to board a private jet take off from the airport of Punta Cana, revealed the DNCD. The assistant prosecutor Carlos Castillo Diaz, who gave the information, said the group is directly linked to that case and is led by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Brazobán Adames, Cesa and was assigned to an officer with responsibility punctual airport in Punta Cana, which was intercepted on the 682 plane loaded with packages of narcotics.
The drug was passed through the VIP area and was bound for the Portuguese islands of Azores.
Source: http://www.elcaribe.com.do
El envío de drogas por el Aeropuerto Internacional de Punta Cana, donde recientemente se incautaron 682 paquetes de coca, involucra a una red de narcotraficantes que incluye a cinco coroneles de instituciones castrenses y la Policía Nacional.Este diario tuvo acceso a un documento de carácter confidencial que identifica a cinco altos oficiales que sirvieron de “franqueadores” a importantes cargamentos de drogas por la referida terminal aérea.
Este informe sobre las labores de inteligencia para atrapar a los militares y policías vinculados a organizaciones de narcotraficantes, elaborado por la Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas (DNCD) el pasado año, identifica a los coroneles Marino de Jesús Tejada, del Ejército Nacional; José Anastacio Brea Román, de la Policía; Carlos Samuel Rodríguez Díaz, de la Fuerza Aérea, y Nelson de Jesús Viloria Otáñez, también del Ejército Nacional.
En la operación donde fueron decomisados los 682 paquetes de drogas y que fue dada a conocer el pasado miércoles, la DNCD y el Ministerio Público vinculan al coronel de la Fuerza Aérea (FAD) José Brazobán Adames, asignado al Cuerpo Especializado de Seguridad Aeroportuaria y de la Aviación Civil (Cesac), y al capitán del Ejército Bolívar Alberto Mercado Díaz, como principales cabecillas de oficiales superiores y subalternos que vendían sus “servicios” de franqueadores a distintas red de narcotraficantes.
Este plan para sacar las drogas del país por esa terminal aérea fue frustrado por agentes de la DNCD y del Cesac. Reporteros de elCaribe fueron informados de que Mercado Díaz habría cobrado dos millones de pesos para proteger el envío de la citada cantidad de drogas hacia las islas portuguesas de Azores.
La experiencia de un capitán
El capitán Mercado Díaz, de acuerdo al informe, tiene un extenso prontuario como “franqueador” de drogas por el Aeropuerto Internacional de Punta Cana, según consta en el informe remitido al presidente de la DNCD, mayor general Rolando Rosado Mateo, sobre las andanzas criminales de importantes agentes antinarcóticos asignados al Aeropuerto Internacional de Punta Cana. Este documento cita a Mercado Díaz y al capitán de la Policía Rafael Aníbal de la Rosa Tapia, diciendo que ellos dos hicieron “millonarios” a los coroneles Fermín Tejada y Brea Román.
La afirmación de que hicieron “millonarios” a estos coroneles es producto de los envíos de cargamentos de cocaína hacia el extranjero, “cosa que hacían en combinación con personal de la DNCD, el Cesac, así como con vigilantes de seguridad y Depósito de Carga del propio Aeropuerto Punta Cana”.
Según el informe de inteligencia, esos coroneles desempeñaron, en tiempos distintos, el cargo de encargados del Centro de Información y Coordinación Conjunta de la DNCD (CICC), que es el departamento de mayor importancia dentro del organismo antinarcóticos, luego de la función del presidente de esa entidad.
De acuerdo al informe de inteligencia fechado al 30 de noviembre del 2012, el coronel Rodríguez Díaz laboraba para el departamento de Asuntos Internos en la sede de la DNCD, y en complicidad con el primer teniente del Ejército Joan Antonio Daniel Rosario, quien trabajó en el área de Asuntos Internacionales, informaban al coronel Fermín Tejada para que alertara a Mercado Díaz y a De la Rosa Tapia para que no fueran sorprendidos por alguna operación ejecutada por la plana mayor del organismo antidrogas.
El coronel Viloria Otañez se mantuvo como subencargado del CICC en Punta Cana y “era la persona a través de la cual el coronel Fermín Tejada mantenía contacto directo con los narcos, razón por la que este último nunca dio la cara”.
Andanzas
En el informe, Mercado Díaz aparece como cabeza de la protección de cuatro grandes operaciones de envío de drogas hacia el exterior. El primero tuvo que ver con 145 kilos de cocaína pura introducidos en el avión que efectuó el vuelo JAF303304, de la aerolínea JETAIRFLY, que partió a las 3:50 de la tarde del 17 de octubre del 2010, por el Aeropuerto Internacional de Punta Cana, con destino a Curazao.
Por ese “servicio” prestado a los narcotraficantes, el citado capitán recibió el pago de 26 mil dólares. Pero también participaron como franqueadores el capitán del Ejército Wascar Francisco Zapata Ramírez, quien también recibió 26 mil dólares; el agente policial Rafael Aníbal de la Rosa Tapia, 26 mil dólares; el primer teniente del Ejército Joan Antonio Daniel Rosario, 600 mil pesos; el segundo teniente de la Fuerza Aérea Dominicana, Fernando Rubí (40 mil pesos) y el alférez de navío Edinson Peña Alvino, recibió 40 mil pesos.
Igualmente participaron los alférez de fragata Anthony Antonio Santana Núñez y Arencio Guevara Guevara, quienes recibieron 40 mil y 70 mil pesos, respectivamente; el sargento Arismendy Villamán, 200 mil pesos; el agente policial Andrison Antonio Reyes Suero, 90 mil pesos, y los señores Jesús Poché y Juan Lazala, encargados de Depósito y de Personal, respectivamente, quienes recibieron la suma de 80 mil dólares. El informe detalla que el responsable de recibir y distribuir el dinero entre sus socios era el propio Mercado Díaz.
La segunda gran operación de narcotráfico protegida por el capitán Mercado Díaz ocurre el 14 de noviembre del 2012. Se trató de una operación mafiosa que tenía de por medio 50 paquetes de cocaína pura, con un peso aproximado de 250 kilogramos. Esta droga salió del país en el vuelo JAF 303-304 de la empresa JETAIRFLY, con destino a Bruselas.
Ese envío fue protegido por 20 agentes de distintas agencias de seguridad del Estado y siete civiles. Mercado Díaz recibió por ese “servicio” la suma de 50 mil dólares.
El informe menciona igualmente como participantes al capitán de corbeta José Manuel Celedonio Castro, a quien le pagaron 40 mil dólares; y a los capitanes del Ejército Bolívar Alberto Mercado Díaz y Wáscar Francisco Zapata Ramírez, cada uno con 50 mil dólares.
El tercer cargamento importante que tuvo como principal protector a Mercado Díaz fue ejecutado entre los días 27 y 28 de noviembre del 2012. Por este “trabajo”, el oficial le habría entregado al coronel Brazobán 3 millones 750 mil pesos, “para ser repartido entre él y todo el personal bajo su mando (en el Cesac) que participó en la operación de franqueo”. Esa labor de protección tuvo como participantes a 15 agentes policiales y militares, y siete civiles.
La cuarta gran operación se produjo entre el 4 y 5 de diciembre del 2012. Fue un cargamento de 500 kilogramos de cocaína pura, custodiado por Mercado Díaz.
Además de los citados militares y miembros de la Policía Nacional, entre los 35 detenidos figuran, igualmente, los tres miembros de la tripulación y cuarto pasajero del moderno avión Falcón 50, matrícula F-GXMC, modelo 1989.
Los extranjeros, todos de nacionalidad francesa, fueron identificados como Pascal Jean Furet, Bruno Armand Víctor Ados, Alain Marc Paul Marie Castañy y Nicolás Cristopher Pisapia. Los 682 paquetes estaban distribuidos en 26 maletas. La desarticulación de la red es fruto de una operación iniciada hace siete meses, pero la DNCD tiene documentados otros casos de envíos de cientos de kilogramos de cocaína a diferentes países de Europa, sobre todo a Holanda y Francia, en los que figuran otros oficiales superiores que en cualquier momento serían expulsados de la institución. Las órdenes de arresto fueron dictadas por el Juez de la Instrucción Yohan Carlos Morales Peguero.
Procuraduría somete a 35 implicados
La Procuraduría General de la República ordenó ayer someter por ante la Justicia a 35 militares, policías y personal de Aduanas, entre ellas un teniente coronel, un mayor y cuatro capitanes, vinculadas a una frustrada operación de narcotráfico en la que fueron ocupados 682 paquetes de cocaína que serían enviados a Francia, a bordo de un jet privado que despegaría del aeropuerto de Punta Cana, reveló la DNCD. El procurador adjunto Carlos Castillo Díaz, quien ofreció la información, dijo que el grupo está directamente ligado al citado caso y lo encabeza el teniente coronel José Brazobán Adames, asignado al Cesa y era un oficial con una responsabilidad puntual en el aeropuerto de Punta Cana, donde fue interceptado el avión cargado con los 682 paquetes de estupefaciente.
La droga fue pasada por el área VIP y tenía como destino las islas portuguesas de Azores.
Source: http://www.elcaribe.com.do Santo Domingo.- The National Drugs Control Agency (DNCD) disclosed the names of the Dominicans and the foreigners arrested in connection with a shipment of cocaine headed to the airport of Versailles, France, with a scheduled stop at the Azores Islands.
Among the 35 arrested figure three crew members and a fourth passenger of a 1989 Falcon 50 aircraft, registry F-GXMC.
The foreigners, all French nationals, were identified as Jean Pascal Furet, Bruno Armand Victor Ados, Alain Marc Paul Marie Castaign, and Nicolas Christopher Pisapia.
In addition to Brazobán, among those to be charged figure captains Bolívar Alberto Mercado Díaz, Santana Núñez, José Manuel Celedonio Castro, Wascar Francisco Zapata Ramírez and Rafael Aníbal de la Rosa Tapia; lieutenants Joan Antonio Daniel Rosario, Andrés Avelino Méndez García Arencio Guevara, Miguel Damián Florimón, Kissoris Ciprian and Carlos H. Martínez.
According to the investigation, those who will also be charge are the sergeants Rolando Colime Rojas; Welcome Pérez Mesa, Juan Santana and Andris out Ozuna Nova.
The civilian agents involved in the case are Manauris Encarnación Sánchez, Cristian Miguel Sánchez Sosa, Danny Daniel Balbuena Bejarán, Michell Camilo Bachá Mateo, Irvin Arias Santana and Jorge Mañón Pérez.
Also Orlando Francisco Franco Noble and Brayan Valerio Santos. Other arrests are still pending, according to the DNCD.
FILE. The authorities are holding around 35 officers and agents -the highest number in one bust ever- from various government agencies allegedly linked to an international during trafficking network, who had shipped cocaine from Punta Cana Airport to various European countries during several years.
Antinarcotics (DNCD) chief Rolando Rosado didn’t reveal the names of those arrested, among them a lieutenant colonel assigned to his agency, but pledged to publish their names and charge them in the next few hours.
He said evidence of more than RD$2.5 million in bribes and an unspecified amount of dollars were collected during seven months, received by the head of the DNCD unit assigned to the airport and the other agents. He said the agents distributed money among different departments lf the DNCD in the capital.
In a press conference Rosado provided the details of the operation which led to the dismantling of the network, accompanied by Air Force Intelligence officials and DNCD Joint Operations chief Valentin Rosado, who led months-long investigation.
Rosado said since 2010 various European countries among them France, Holland, and Belgium had alerted the DNCD of large drug seizures aboard planes arriving from Punta Cana’s airport, raising suspicions of a structure which managed to ship the drugs from that terminal.
He said the information prompted the deployment of undercover agents to infiltrate the Customs, Airport Security (CESA) and DNCD offices charged with the terminal’s safety and security.
A French aircraft was seized yesterday and its French crew of four detained, together with 35 members of various government agencies involved in the confiscation of at least 670 kilos of cocaine at Punta Cana Airport.
UPDATE
Valentin Rosado reiterated that Customs inspectors are among the detainees, and that Army captain Bolivar Alberto Mercado Diaz and Air Force Lt. colonel Jose Brazoban headed the ring.
A Fleet Of Our Own? Lawmakers Propose A Colorado Air Tanker Fleet (With Audio)
At the height of the now contained Galena Fire, officials noted most air resources for fighting the fire were unavailable or out of service.
Two Colorado State Senators are introducing a bill aimed at creating a Colorado wildfire air tanker fleet, in hopes critical air resources are never unavailable or delayed again.
As the first major wildfire of the year ravaged tinder dry grass and trees near Horsetooth Reservoir northwest of Fort Collins, Chief Tom DeMint of the Poudre Fire Authority was struggling to find the air support he needed. “You know, in March it’s a little tough because we’re trying to find resources available,” said DeMint. A U.S. Forest Service helicopter did make it to the scene within 48 hours.
While it seems the fire season in Colorado starts earlier and earlier, firefighting resources including important air tankers, are actually positioned elsewhere across the country this time of year.
The theory is that resources will be near areas with the greatest need. “Usually the resources are in areas that have fires in March; California, down in the southeast in the Florida, South Carolina area. So we have to find the resources where we can,” says DeMint.
Past Performance Indicator of Future Performance
Sen. Steve King, R-Grand Junction says he’s not convinced the current U.S. Forest Service fleet can come to the aid of Colorado if needed.“You know they say that past performance is an indicator of future performance,” said King, one of the sponsors of the bill.
He estimates it would cost Colorado around $20 million to fund a state air tanker fleet, which would be managed by the Colorado Department of Public Safety. There’s been no official discussion about the number of tankers the state would purchase, but King says he’s envisioning a very capable fleet.
“Three air tankers, three command and control fixed wing airplanes and three or four helicopters stationed throughout the state during the fire season and I think we would be well on our way to having control of that situation, and control of the possibility of catastrophic wildfires,” said King.
National firefighting air resources like heavy air tankers and helicopters are spread strategically across the country by the U.S. Forest Service. Steve Segin, spokesman for the Rocky Mountain Area Coordination Center says it’s not effective having resources ready and waiting at times when fires are uncommon. “If we needed certain aircraft or certain capabilities there are some things available,” said Segin. “However this time of the year we just have less of those resources as we do in the middle of fire season, so May, June, July, August –that time frame.”
Right now, most of the nation’s air resources are preparing for the typical start of the fire season. “We don’t have a lot of fire activity, so the aircraft we do have available, or that are normally available throughout the fire season are off contract and down for maintenance or that type of thing,” says Segin.
Maintenance Critical For Year Round Coverage
Jennifer Jones, Fire and Aviation Spokeswoman for the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise says air resources need to have staggered contracts and maintenance so there can be year-round coverage. “It is important for air tankers to be out of service for several months each year so that the maintenance and inspections can be done and that’s really critical to ensuring that they fly safely,” said Jones.
Jones says in addition to the nine air tankers on exclusive use contract to the U.S. Forest Service, 16 additional ‘private contract’ air tankers are on standby in case they’re needed. That brings the total air tanker fleet across the country to 25 planes. That’s still a far cry from the over 40 tankers the forest service had in use in the early 2000’s.
Because of the low number of all firefighting resources available including air tankers, Jones says often the Forest Service is maxed out. “It is not uncommon for all of our assets to be almost fully committed; whether we’re talking about fire fighters, engines, air tankers, or helicopters,” said Jones. “And during those periods of time we prioritize fires to where those that are threatening life, property, critical natural and cultural resource values receive the assets first.”
State Owned Fleets A Boon For U.S. Forest Service?
Senator King says he’s not yet reached out to any active member of the U.S. Forest Service about forming a Colorado air tanker fleet, but Jones says the Forest Service is helped by other state owned fleets.
“Other state partners in fire suppression such as the state of California and the state of Alaska already do have their own air tankers, and the U.S. Forest Service certainly benefits from that,” said King.
While the U.S. Forest Service and state Lawmakers grapple with increasing the number of firefighting air tankers, the threat of another destructive wildfire season looms. 1,330 fires burned across Colorado last year scorching 243,811 acres.
With officials saying drought conditions appear to be eerily similar to 2002, Colorado is poised for another long year of fires.
Story and Audio: http://www.kunc.org
Two Colorado State Senators are introducing a bill aimed at creating a Colorado wildfire air tanker fleet, in hopes critical air resources are never unavailable or delayed again.
As the first major wildfire of the year ravaged tinder dry grass and trees near Horsetooth Reservoir northwest of Fort Collins, Chief Tom DeMint of the Poudre Fire Authority was struggling to find the air support he needed. “You know, in March it’s a little tough because we’re trying to find resources available,” said DeMint. A U.S. Forest Service helicopter did make it to the scene within 48 hours.
While it seems the fire season in Colorado starts earlier and earlier, firefighting resources including important air tankers, are actually positioned elsewhere across the country this time of year.
The theory is that resources will be near areas with the greatest need. “Usually the resources are in areas that have fires in March; California, down in the southeast in the Florida, South Carolina area. So we have to find the resources where we can,” says DeMint.
Past Performance Indicator of Future Performance
Sen. Steve King, R-Grand Junction says he’s not convinced the current U.S. Forest Service fleet can come to the aid of Colorado if needed.“You know they say that past performance is an indicator of future performance,” said King, one of the sponsors of the bill.
He estimates it would cost Colorado around $20 million to fund a state air tanker fleet, which would be managed by the Colorado Department of Public Safety. There’s been no official discussion about the number of tankers the state would purchase, but King says he’s envisioning a very capable fleet.
“Three air tankers, three command and control fixed wing airplanes and three or four helicopters stationed throughout the state during the fire season and I think we would be well on our way to having control of that situation, and control of the possibility of catastrophic wildfires,” said King.
National firefighting air resources like heavy air tankers and helicopters are spread strategically across the country by the U.S. Forest Service. Steve Segin, spokesman for the Rocky Mountain Area Coordination Center says it’s not effective having resources ready and waiting at times when fires are uncommon. “If we needed certain aircraft or certain capabilities there are some things available,” said Segin. “However this time of the year we just have less of those resources as we do in the middle of fire season, so May, June, July, August –that time frame.”
Right now, most of the nation’s air resources are preparing for the typical start of the fire season. “We don’t have a lot of fire activity, so the aircraft we do have available, or that are normally available throughout the fire season are off contract and down for maintenance or that type of thing,” says Segin.
Maintenance Critical For Year Round Coverage
Jennifer Jones, Fire and Aviation Spokeswoman for the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise says air resources need to have staggered contracts and maintenance so there can be year-round coverage. “It is important for air tankers to be out of service for several months each year so that the maintenance and inspections can be done and that’s really critical to ensuring that they fly safely,” said Jones.
Jones says in addition to the nine air tankers on exclusive use contract to the U.S. Forest Service, 16 additional ‘private contract’ air tankers are on standby in case they’re needed. That brings the total air tanker fleet across the country to 25 planes. That’s still a far cry from the over 40 tankers the forest service had in use in the early 2000’s.
Because of the low number of all firefighting resources available including air tankers, Jones says often the Forest Service is maxed out. “It is not uncommon for all of our assets to be almost fully committed; whether we’re talking about fire fighters, engines, air tankers, or helicopters,” said Jones. “And during those periods of time we prioritize fires to where those that are threatening life, property, critical natural and cultural resource values receive the assets first.”
State Owned Fleets A Boon For U.S. Forest Service?
Senator King says he’s not yet reached out to any active member of the U.S. Forest Service about forming a Colorado air tanker fleet, but Jones says the Forest Service is helped by other state owned fleets.
“Other state partners in fire suppression such as the state of California and the state of Alaska already do have their own air tankers, and the U.S. Forest Service certainly benefits from that,” said King.
While the U.S. Forest Service and state Lawmakers grapple with increasing the number of firefighting air tankers, the threat of another destructive wildfire season looms. 1,330 fires burned across Colorado last year scorching 243,811 acres.
With officials saying drought conditions appear to be eerily similar to 2002, Colorado is poised for another long year of fires.
Story and Audio: http://www.kunc.org
Close shave for 200 passengers as Jet Airways plane windscreen cracks mid-flight
Srinagar, March 21: Around 200 passengers and crew on board a Srinagar -bound Jet Airways flight had a narrow escape Wednesday when the pilot detected a crack in the cockpit windscreen mid-flight, reports and witnesses said.
Reports said that windscreen of New Delhi-Srinagar Jet Airways flight 9W-603 developed a crack mid air sometime before it was scheduled to land at Srinagar airport at 2 PM.
“Air entered plane through cockpit. It was a panicky situation for the passengers had they come to know. But it was not much cause of concern for pilots as plane was about to land,” an official said on the condition of anonymity adding that situation could have worsened if plane would have been at a much more height.
Manoj Garj who heads the Air Traffic Management (ATS) at the Srinagar International Airport told Greater Kashmir: “Plane landed minutes after the slight windscreen crack. All the passengers were safe.”
A technical officer at the Srinagar airport who wished anonymity said that some object might have hit the plane. “It can also happen due to the sudden fall or rise in temperature,” they added.
Khursheed Ahmed, Manager Jet airways at the Srinagar International Airport admitted the incident occurred but said: “It was a slight windscreen crack. Flight landed safely. Safety of passengers is our first priority.”
Khursheed said that engineers inspected the aircraft for any snag and it has taken flight back to New Delhi.
SP Srinagar Airport, Abdul Rasheed Bhat termed it as a minor incident and said that all the passengers were safe.
Reports said that windscreen of New Delhi-Srinagar Jet Airways flight 9W-603 developed a crack mid air sometime before it was scheduled to land at Srinagar airport at 2 PM.
“Air entered plane through cockpit. It was a panicky situation for the passengers had they come to know. But it was not much cause of concern for pilots as plane was about to land,” an official said on the condition of anonymity adding that situation could have worsened if plane would have been at a much more height.
Manoj Garj who heads the Air Traffic Management (ATS) at the Srinagar International Airport told Greater Kashmir: “Plane landed minutes after the slight windscreen crack. All the passengers were safe.”
A technical officer at the Srinagar airport who wished anonymity said that some object might have hit the plane. “It can also happen due to the sudden fall or rise in temperature,” they added.
Khursheed Ahmed, Manager Jet airways at the Srinagar International Airport admitted the incident occurred but said: “It was a slight windscreen crack. Flight landed safely. Safety of passengers is our first priority.”
Khursheed said that engineers inspected the aircraft for any snag and it has taken flight back to New Delhi.
SP Srinagar Airport, Abdul Rasheed Bhat termed it as a minor incident and said that all the passengers were safe.
Rise in Required Flight Time Could Reduce Number of Alaska Regional Pilots
ANCHORAGE, Alaska — A new Federal Aviation Administration rule requiring commercial pilots for regional airlines to have more hours of flying experience is scheduled to go into effect Aug. 2.
The FAA says all captains and co-pilots for so-called Part 121 carriers, including familiar Alaska names like Era Aviation and PenAir, will need to have at least 1,500 hours of flying time to fly for them.
Aviation experts say the regulation that made the change -- the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, passed by Congress in 2010 -- was a reaction to the 2009 Colgan Air crash that killed 50 people in Buffalo, N.Y. At that time, pilots were only required to have 250 hours of flight time before working in the cockpit.
Mark Madden, a professor with the University of Alaska Anchorage’s Aviation Technology program who instructs new pilots, says the act’s requirement for more flight hours was a knee-jerk reaction.
“It would have been much better in my opinion if they had concentrated on not the total minimum of flight hours, but instead on the quality and quantity of training that is required of the regional operators,” Madden said. “Minimum number of flight hours is not a good indication of the quality of the pilot; it’s the quality and quantity of training that makes the difference.”
Local Part 121 carriers say they’re not yet feeling the full effects of the new regulation, but will soon.
“Our worry of course, (is) if this moves forward, then the pilot demand in the major airlines will suck up all the resources -- leaving the regional carriers (in) a very desperate situation looking for pilots,” said Brian Carricaburu, PenAir’s vice president of operations.
Carricaburu says it’s still too soon to tell how many pilots in Alaska will be affected by the new minimum flight-time requirement.
“Our pilot numbers have been fairly steady over the last several years, and so we’re not really seeing quite that much (impact) yet,” Carricaburu said.
FAA officials declined a Channel 2 request for comment on the changes Wednesday.
The air carriers said they hope the new rules won’t lead to pilot shortages in Alaska’s skies.
“We don’t know what’s going to happen in the future. We’re going to have to wait and see like everybody else,” Madden said.
Source: http://articles.ktuu.com
The FAA says all captains and co-pilots for so-called Part 121 carriers, including familiar Alaska names like Era Aviation and PenAir, will need to have at least 1,500 hours of flying time to fly for them.
Aviation experts say the regulation that made the change -- the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, passed by Congress in 2010 -- was a reaction to the 2009 Colgan Air crash that killed 50 people in Buffalo, N.Y. At that time, pilots were only required to have 250 hours of flight time before working in the cockpit.
Mark Madden, a professor with the University of Alaska Anchorage’s Aviation Technology program who instructs new pilots, says the act’s requirement for more flight hours was a knee-jerk reaction.
“It would have been much better in my opinion if they had concentrated on not the total minimum of flight hours, but instead on the quality and quantity of training that is required of the regional operators,” Madden said. “Minimum number of flight hours is not a good indication of the quality of the pilot; it’s the quality and quantity of training that makes the difference.”
Local Part 121 carriers say they’re not yet feeling the full effects of the new regulation, but will soon.
“Our worry of course, (is) if this moves forward, then the pilot demand in the major airlines will suck up all the resources -- leaving the regional carriers (in) a very desperate situation looking for pilots,” said Brian Carricaburu, PenAir’s vice president of operations.
Carricaburu says it’s still too soon to tell how many pilots in Alaska will be affected by the new minimum flight-time requirement.
“Our pilot numbers have been fairly steady over the last several years, and so we’re not really seeing quite that much (impact) yet,” Carricaburu said.
FAA officials declined a Channel 2 request for comment on the changes Wednesday.
The air carriers said they hope the new rules won’t lead to pilot shortages in Alaska’s skies.
“We don’t know what’s going to happen in the future. We’re going to have to wait and see like everybody else,” Madden said.
Source: http://articles.ktuu.com
Royal Canadian Air Force asked to help move Toronto elephants, watchdog says
The Royal Canadian Air Force is considering a proposal to move three Toronto-based elephants to a new home in California, a national zoo watchdog said Thursday.
Julie Woodyer, campaigns director with Zoocheck Canada, said she personally requested help from the military in order to ensure the pachyderms are relocated as soon as possible.
However, a spokeswoman for the Canadian Forces said Thursday that "no such request has been received."
"The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces receive numerous requests each year for the use of military resources," Capt. Kendrah Allison said in an email.
City councillors voted last November to transfer the only three elephants still living at the Toronto Zoo to the Performing Animal Welfare Society sanctuary (PAWS) in San Andreas, Calif., by year's end.
The move has been delayed in part due to the logistics of transporting the three huge animals, Woodyer said, adding those challenges prompted her to get the air force involved.
"There is no commercial option that is fully pressurized and has the height of the door to accommodate the tallest crate, which is 10 feet eight inches," Woodyer said in a telephone interview. "This would be the ideal situation."
Thursday meeting
Woodyer said she attended a meeting with both zoo and air force officials on Thursday morning.
She said all parties seemed receptive to the idea of leaving the animals in military hands for the move, but said the decision would ultimately lie with Defence Minister Peter MacKay. A refusal would mean the elephants would have to travel by ground, she said.
Allison said Thursday's meeting was intended to assess and better understand the issues involved should a request be made for military help moving the elephants.
"A determination is made based on factors such as the impact on Canadian Armed Forces operations, the availability of personnel and equipment, and legal and financial issues, as well as the impact on competing commercial enterprises," Allison said.
Transportation logistics are the latest headaches to plague relocation efforts for the zoo's elephants. City and zoo officials originally clashed over where Toka, Thika and Iringa should be housed due to concerns about tuberculosis at PAWS.
City council accepted an independent infectious disease report from a specialist veterinarian which found that PAWS is a safe facility and meets the requirements of the due diligence process.
Woodyer dismissed concerns that the three Toronto elephants would be exposed to tuberculosis, saying the disease was confined to one animal that would not be coming into contact with any new additions.
"It's essentially akin to saying you wouldn't go to hospital with your child with a broken leg because there was somebody in another wing that had TB," she said. "It's ridiculous."
The tuberculosis issue did not come up at Thursday's meeting, she said.
Woodyer said the move to PAWS must take place some time within the next three months before temperatures become too hot for the elephants.
U.S. officials peg the relocation costs at up to US$1 million, but PAWS will not be on the hook for the cost. Animal rights activist and former "The Price is Right" host Bob Barker has vowed to pick up the tab.
Story and Photo: http://www.cbc.ca
Julie Woodyer, campaigns director with Zoocheck Canada, said she personally requested help from the military in order to ensure the pachyderms are relocated as soon as possible.
However, a spokeswoman for the Canadian Forces said Thursday that "no such request has been received."
"The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces receive numerous requests each year for the use of military resources," Capt. Kendrah Allison said in an email.
City councillors voted last November to transfer the only three elephants still living at the Toronto Zoo to the Performing Animal Welfare Society sanctuary (PAWS) in San Andreas, Calif., by year's end.
The move has been delayed in part due to the logistics of transporting the three huge animals, Woodyer said, adding those challenges prompted her to get the air force involved.
"There is no commercial option that is fully pressurized and has the height of the door to accommodate the tallest crate, which is 10 feet eight inches," Woodyer said in a telephone interview. "This would be the ideal situation."
Thursday meeting
Woodyer said she attended a meeting with both zoo and air force officials on Thursday morning.
She said all parties seemed receptive to the idea of leaving the animals in military hands for the move, but said the decision would ultimately lie with Defence Minister Peter MacKay. A refusal would mean the elephants would have to travel by ground, she said.
Allison said Thursday's meeting was intended to assess and better understand the issues involved should a request be made for military help moving the elephants.
"A determination is made based on factors such as the impact on Canadian Armed Forces operations, the availability of personnel and equipment, and legal and financial issues, as well as the impact on competing commercial enterprises," Allison said.
Transportation logistics are the latest headaches to plague relocation efforts for the zoo's elephants. City and zoo officials originally clashed over where Toka, Thika and Iringa should be housed due to concerns about tuberculosis at PAWS.
City council accepted an independent infectious disease report from a specialist veterinarian which found that PAWS is a safe facility and meets the requirements of the due diligence process.
Woodyer dismissed concerns that the three Toronto elephants would be exposed to tuberculosis, saying the disease was confined to one animal that would not be coming into contact with any new additions.
"It's essentially akin to saying you wouldn't go to hospital with your child with a broken leg because there was somebody in another wing that had TB," she said. "It's ridiculous."
The tuberculosis issue did not come up at Thursday's meeting, she said.
Woodyer said the move to PAWS must take place some time within the next three months before temperatures become too hot for the elephants.
U.S. officials peg the relocation costs at up to US$1 million, but PAWS will not be on the hook for the cost. Animal rights activist and former "The Price is Right" host Bob Barker has vowed to pick up the tab.
Story and Photo: http://www.cbc.ca
Cessna 210C Centurion, C-FWUX: Accident occurred February 10, 2013 in Waskada, Manitoba - Canada
At approximately 1230 Central Standard Time, the privately registered Cessna 210C, (registration C-FWUX, serial number 21058098) departed a private airstrip located at Waskada, Manitoba, with a pilot and 3 passengers on board for a sightseeing flight in the local area. Approximately 30 minutes after the aircraft departed, fog moved into the area. At 1317 Central Standard Time, an emergency locator transmitter signal was received in the area. A search was undertaken and the wreckage was located 3 nautical miles north of Waskada. All occupants suffered fatal injuries. There was no post crash fire.
The pilot had recently acquired C-FWUX and had accumulated approximately 5 hours of flight time on the aircraft since its purchase. Although aware of the reported poor weather in the area, the pilot wanted to get some more flight hours on his new aircraft and considered that the local weather was suitable for a visual flight rules (VFR) flight. The pilot was planning to tour the local area, then fly to Brandon, Manitoba, for lunch.
At 1300, approximately 30 minutes after departure, the local weather deteriorated rapidly and fog rolled in over the private airstrip and surrounding area. An emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was reported to Winnipeg Area Control Centre at 1317 by an over-flying aircraft. After it was confirmed that C-FWUX had not landed at Brandon, a call was made to the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) at approximately 1610 to report the overdue aircraft. A search and rescue (SAR) aircraft tracked the aircraft’s ELT signal and located the aircraft at 1750. SAR technicians were deployed into the accident site and found that all occupants had suffered fatal injuries.
The 1200 aviation routine weather report (METAR) for Brandon, about 63 nautical miles (nm) northeast of the private airstrip, recorded the weather as surface winds 050° at 11 knots and surface visibility ¾ of 1 statute mile (sm) in light snow and mist, with broken clouds at 600 feet above ground level (agl). The graphical area forecast (GFACN32) clouds and weather, and icing, turbulence and freezing level charts for use starting at 1200 on 10 February 2013, indicated an overcast layer of cloud based at 2000 to 3000 feet above sea level (asl) and topped at 6000 feet asl in the Brandon and Waskada area (Appendix A – 1300 CST Clouds and Weather , Appendix B – 1300 CST Icing, Turbulence and Freezing Level ). Visibility was forecast to be 4 to greater than 6 sm in light snow with patchy areas of visibility greater than 6 sm. The ceilings in the area were forecast to be 600 to 1200 feet agl, with local visibility 1 sm in light freezing drizzle and mist with ceilings at 300 feet agl.
The pilot held a commercial pilot licence (CPL) valid for single-engine landplanes. The pilot did not have an instrument rating endorsement. The pilot met the currency requirements for the carriage of passengers. The pilot’s total flight time was approximately 5890 hours, flown mostly during the summer as an agricultural spraying pilot. The pilot had accumulated approximately 265 hours in the last 12 months. Autopsy results indicated that there were no pre-existing physiological conditions that would have impaired the pilot’s ability to conduct the intended flight.
http://tsb.gc.ca
A special hockey game taking place tonight in Waskada, Man., will remember a local pilot and three children who died in a small plane crash last month.
Darren Spence and his sons Logan and Gage, as well as their friend, Dawson Pentecost, all died after their Cessna crashed in a farm field near the southwestern Manitoba village on Feb. 10.
The victims were heavily involved in hockey in their community, so a game has been organized between the RCMP Horsemen and the Melita/Waskada Devils to raise money towards sending a child to hockey camp.
Cpl. Miles Hiebert says the tragedy affected many RCMP officers, and they wanted to help with a scholarship fund being set up in the boys' names.
"Aside from being law enforcement people, we're parents and fathers and mothers and family people, and it was so heartbreaking and so tragic," Hiebert said.
"These people really felt that they needed to do something to help the community get back together on its feet."
The game begins at 7 p.m. Thursday in Waskada.
Story and Photo: http://www.cbc.ca
NTSB Identification: ANC13WA022
14 CFR Unknown
Accident occurred Sunday, February 10, 2013 in Waskada, Canada
Aircraft: CESSNA 210, registration: C-FWUX
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
The foreign authority was the source of this information.
On February 10, 2013, about 1317 central standard time, a Cessna 210C airplane, (Canadian Registration C-FWUX) was on a flight from a private airport located 9 nautical miles east of Weskada, MB, to Brandon, MB, Canada. The airplane crashed 12 nautical miles east of Waskada. The pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries.
The accident investigation is under the jurisdiction and control of the Canadian government. This report is for information purposes only and contains only information released by or obtained from the Canadian government. Further information pertaining to this accident may be obtained from:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
200 Promenade du Portage
Place du Centre, 4th Floor
Hull, Quebec K1A 1K8
Canada
Tel.: (1) 819-994-4252
(1) 819-997-7887 (24 hour)
E-mail: airops@tsb.gc.ca
Fax: (1) 819-953-9586
Website: http://www.tsb.gc.ca
The pilot had recently acquired C-FWUX and had accumulated approximately 5 hours of flight time on the aircraft since its purchase. Although aware of the reported poor weather in the area, the pilot wanted to get some more flight hours on his new aircraft and considered that the local weather was suitable for a visual flight rules (VFR) flight. The pilot was planning to tour the local area, then fly to Brandon, Manitoba, for lunch.
At 1300, approximately 30 minutes after departure, the local weather deteriorated rapidly and fog rolled in over the private airstrip and surrounding area. An emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was reported to Winnipeg Area Control Centre at 1317 by an over-flying aircraft. After it was confirmed that C-FWUX had not landed at Brandon, a call was made to the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) at approximately 1610 to report the overdue aircraft. A search and rescue (SAR) aircraft tracked the aircraft’s ELT signal and located the aircraft at 1750. SAR technicians were deployed into the accident site and found that all occupants had suffered fatal injuries.
The 1200 aviation routine weather report (METAR) for Brandon, about 63 nautical miles (nm) northeast of the private airstrip, recorded the weather as surface winds 050° at 11 knots and surface visibility ¾ of 1 statute mile (sm) in light snow and mist, with broken clouds at 600 feet above ground level (agl). The graphical area forecast (GFACN32) clouds and weather, and icing, turbulence and freezing level charts for use starting at 1200 on 10 February 2013, indicated an overcast layer of cloud based at 2000 to 3000 feet above sea level (asl) and topped at 6000 feet asl in the Brandon and Waskada area (Appendix A – 1300 CST Clouds and Weather , Appendix B – 1300 CST Icing, Turbulence and Freezing Level ). Visibility was forecast to be 4 to greater than 6 sm in light snow with patchy areas of visibility greater than 6 sm. The ceilings in the area were forecast to be 600 to 1200 feet agl, with local visibility 1 sm in light freezing drizzle and mist with ceilings at 300 feet agl.
The pilot held a commercial pilot licence (CPL) valid for single-engine landplanes. The pilot did not have an instrument rating endorsement. The pilot met the currency requirements for the carriage of passengers. The pilot’s total flight time was approximately 5890 hours, flown mostly during the summer as an agricultural spraying pilot. The pilot had accumulated approximately 265 hours in the last 12 months. Autopsy results indicated that there were no pre-existing physiological conditions that would have impaired the pilot’s ability to conduct the intended flight.
http://tsb.gc.ca
A special hockey game taking place tonight in Waskada, Man., will remember a local pilot and three children who died in a small plane crash last month.
Darren Spence and his sons Logan and Gage, as well as their friend, Dawson Pentecost, all died after their Cessna crashed in a farm field near the southwestern Manitoba village on Feb. 10.
The victims were heavily involved in hockey in their community, so a game has been organized between the RCMP Horsemen and the Melita/Waskada Devils to raise money towards sending a child to hockey camp.
Cpl. Miles Hiebert says the tragedy affected many RCMP officers, and they wanted to help with a scholarship fund being set up in the boys' names.
"Aside from being law enforcement people, we're parents and fathers and mothers and family people, and it was so heartbreaking and so tragic," Hiebert said.
"These people really felt that they needed to do something to help the community get back together on its feet."
The game begins at 7 p.m. Thursday in Waskada.
Story and Photo: http://www.cbc.ca
NTSB Identification: ANC13WA022
14 CFR Unknown
Accident occurred Sunday, February 10, 2013 in Waskada, Canada
Aircraft: CESSNA 210, registration: C-FWUX
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
The foreign authority was the source of this information.
On February 10, 2013, about 1317 central standard time, a Cessna 210C airplane, (Canadian Registration C-FWUX) was on a flight from a private airport located 9 nautical miles east of Weskada, MB, to Brandon, MB, Canada. The airplane crashed 12 nautical miles east of Waskada. The pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries.
The accident investigation is under the jurisdiction and control of the Canadian government. This report is for information purposes only and contains only information released by or obtained from the Canadian government. Further information pertaining to this accident may be obtained from:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
200 Promenade du Portage
Place du Centre, 4th Floor
Hull, Quebec K1A 1K8
Canada
Tel.: (1) 819-994-4252
(1) 819-997-7887 (24 hour)
E-mail: airops@tsb.gc.ca
Fax: (1) 819-953-9586
Website: http://www.tsb.gc.ca
Consular and trade officials take tour of Thrush Aircraft
Thibauld Quirion, the USA director for Enterprise Rhone-Alpes International, a global economic development facilitator, talks with Thrush Aircraft's sales and marketing director Eric Rojek during a tour of the Albany plant Thursday, March 21, 2013.
ALBANY, Ga. — George Novak was surprised Thursday to find, almost 5,000 miles from his home country, a little piece of home at an agricultural aircraft manufacturer in Albany.
The Consul General of the Czech Republic noticed, as he was walking among the aircraft parts at Thrush Aircraft, that the engines that power the planes that spray crops the world over are originally manufactured in his home country.
That Georgia, Czech connection is exactly what state and local economic development officials are hoping grows after dignitaries and trade officials from 23 different countries took a tour through Albany Thursday.
"It's all about learning about different opportunities and learning what's happening in different parts of Georgia," Claudio Leoncavallo, the Consul General of Switzerland and the dean of the Atlanta Consular Corps, said. "Most of my colleagues and myself cover a large territory in the south and we travel to many states so we don't have that many opportunities to travel in Georgia itself so it's important for us to learn what's happening and report to our head offices to draw attention to this region and look for opportunities to create jobs both here in Georgia and in our home countries."
The three day tour showcases Southwest Georgia to an audience that it seldom has an opportunity to see. Thursday, representatives of Haiti, Canada, Belgium, Argentina, France and many other countries strolled through the Thrush manufacturing complex near the Southwest Georgia Regional Airport learning about opportunities for import and export with Georgia-grown businesses.
Albany is no stranger to international business dealings. In 2010, Coats and Clark, a U.K.-based thread and yarn manufacturer expanded their facilities in Albany; an event that brought Paul Forman, the group chief executive and member of the Coats board of directors, across the pond to cut the ribbon on a new 400,000 square-foot distribution center.
Thrush has grown on the international stage since taking over the Ayers product line in 2003. The company now has aircraft in 80 countries being used for applications that stretch way beyond the original crop dusting its predecessors established themselves with, including fire fighting, drug eradication, rice sowing and environmental cleanup.
Story, Reaction/Comments, Video, Photo: http://www.albanyherald.com
ALBANY, GA (WALB) - Thrush Aircraft is very much involved in international trade. Trade officials and representatives from 23 countries continued their tour of Albany and southwest Georgia with a stop at a growing crop duster manufacturer.
But for some on the tour, this specialized aircraft can provide more than agriculture opportunities.
It's a continental visit to Thrush Aircraft. Representatives from 23 countries getting a look at one of America's top crop duster manufacturers.
"We are always looking at ways to improve food security in the country," said Cynthia Blanford, who represents Liberia. A post-war west African Nation. "We are importing 80% of everything that we eat on an annual basis at $80 million a year," she said.
Last year thrush rolled out 50 planes. "That's about a plane a week and we've actually increased our production this year, our goal is to go to 65," said Eric Rojek VP of Sales for Thrush.
Thrush has sold aircraft to buyers in 80 countries. And while it's met the agricultural needs of many these, dusters not only spray crops. In some places they save lives. "Malaria is one of our biggest challenges," said Blanford.
"It's currently in operation Africa fighting malaria as we speak," said Rojek said of his plane.
And as Liberia looks to combat that problem as well as well its food needs. This trip could prove worthwhile for both the country and the South Georgia company.
"We certainly welcome the opportunities for companies like Thrush to sit down and meet with me and my counterparts to figure out how me might develop a collaborative relationship," said Blanford.
One that could equal more growth for an already growing at home manufacturer.
In The VIP guests later traveled to Thomasville and Southwest Georgia Technical College. Last year, Georgia earned more than $36 billion from international trade.
Story and Photos: http://www.walb.com
Toddler killed by remote control helicopter
Nurdamia Husnina Banee Yamin
SEREMBAN: An 18-month-old baby was killed by a remote control helicopter which crashed at the launch of the Paroi Youth and Sports Complex synthetic football field, here on Wednesday night.
Nurdamia Husnina Banee Yamin died upon arrival at the Tuanku Ja’afar Hospital in the 10pm incident.
The toy helicopter had also grazed the head of the baby’s father, Banee Yamin Idris, 35, who also sought treatment at the same hospital.
A witness, Abdul Latif Salim, said the toy helicopter was seen to have lost control before plunging towards the public.
He said he managed to dodge the falling toy before it hit the baby who was being carried by the father.
“The baby’s head was bleeding and the father rushed her into an ambulance to get to the hospital,” he said.
The remote control helicopter show was a part of the event officiated by Menteri Besar Datuk Seri Mohamad Hasan.
Mohamad, when met by reporters after visiting the victim at the hospital, said he regretted the incident which he described as unexpected.
He said the state government would set up an investigation board to look into the matter and to ensure it did not recur in the future.
He said the state government would also make sure that the victim’s family received the necessary assistance.
Meanwhile, Seremban Police Chief ACP Saiful Azly Kamaruddin said the 40-year-old equipment operator had filed a police report and the case was being investigated under Section 304A of the Penal Code.
Poland resumes investigation of President Kaczynski's plane crash
WARSAW, March 21 - RAPSI, Yevgeny Bezeka. A Polish court has quashed the decision taken last year by the prosecutors office to close the case of alleged violations of flight rules during the preparation of President Lech Kaczynskis visit to Smolensk on April 10, 2010, PAP Polish Press Agency reports.
The prosecutors said they did not find signs of any crime. The daughter of the late president Marta Kaczynska and his brother Jaroslaw Kaczynski filed an appeal against this ruling.
The Polish authorities investigated the actions of the prime ministers and the presidents secretariat and the ministries of foreign affairs and defense. Military prosecutors are currently investigating the potential involvement of military personnel, because the plane that crashed belonged to the Defense Ministry. The case involving civilians was investigated separately. It was turned over to the district prosecutors office in Warsaw in 2011 and closed in June 2012.
The prosecutors looked into the preparations of the two official Polish visits to Smolensk, one by Prime Minister Donald Tusk on April 7, 2010, and the other by President Lech Kaczynski on April 10, 2010. They uncovered a number of violations committed by officials, but concluded that legally none of these constituted a crime of negligence.
A Polish Tu-154 plane carrying former President Lech Kaczynski, his wife, and a large group of high-ranking officials crashed near Smolensk due to thick fog on April 10, 2010, killing 96 people. The Moscow-based Interstate Aviation Committee issued a final report in late July 2011, placing the blame entirely on the Polish crew. Meanwhile, Poland, which carried out a separate investigation, partially blamed the Russian air traffic controllers for the tragedy.
Source: http://rapsinews.com
NTSB Identification: ENG10RA025
14 CFR Unknown
Accident occurred Saturday, April 10, 2010 in Smolensk, Russia
Aircraft: TUPOLEV TU154, registration:
Injuries: 89 Fatal.
The foreign authority was the source of this information.
On April 10, 2010, about 0656 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a Tupolev Tu-154M, Tail Number 101, operated by the Polish Air Force as flight PLF101, crashed during approach to the Military Aerodrom Smolensk "Severnyi", Russia. All 89 passengers and 7 flightcrew were killed, including the President of Poland. The airplane was destroyed by impact and postcrash fire.
Following the accident, the governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland concluded a bilateral agreement that the regional international independent safety investigation organization, the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC), would conduct the investigation. Although the airplane was operated as a "state" aircraft, by the mutual agreement, the investigation was conducted following the guidance provided in ICAO Annex 13 Standards and Recommended Practices. As the United States was state of design and manufacture for the TAWS and FMS units, the NTSB was requested to support the investigation activity.
For more information on the accident investigation, contact MAK at mak@mak.ru.
The prosecutors said they did not find signs of any crime. The daughter of the late president Marta Kaczynska and his brother Jaroslaw Kaczynski filed an appeal against this ruling.
The Polish authorities investigated the actions of the prime ministers and the presidents secretariat and the ministries of foreign affairs and defense. Military prosecutors are currently investigating the potential involvement of military personnel, because the plane that crashed belonged to the Defense Ministry. The case involving civilians was investigated separately. It was turned over to the district prosecutors office in Warsaw in 2011 and closed in June 2012.
The prosecutors looked into the preparations of the two official Polish visits to Smolensk, one by Prime Minister Donald Tusk on April 7, 2010, and the other by President Lech Kaczynski on April 10, 2010. They uncovered a number of violations committed by officials, but concluded that legally none of these constituted a crime of negligence.
A Polish Tu-154 plane carrying former President Lech Kaczynski, his wife, and a large group of high-ranking officials crashed near Smolensk due to thick fog on April 10, 2010, killing 96 people. The Moscow-based Interstate Aviation Committee issued a final report in late July 2011, placing the blame entirely on the Polish crew. Meanwhile, Poland, which carried out a separate investigation, partially blamed the Russian air traffic controllers for the tragedy.
Source: http://rapsinews.com
NTSB Identification: ENG10RA025
14 CFR Unknown
Accident occurred Saturday, April 10, 2010 in Smolensk, Russia
Aircraft: TUPOLEV TU154, registration:
Injuries: 89 Fatal.
The foreign authority was the source of this information.
On April 10, 2010, about 0656 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a Tupolev Tu-154M, Tail Number 101, operated by the Polish Air Force as flight PLF101, crashed during approach to the Military Aerodrom Smolensk "Severnyi", Russia. All 89 passengers and 7 flightcrew were killed, including the President of Poland. The airplane was destroyed by impact and postcrash fire.
Following the accident, the governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland concluded a bilateral agreement that the regional international independent safety investigation organization, the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC), would conduct the investigation. Although the airplane was operated as a "state" aircraft, by the mutual agreement, the investigation was conducted following the guidance provided in ICAO Annex 13 Standards and Recommended Practices. As the United States was state of design and manufacture for the TAWS and FMS units, the NTSB was requested to support the investigation activity.
For more information on the accident investigation, contact MAK at mak@mak.ru.
Piper PA-30 Twin Comanche, ZK-DOK: Taieri Aerodrome (NZTI) , Mosgiel, Otago, New Zealand
Just moments earlier, he commented how dirty his $200,000 plane looked, and how strange it felt to be watching it rather than flying it as it did a high-speed fly-past over the airfield about noon.
Slideshow: Light plane runway excursion at Taieri
As the plane made its final approach, and glided metres above the runway, concern began to creep in.
''Gee, he's leaving that late,'' he said.
''He's going fast. He should go around again.''
When the plane touched down more than halfway down the runway, pilots standing around him started asking each other if they thought the pilot was going to pull up, go around again - or if he was going to stop in time.
Then Mr Small was advised by a fellow pilot: ''Don't look, don't look,'' as the plane ploughed through a fence at the end of the runway and came to a halt.
Fortunately, the two men and the woman on board were able to walk away without injury - not even a bruise.
And as organizers started to run towards the crash site, pilots began offering Mr Small their commiserations over the damage to his plane.
While he was concerned about his aeroplane, he was more concerned at the time for those on board.
''It's just a piece of machinery.
''At least they got to walk away.''
The plane was one of more than 30 taking part in the Flying New Zealand Air Safari, of which Mr Small is one of the organizers - hence the reason he was not flying the plane.
The participants were flying in from Wanaka, and stopping at Taieri Aerodrome to refuel and have lunch, before continuing to Timaru.
He had hired out his plane to the young trio so they could take part in the safari.
After emergency services left the scene, he credited the pilot for his good decision-making skills.
''These kinds of crashes happen. I've seen four or five go through fences at the end of runways.
''Once he [the pilot] got that far into it, he was committed.
''He made the right decision to take the fence out because if he had tried to boot the aeroplane and go around again, it could have been a lot worse.''
The damage to the plane was ''relatively minor'' and mainly affected the fuselage, he said.
The plane will be grounded at Taieri until it is repaired and safety checked. Under New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority regulations, the pilot was forbidden to speak to the Otago Daily Times after the incident.
Flying New Zealand president John Brunskill believed the pilot was experienced. He also believed the pilot did the right thing by choosing to go through the fence.
Had he caught the fence while still in the air, it could have flipped the plane, causing serious injury to those on board, and damage to the plane, he said.
''Taking off and landing is the most dangerous time. It's all about timing.''
Despite the incident, the 10-day Air Safari continued otherwise as normal to Timaru yesterday afternoon.
Mr Small said the safari began in Masterton earlier this week, and flew to Wanaka, via Hokitika, on Wednesday.
The plan was to do a ''figure eight'' around New Zealand. The aircraft would fly around the North Island this weekend, before finishing in Motueka on Wednesday next week.
Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA, N26DK: Accident occurred March 17, 2013 in South Bend, Indiana
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/14/2016
Aircraft: HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), during cruise flight, the unqualified pilot-rated passenger was manipulating the aircraft controls, including the engine controls, under the supervision and direction of the private pilot. After receiving a descent clearance to 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the pilot told the pilot-rated passenger to reduce engine power to maintain a target airspeed. The cockpit area microphone subsequently recorded the sound of both engines spooling down. The pilot recognized that the pilot-rated passenger had shutdown both engines after he retarded the engine throttles past the flight idle stops into the fuel cutoff position. Specifically, the pilot stated "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." According to air traffic control (ATC) radar track data, at the time of the dual engine shutdown, the airplane was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport and was descending through 6,700 feet msl. The pilot reported to the controller that the airplane had experienced a dual loss of engine power, declared an emergency, and requested radar vectors to the destination airport. As the flight approached the destination airport, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter spooling up; however, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine. The CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne, with both engines still inoperative, while on an extended base leg to the runway. Subsequently, the controller told the pilot to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern to make another landing approach. Witness accounts indicated that only the nose landing gear was extended during the second landing approach. The witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community. The postaccident examinations and testing did not reveal any anomalies or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.
Although the CVR did not record a successful engine restart, the pilot was able to initiate a go-around during the initial landing attempt, which implies that he was able to restart at least one engine during the initial approach. The investigation subsequently determined that only the left engine was operating at impact. Following an engine start, procedures require that the respective generator be reset to reestablish electrical power to the Essential Bus. If the Essential Bus had been restored, all aircraft systems would have operated normally. However, the battery toggle switch was observed in the Standby position at the accident site, which would have prevented the Essential Bus from receiving power regardless of whether the generator had been reset. As such, the airplane was likely operating on the Standby Bus, which would preclude the normal extension of the landing gear. However, the investigation determined that the landing gear alternate extension handle was partially extended. The observed position of the handle would have precluded the main landing gear from extending (only the nose landing gear would extend). The investigation determined that it is likely the pilot did not fully extend the handle to obtain a full landing gear deployment. Had he fully extended the landing gear, a successful single-engine landing could have been accomplished.
In conclusion, the private pilot's decision to allow the unqualified pilot-rated passenger to manipulate the airplane controls directly resulted in the inadvertent dual engine shutdown during cruise descent. Additionally, the pilot's inadequate response to the emergency, including his failure to adhere to procedures, resulted in his inability to fully restore airplane systems and ultimately resulted in a loss of airplane control.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The private pilot's inadequate response to the dual engine shutdown during cruise descent, including his failure to adhere to procedures, which ultimately resulted in his failure to maintain airplane control during a single-engine go-around. An additional cause was the pilot's decision to allow the unqualified pilot-rated passenger to manipulate the airplane controls, which directly resulted in the inadvertent dual engine shutdown.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger, who were occupying the cockpit seats, were fatally injured. An additional two passengers, who were seated in the cabin area, and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed the Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1356 central daylight time.
According to air traffic control (ATC) information, after departing RVS, the accident flight proceeded toward the intended destination while receiving normal ATC services. The flight was eventually cleared to a final cruise altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410). The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contained about 31 minutes of cockpit conversation/audio and radio communications. At 1545:31, the beginning of the CVR recording, the pilot was discussing the airplane's fuel status and how much fuel would be required for the return flight. The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate various flight management system functions to the pilot-rated-passenger. At 1546:08, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked "a lot of stuff to learn." The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate the features of the flight management system, the use of his mobile tablet as an electronic flight bag, and the airplane's various weight limitations.
At 1552:17, the pilot established contact with Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and reported being level at FL410. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to descend to 24,000 feet (FL240). After receiving the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger discussed how to initiate a descent using the autopilot's vertical speed mode. The pilot explained how to use airplane pitch and engine power and to maintain a desired airspeed during the descent. At 1555:22, the pilot stated "we're up more speed, so we got to get our power back. gettin' ready to start beeping at us. got to bring it back." At 1555:27, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning for 13.5 seconds. At 1555:31, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot, "just pull it way back?" The pilot replied, "well, just get it out of the line. and we got to get it so, that it trends -- there you go -- there you go -- now give it -- it ends, there you go." The pilot continued to explain how to maintain a desired airspeed. At 1555:55, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked, "I just hate chasin' the darn thing." The pilot replied, "huh, how many hours you got flying this jet?" The pilot-rated-passenger stated, "well, I know, but I'm just saying it's just, you know, uncomfortable. Creates alarm in the back -- throttle up, throttle down."
The pilot then explained how to setup a descent while maintaining a specified airspeed. At 1557:29, the pilot-rated passenger stated, "so, pull back?" The pilot replied, "little bit. little bit. keep working it back 'cause that tells you where you're gonna be in six seconds. so, right now, you're going to be at the line in six seconds, so you want to continue to trend back. so yeah. so, just take two seventy or something like that." At 1557:53, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to "just keep us out the red."
At 1558:08, the controller cleared the flight direct to South Bend. After acknowledging the direct clearance, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger how to program the flight management system to proceed direct to the destination airport. The pilot then discussed the airplane's indicated airspeed, ground speed, and how to cross-check the airplane's flight attitude with the backup cockpit instrumentation. At 1559:24, the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) recording is audible over the radio channel. At 1559:42, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot if they needed to engage engine heat. The pilot replied that they would wait until they get an ice indication light. At 1600:34, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot "okay. pull back on the power?"
At 1601:35, the controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 20,000 feet (FL200). At 1602:13, the pilot discussed the current weather conditions that he had obtained from the ATIS recording, the expected wind correction during the approach and landing, the minimum descent altitude during the instrument approach, and the landing reference speed. At 1603:22, the controller asked the pilot to expedite a descent to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). At 1603:51, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "watch your speed" and "very good, very good. great speed management."
At 1605:08, a sound similar to the altitude alert was heard, the pilot announced "thousand away" and told the pilot-rated-passenger "okay, now we can come nose back up." At 1605:29, the pilot stated "let's go to the stop... to the click (detent)... MCT (maximum continuous thrust)." At 1606:14, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning that lasted for 11.4 seconds. At 1606:20, the pilot stated "that's what a check pilot will do, is he'll give you three things to do... when he knows you're trending in the wrong direction." At 1606:32, the pilot said "your throttles."
At 1606:49, the controller cleared the flight to expedite a descent to maintain 11,000 feet msl. After acknowledging the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated passenger continued to discuss how to maintain airspeed during a cruise descent. At 1607:23, the controller asked the pilot for a ride report. The pilot replied that the weather conditions had been "smooth all the way." At 1607:52, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to maintain 290 knots. The pilot-rated-passenger replied "okay, where is it?" The pilot responded "two ninety would be more power." At 1608:44, the controller issued a heading change for traffic sequencing. The pilot then explained how to promote a waypoint using the flight management system and how to plan for a descent to the selected waypoint. At 1610:11, the controller cleared the flight direct the destination airport and to contact South Bend Approach Control.
At 1610:32, the pilot established communications with South Bend Approach Control and reported being level at 11,000 feet msl. The approach controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE, the outer marker for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 9R instrument approach, but to expect a visual approach to the airport. The pilot then explained how to promote KNUTE as the next active waypoint within the flight management system, and how to plan for the descent to the waypoint. At 1611:45, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:07, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 3,000 feet msl.
After receiving the descent clearance to 3,000 feet msl, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "let's power back. let's bring it back to uh -- let's trend toward uh two twenty, two ten." The pilot-rated-passenger acknowledged and the pilot replied "and we'll have to come way out of it to do that." At 1613:30, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. The pilot then verbalized a descent checklist and turned on the seatbelt cabin chime. At 1614:14, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "we gotta get -- just pull -- just pull the power out." At 1614:18, the pilot-rated-passenger asked, "just pull it on down?" The pilot replied, "yeah, let's -- let's get back to two hundred (knots)." At 1614:21, the cockpit area microphone recorded another sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. At 1614:26, the cockpit area microphone recorded the sound of two clicks. At 1614:27, there was a brief interruption in electrical power, an autopilot disconnect chime, and two unidentified tones. According to ATC radar track data, at 1614:28, the final radar return with an accompanying mode-C altitude return was recorded at 6,700 feet msl. At that time, the flight was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport. At 1614:29, the pilot said "uh-oh" and the pilot-rated-passenger replied "what?" At 1614:33, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 3.5 seconds. At 1614:35, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." (The airplane throttle quadrant had a mechanical stop at the flight idle power position, which required lifting finger levers, or pull-up locks, to further retard the throttles into the fuel cut-off position.)
At 1614:43, the pilot said "okay let's see here... boost pumps are on... okay we are dead stick." At 1614:56, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 10.9 seconds. At 1615:01, the approach controller told the pilot to turn five degrees left for runway 9R and to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:02, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter/generator spooling up; however, according to a sound spectrum study, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. At 1615:08, the pilot told the approach controller, "uh... South Bend, we have an emergency, two six delta kilo. dead engines, dead stick, no power." The controller asked if he needed assistance and the pilot replied "affirm." Between 1615:19 and 1615:27, there was a sustained electrical power interruption to the CVR. At 1615:30, the controller asked for the pilot's intentions and the pilot replied "uh, we've lost all power and we have no hydraulics." At 1615:32, there was the sound similar to an altitude alert.
At 1615:38, the controller stated that the airport would have emergency equipment standing-by and asked if the airplane was controllable. At 1615:42, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller told the pilot that all of the runways were available for landing and issued the current wind condition. At 1615:53, the pilot told the controller "uh, we have no navigation. if you could give us a vector please... we have no heading either. which -- you're gonna have to tell us which way to fly." The controller replied that the airplane was about 9 miles from the airport, which was at the 12-o'clock position. At 1616:09, the pilot-rated-passenger stated "there's the airport" and the pilot responded "Where? -- Okay." At 1616:12, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was audible until the end of the CVR recording. At 1616:13, the approach controller told the pilot to turn left 10 degrees. At 1616:16, the pilot replied "two six delta, turning left." At 1616:32, the CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne with both engines still inoperative.
No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:59, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to the runway with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
--- Pilot ---
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was type-rated for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet. His last aviation medical examination was completed on January 22, 2013, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate. The medical certificate had a limitation that it was not valid for any certificate classification after January 31, 2014. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using a partially completed pilot logbook, a spreadsheet flight log, several applications for his FAA pilot certificates and ratings, and a spreadsheet history of the flights that had been completed in the accident airplane. The pilot began his primary flight instruction on January 21, 2011. On April 29, 2011, when he applied for his private pilot certificate, he reported having 71 hours total time. On February 5, 2012, when he applied for his instrument rating, the pilot reported having 314 hours total time. On February 26, 2012, when he applied for his multi-engine rating, the pilot reported having 330 hours total time. On May 4, 2012, when he applied for his type-rating in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390, the pilot reported having 450 hours total time. According to additional flight documentation, after he had received his type-rating, the pilot accumulated an additional 163.7 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot's total flight experience was estimated to be about 613.7 hours, of which at least 171.5 hours were completed in the same make/model as the accident airplane.
According to training records, from April 29, 2012, through May 4, 2012, the pilot attended initial type-rating training for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane at The Jetstream Group, located in Chino, California. The course consisted of 41 hours of ground training, 8 hours of flight briefing/debriefing, and 7.8 hours of flight training in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane. On May 4, 2012, the pilot obtained his type-rating following a 2.1-hour oral examination and a 2.0 hour checkride with a FAA designated pilot examiner.
--- Pilot-Rated-Passenger ---
According to FAA records, the pilot-rated-passenger, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on August 3, 2005, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with the limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
A review of available logbook information indicated that the last recorded flight was completed on September 28, 2008. At that time, the pilot-rated-passenger had accumulated 1,877.2 hours total flight experience, of which 1,705.3 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 1,576.2 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 301 hours in single-engine airplanes. He had accumulated 92.4 hours in actual instrument conditions and 517.6 hours at night. His last recorded flight review and instrument proficiency check was completed on September 19, 2006, in a Beech model 60 twin-engine airplane. A review of available information did not reveal any logged flight experience in turbine-powered business jets.
According to an affidavit provided by the pilot's son following the accident, the pilot-rated-passenger was not an employee of the operator, nor was he employed as a pilot for the accident flight. He was reportedly a friend of the pilot who shared a common interest in aviation. He reportedly did not have an official role on the accident flight, and as such, was considered a pilot-rated-passenger.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident airplane was a 2008 Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, serial number RB-226. Two Williams International model FJ44-2A turbofan engines, each capable of producing 2,300 pounds of thrust at takeoff, powered the airplane. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules and in known icing conditions.
The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on March 13, 2008. According to FAA documentation, 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, purchased the airplane on April 18, 2012. The current FAA registration certificate was issued on May 1, 2012. The airplane was maintained under the provisions of a FAA-approved manufacturer inspection program. The last inspection of the airplane was completed on November 4, 2012, at 419 hours total airframe time. As of the last inspection, both engines also had accumulated 419 hours since new. The static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were last tested on July 7, 2011. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane hour meter indicated 457.5 hours at the accident site.
The primary flight control systems, except the spoilers, were manually operated through control cables, push/pull tubes, and mechanical linkages. The spoilers were electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated. The pitch trim system, roll trim system, and yaw trim system were electrically operated. The speed brake was controlled electrically and operated hydraulically. The flaps were electronically controlled and electrically actuated.
Pitch attitude of the airplane was controlled by the elevators and the variable incidence horizontal stabilizer. The elevator control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control columns. Roll attitude was controlled through the ailerons, spoilers and roll trim. The aileron control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control wheels. The spoiler control system was electrically controlled by movement of the cockpit control wheels and hydraulically actuated. Yaw control was accomplished by the rudder and rudder trim tab. The rudder control system was operated manually by moving the cockpit rudder pedals.
The cockpit engine thrust levers were connected to control cables that extended aft through the fuselage to the power control arm located on the bottom of each hydromechanical fuel control unit (HMU). In addition to the mechanical throttle linkages to the HMUs, each engine had an electronic control unit (ECU) that interfaced with its respective HMU to provide automatic fuel control throughout the normal engine operating envelope. The ECUs were part of the Standby Bus electrical system. Finger levers, or pull-up locks, were installed to prevent the inadvertent movement of the thrust levers from flight idle into the fuel cutoff position. To access the fuel cutoff position, the pull-up locks are lifted as the thrust levers are moved aft into the fuel cutoff position. During normal flight, with the engines operating, placing the thrust levers into the fuel cutoff position will shut off fuel flow to the engine and cause the engines to shut down.
During normal operation, the Standby Bus is powered by the Essential Bus. The Essential Bus receives electrical power from the main battery and generators (when online). During engine prestart and engine start, the ECUs are powered by the main battery until a generator is brought online. The generators are used as starter motors during normal engine starts and starter-assisted air starts. As such, following an engine start, a generator is reset by selecting the associated toggle switch that is located on the electrical control sub-panel. The momentary reset toggle switch position reestablishes electrical power from the generator to the Essential Bus system. During normal engine operation, the ECUs are powered by the generators through the Essential Bus; however, the ECUs could also be powered by the standby battery, through the Standby Bus, if the standby battery is selected following the depletion of the main battery.
The airplane's main battery was a 24-volt direct current (DC), maintenance free lead-acid battery with a minimum performance capacity of 42 ampere-hours. The battery provides power for self-contained engine starts and is a backup power source for the Essential Bus components.
The standby battery was a 5 ampere-hour, lead-acid battery. The standby battery was used to supply 24-volts DC to the Standby Bus and 5 volts DC for lighting of selected components during abnormal power conditions. The standby bus supplies electrical power to dedicated airplane components to sustain safe operation of the airplane when no other source of power is available. According to the airframe manufacturer, the standby battery was designed to supply 150 watts of power for a minimum of 30 minutes or until the cutoff voltage of 20 volts DC is reached.
In abnormal power situations, the main battery is used to provide airplane power until a generator is reset and brought back online. Furthermore, if a starter/generator is inoperative due to a loss of engine power, the main battery is designed to power the starter/generator to reignite the affected engine. In the event the battery switch is selected to Standby, regardless if the generators have been reset, electrical power would not be available to the essential bus (only the Standby bus would be powered). Additional information concerning the airplane electrical system, including a list of components found on the Essential and Standby Buses, is included with the docket materials associated with this investigation.
In the event of a loss of engine power during flight, an engine can be restarted in the air by one of two methods: either a windmilling start or a starter-assisted air start. A windmilling start uses residual engine speed, air movement against the fan blades, and engine igniters to restart the engine and regain power. A starter-assisted air start uses electrical power, routed through the generator/starter motor, to increase the N2 shaft to a speed where the igniters can restart the engine. Generally, the flight envelope to accomplish an engine air start is between 130 and 300 knots indicated airspeed and from sea level to 25,000 feet. At lower airspeeds, a starter-assisted air start is recommended and uses the normal engine start switch. At higher airspeeds a windmilling start is recommended and does not use the normal engine start switch. In contrast to the normal ground start procedure, the air start procedure requires that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start.
The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled, hydraulically actuated, retractable landing gear. If hydraulic or electric power is unavailable, an alternate procedure is used to extend the landing gear. When the alternate landing gear extension handle, located at the base of the left-side control column, is pulled outward from the stowed position, the landing gear and door up-lock hooks are released, which allows the landing gear to free-fall into the down-and-locked position. The use of the alternate landing gear handle also opens a mechanically actuated recirculation valve that connects the main landing gear retraction and extension hydraulic lines to allow a more positive free-fall of the gear. The landing gear release is sequenced so that the nose gear is released first, followed by the main landing gear inboard doors, and finally the main landing gear. According to the airframe manufacturer, the nose landing gear is released from the up-locks when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The main landing gear inboard doors are released when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-3/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). Finally, the main landing gear are released from their respective up-locks when the alternate extension handle is pulled to 3-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The full stroke length of the alternate extension handle, following a full deployment of the landing gear, is specified to be a minimum of 4 inches.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1620, the SBN automated surface observing system reported: wind 120 degrees at 13 knots, gusting 17 knots; a clear sky; 10 mile surface visibility; temperature 2 degrees Celsius; dew point -8 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury.
COMMUNICATIONS
The accident flight was on an activated instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A review of available ATC information indicated that the accident flight had received normal air traffic control services and handling. A transcript of the voice communications recorded between the accident flight and South Bend Approach Control are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The South Bend Airport (SBN), a public airport located approximately 3 miles northwest of South Bend, Indiana, was owned and operated by the St. Joseph County Airport Authority. The airport was a certificated airport under 14 CFR Part 139 and had on-airport fire and rescue services. The airport field elevation was 799 feet msl. The airport had three runways: runway 9R/27L (8,414 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); runway 18/36 (7,100 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); and runway 9L/27R (4,300 feet by 75 feet, asphalt).
FLIGHT RECORDERS
Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild model FA2100-1010 CVR, serial number 446023. The CVR recording contained about 31 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR was not damaged during the accident and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1545:31 with the airplane established in cruise flight at 41,000 feet (FL410), and the recording stopped about 1616:32 while the airplane was maneuvering toward the destination airport with both engines inoperative. A transcript of the CVR audio information is included with the docket materials associated with the investigation. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane collided with three residential structures during the final impact sequence. A majority of the wreckage was found within one of the structures. There was a noticeable odor of Jet-A fuel at the accident site and the South Bend Fire Department reported that fuel had pooled in the basement of the house. The airplane wreckage was recovered from the house and transported to the South Bend Airport to facilitate a more detailed examination. A postaccident examination of the runway 9R revealed areas of abrasion damage to the grooved asphalt surface. The observed damage was consistent with the accident airplane coming in contact with the runway surface during the accident flight.
--- Fuselage ---
The radome had separated from the radome bulkhead, which had separated from the fuselage. The nose baggage and avionics sections had separated forward of the forward pressure bulkhead and the nose wheel well structure had buckled. The cabin area exhibited impact damage; however, portions remained intact from the forward pressure bulkhead to the aft pressure bulkhead. A section of the right cabin sidewall, from the emergency escape hatch opening forward to approximately the right side galley area, had been cut open by first responders to extract the occupants. The aft fuselage had separated from the cabin portion at the aft pressure bulkhead, but remained attached by flight control cables and other conduits. Both engines remained attached to the aft fuselage. The main entry door remained attached at both hinge locations and was found open with the latches in the closed position. The main entry door latching mechanism was actuated and operated as designed. Examination of the fuselage revealed no evidence of an in-flight or post-impact fire. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna had separated from the lower fuselage, and exhibited gouges and scoring of the lower leading edge that were consistent with contact with the runway surface. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna was recovered from the runway by airport personnel following the accident.
--- Wings ---
The wing assembly had separated from the airframe at all mounting points. The left wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces, but remained intact with all flight control surfaces attached. The right wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces and had separated in several locations. The inboard portion of the right wing exhibited minor damage when compared to the outboard wing. The outboard portion of the right wing, outboard of the inboard flap, exhibited impact damage, deformation, and had separated into several pieces. The outboard portion of the right wing, from the aileron outboard, had separated as one piece, with the exception of the composite wing tip assembly. The composite wing tip assembly had separated from the outboard end of the wing and was found amongst the main wreckage. The lower skin of the outboard portion of right wing and the lower skin of the composite wing tip exhibited gouging/scoring that was consistent with contact with the runway surface. The marks made by the gouging/scoring were approximately parallel with the chord of the wing and were aligned with the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. Additional abrasion damage was observed on the lower aft portion of all right wing flap tracks and the aft portion of the wing center keel structure. The trailing edge of the right aileron also exhibited abrasion damage. The wing flaps were observed in the retracted position and the measurement of the individual flap actuators corresponded with fully retracted flap positions. The aileron flight control system displayed multiple separations throughout the circuit; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure. The roll trim actuators remained attached to their respective aileron and were observed to be extended 1.3 inches. The roll trim tabs were visually aligned (faired) with the aileron trailing edge, consistent with a neutral position.
--- Stabilizers ---
The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the rear fuselage and revealed limited impact damage. The pitch trim actuator remained attached to its mounting location in the vertical stabilizer and was attached to the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. The pitch trim actuator extension was observed to be extended 17-5/8 inches. The elevators remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer at all hinges. The outboard portion of the right elevator, including the balance weight, had separated from the remaining right elevator. The right and left elevator trim tab surfaces remained attached to their respective elevators at their hinges. Both elevator trim tab surfaces were visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the respective elevator. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and the hinges exhibited no apparent damage. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder at the hinges and did not appear to be damaged. The rudder trim tab surface was visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the rudder. Flight control continuity for the elevator and rudder displayed multiple separations; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure or had been cut to facilitate wreckage recovery.
--- Landing Gear ---
The nose landing gear had separated from the airframe trunnion. The nose landing gear drag brace had separated from the nose landing gear assembly and the airframe supporting structure. The down lock actuator and down lock "pawl" assembly had separated from the drag brace assembly. The nose wheel and tire remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly. The nose wheel exhibited signs of impact damage to a portion of the bead area. The nose landing gear doors had separated from the airframe and were found amongst the main wreckage. The nose landing gear actuator had separated from the airframe in two pieces. The piston portion of the actuator remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly.
The left main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the left wing trunnion. The gear was found in the wheel well; however, the uplock was not engaged to the main landing gear uplock roller. The left main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and to the wing supporting structure. The actuator was found in the retracted position; however, multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by the measurement of the landing gear actuator. The left outboard gear door remained attached to the wing structure and the left main landing gear assembly. The left inboard gear door had separated from the wing and was found in several pieces amongst the main wreckage. The left inboard gear door actuator remained attached to the wing. About 90-percent of the inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The paint on the exterior portions of the door appeared to be eroded, consistent with contact with the runway surface while in the closed position.
The right main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the wing structure. The right wing had separated between the main landing gear trunnion fitting and the main landing gear actuator wing attach fitting. The main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and the wing attach fitting. The right main landing gear actuator was partially extended; the actuator was in neither the fully retracted nor the down-and-locked position. Multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by measurement of the landing gear actuator. The right main landing gear outboard door had separated from the wing and was not recovered during the investigation. About 60-percent of the right inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The reconstructed portion of the door exhibited exterior paint abrasion that was consistent with door in the closed position. The inboard gear door actuator remained attached the wing.
--- Cockpit Switch and Lever Positions ---
Both engine power levers were in the normal takeoff position. Both levers were bent right and forward approximately 45-degrees. The power levers moved smoothly from the normal takeoff position to the flight idle detent. There was a positive indication at the normal takeoff and flight idle stops. The finger levers, which allow the power levers to be moved aft of the flight idle detent into fuel cut-off, could not be activated/pulled because of damage to both the power levers and the finger levers.
The flap handle was in the 20-degree detent position. Although the flap handle was bent, it could be moved between each flap position detent. A positive detent was noted at each flap position.
The lift dump switch was in the "Unlock" position. The lift dump handle was in the retracted position.
The speed brake was in the "RETRACT" position.
The landing gear position handle located in the cockpit was observed in the "UP" position. The cockpit landing gear circuit breaker was in the closed (not pulled) position. The landing gear alternate extension handle was found partially extended about 1-1/2 inches and was bent toward the instrument panel.
The battery toggle switch was in the "Standby" position.
Both generator toggle switches were in the "ON" position.
Both avionics switches were in the "ON" position.
The left fuel boost switch was in the "ON" position.
The position of the right fuel boost switch could not be determined due to impact damage.
The fuel transfer switch was in the "OFF" position.
Both engine ECU switches were in the "ON" position.
Both engine ignition switches were in the "ARM" position.
Engine synchronization was in the "OFF" position.
Additional cockpit switch positions are included in the docket materials associated with this investigation.
--- Engines ---
A postaccident examination of the left engine, serial number 105363, revealed evidence of leading edge foreign object damage to the N1 (Spool) Fan, consistent with the ingestion of debris during the impact sequence. Although damaged, the N1 Fan could still be rotated by hand. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm located at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The Low Pressure (LP) Trip Lever cable exhibited no visible damage, and the fuel cutoff mechanism had not been activated. All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination revealed evidence that the left engine was operating at the time of impact.
A postaccident examination of the right engine, serial number 105364, revealed evidence of attic insulation, pieces of home roofing shingles, pieces of wood, and other unidentified debris within the engine cowling and bypass duct. However, the N1 fan did not reveal visible evidence of leading edge foreign object damage that would be expected from the ingestion of debris in conjunction with engine operation. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The LP Trip Lever cable was found bent and damaged, and the LP Trip Lever fuel cutoff mechanism had been activated. (The LP Shaft Trip Sensor is activated when the LP turbine is forced in the aft direction against the trip lever. Typical scenarios of when a trip sensor would be activated include a LP Shaft separation or when the engine is exposed to significant impact loading.) All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination did not reveal any evidence that the right engine was operating at the time of impact.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
On March 18, 2013, autopsies were performed on the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, located in Mishawka, Indiana. The cause of death for both individuals was attributed to blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during each autopsy.
The pilot's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Losartan, an FAA-accepted high blood pressure medication, was detected in urine and blood samples. The pilot had reported the use of this medication on his most recent FAA medical certificate application.
The pilot-rated-passenger's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
--- Sound Spectrum Study ---
A study was performed to evaluate the sound spectrum of audio recorded by the cockpit area microphone after the loss of engine power at 1614:27. The CVR audio was compared with audio recorded during ground testing of an exemplar Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA). The sound spectrum study indicated that, at 1615:02, the pilot engaged a starter motor in attempt to restart one of the engines. The study further established that the electrical noise from the engine igniters was not present at any point during the CVR recording, including the attempted engine air start. (The air start procedure required that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start) A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine.
--- Surveillance Video Study ---
There were several surveillance videos of the accident airplane during the two landing attempts, and the final descent and impact. A study of airport surveillance footage was completed to determine an average ground speed of the airplane during the second landing attempt. The study determined that the airplane's average ground speed was 127 knots (+/- 4 knots) during the 3.75 seconds of camera footage of the second landing attempt. Additional information concerning the surveillance videos can be found with the docket materials associated with this investigation.
--- Mobile Device Examinations ---
Several mobile devices were recovered from the wreckage and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination.
The pilot's tablet mobile device contained several aviation related applications; however, none of the applications contained flight track data for the accident flight. One application, ForeFlight, depicted the planned route-of-flight for the accident flight. Additionally, the ForeFlight application also contained 160 file-and-brief entries for previous flights. Another application, LogTen Pro, contained a partial flight history log.
The pilot's mobile phone was reviewed and no information pertinent to the investigation was recovered.
The pilot-rated-passenger's mobile phone contained a text message, dated March 13, 2013, concerning a previous flight that he had in the accident airplane with the pilot. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
Another passenger's mobile phone contained multiple out-going text messages with timestamps between 13:45 and 13:53 central daylight time. These text messages noted that the accident flight was about to takeoff and provided the expected time en route to South Bend. At 1505 eastern daylight time, a multi-media text message was sent with a photograph from inside the airplane cabin looking toward the cockpit. At 1612, another photo was taken from inside the cabin looking outside through a cabin window. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
--- Starter-Generator Examinations ---
An initial visual examination of both starter-generators determined that their drive shafts were intact and the armatures rotated. The brush covers were removed and the brushes were observed to be in a good condition. The starter-generators were examined and tested at the manufacturer and no failures or anomalies were noted that would have prevented normal operation.
--- Generator Control Unit Examinations ---
Visual examination revealed the outer dust sleeve for the left generator control unit (GCU) was dented; however, further disassembly revealed no internal damage. The right GCU appeared to be undamaged. Both devices were examined and tested at the manufacturer and no failures or anomalies were noted that would have prevented normal operation.
--- Battery Examinations ---
During the on-site investigation, the no-load voltage of the main battery was 25 volts. Additional examination, at the manufacturer, confirmed that the battery was electrically intact and exceeded the acceptance test standards for a new battery. The standby battery was visually inspected at the accident site and no additional testing was completed.
--- Throttle Quadrant Assembly Examinations ---
The throttle quadrant assembly was removed from the airplane and examined at the manufacturer. A visual inspection revealed that both throttle levers were bent to the right and the fuel cutoff pull-up locks were jammed. There was foreign object debris, mostly loose attic insulation, found within the throttle quadrant assembly. To facilitate additional testing, the throttle arms were straightened to a vertical position. A partial Acceptance Test Procedure was completed because of existing damage to the throttle quadrant assembly. An electrical continuity check confirmed proper function of the throttle quadrant at each switch location.
--- Engine Electronic Control Unit Examinations ---
Both engine electronic control units (ECU) were examined and tested at the manufacturer on a Williams FJ44-2A engineering test cell. After a successful bit check at power-up, the contents of the ECU's non-volatile memory were downloaded. The examination of the recorded fault codes from each ECU determined no faults were recorded during the last flight in memory. Additionally, neither device contained any information regarding the engine operation during the last recorded flight.
Additional component examination summaries are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
One of the surviving passengers was interviewed by two NTSB Human Performance and Survival Factors investigators. The passenger reported that he loaded his luggage and computer gear on the airplane between 1330 and 1345 central daylight time. After loading, he and the other passenger boarded the airplane and waited for the pilots. Around 1350, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger boarded the airplane. The passengers were not provided a safety briefing. He stated that the takeoff and cruise portion of the flight appeared to be normal; however, while the airplane was on approach to the runway he noticed instrument panel was not illuminated like it had been earlier in the flight. Specifically, he recalled that the cockpit instrument panel appeared to be unpowered. He saw that the pilot was manually flying the airplane. The pilot-rated-passenger turned around and announced that they should prepare for landing. The passenger stated that he became concerned when the airplane flew past the terminal and control tower and had not touched down. He noted that he felt like the airplane was "coming in hot." The airplane then banked right and climbed away from the runway. The passenger heard the pilot tell the pilot-rated-passenger that they were "down to one engine." The airplane continued in the traffic pattern back to the runway. The passenger stated that the cockpit instrument panel still appeared to be unpowered during the second landing attempt; however, he did recall seeing flashing red and yellow cockpit lights. The passenger believed that during the second landing attempt the airplane had a slower groundspeed when compared to the first landing attempt. He noted that the airplane bounced off the runway several times before it entered a nose-high attitude and rolled to the right. He remembered seeing rooftops of homes before he blacked-out. His next memory was after the accident, as first responders attempted to gain access to the cabin.
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The following is an INTERIM FACTUAL SUMMARY of this accident investigation. A final report that includes all pertinent facts, conditions, and circumstances of the accident will be issued upon completion, along with the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause of the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger, who were occupying the cockpit seats, were fatally injured. An additional two passengers, who were seated in the cabin area, and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed the Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1356 central daylight time.
According to air traffic control (ATC) information, after departing RVS, the accident flight proceeded toward the intended destination while receiving normal ATC services. The flight was eventually cleared to a final cruise altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410). The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contained about 31 minutes of cockpit conversation/audio and radio communications. At 1545:31, the beginning of the CVR recording, the pilot was discussing the airplane's fuel status and how much fuel would be required for the return flight. The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate various flight management system functions to the pilot-rated-passenger. At 1546:08, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked "a lot of stuff to learn." The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate the features of the flight management system, the use of his mobile tablet as an electronic flight bag, and the airplane's various weight limitations.
At 1552:17, the pilot established contact with Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and reported being level at FL410. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to descend to 24,000 feet (FL240). After receiving the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger discussed how to initiate a descent using the autopilot's vertical speed mode. The pilot explained how to use airplane pitch and engine power and to maintain a desired airspeed during the descent. At 1555:22, the pilot stated "we're up more speed, so we got to get our power back. gettin' ready to start beeping at us. got to bring it back." At 1555:27, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning for 13.5 seconds. At 1555:31, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot, "just pull it way back?" The pilot replied, "well, just get it out of the line. and we got to get it so, that it trends -- there you go -- there you go -- now give it -- it ends, there you go." The pilot continued to explain how to maintain a desired airspeed. At 1555:55, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked, "I just hate chasin' the darn thing." The pilot replied, "huh, how many hours you got flying this jet?" The pilot-rated-passenger stated, "well, I know, but I'm just saying it's just, you know, uncomfortable. Creates alarm in the back -- throttle up, throttle down."
The pilot then explained how to setup a descent while maintaining a specified airspeed. At 1557:29, the pilot-rated passenger stated, "so, pull back?" The pilot replied, "little bit. little bit. keep working it back 'cause that tells you where you're gonna be in six seconds. so, right now, you're going to be at the line in six seconds, so you want to continue to trend back. so yeah. so, just take two seventy or something like that." At 1557:53, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to "just keep us out the red."
At 1558:08, the controller cleared the flight direct to South Bend. After acknowledging the direct clearance, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger how to program the flight management system to proceed direct to the destination airport. The pilot then discussed the airplane's indicated airspeed, ground speed, and how to cross-check the airplane's flight attitude with the backup cockpit instrumentation. At 1559:24, the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) recording is audible over the radio channel. At 1559:42, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot if they needed to engage engine heat. The pilot replied that they would wait until they get an ice indication light. At 1600:34, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot "okay. pull back on the power?"
At 1601:35, the controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 20,000 feet (FL200). At 1602:13, the pilot discussed the current weather conditions that he had obtained from the ATIS recording, the expected wind correction during the approach and landing, the minimum descent altitude during the instrument approach, and the landing reference speed. At 1603:22, the controller asked the pilot to expedite a descent to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). At 1603:51, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "watch your speed" and "very good, very good. great speed management."
At 1605:08, a sound similar to the altitude alert was heard, the pilot announced "thousand away" and told the passenger-rated-pilot "okay, now we can come nose back up." At 1605:29, the pilot stated "let's go to the stop... to the click (detent)... MCT (maximum continuous thrust)." At 1606:14, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning that lasted for 11.4 seconds. At 1606:20, the pilot stated "that's what a check pilot will do, is he'll give you three things to do... when he knows you're trending in the wrong direction." At 1606:32, the pilot said "your throttles."
At 1606:49, the controller cleared the flight to expedite a descent to maintain 11,000 feet msl. After acknowledging the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated passenger continued to discuss how to maintain airspeed during a cruise descent. At 1607:23, the controller asked the pilot for a ride report. The pilot replied that the weather conditions had been "smooth all the way." At 1607:52, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to maintain 290 knots. The pilot-rated-passenger replied "okay, where is it?" The pilot responded "two ninety would be more power." At 1608:44, the controller issued a heading change for traffic sequencing. The pilot then explained how to promote a waypoint using the flight management system and how to plan for a descent to the selected waypoint. At 1610:11, the controller cleared the flight direct the destination airport and to contact South Bend Approach Control.
At 1610:32, the pilot established communications with South Bend Approach Control and reported being level at 11,000 feet msl. The approach controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE, the outer marker for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 9R instrument approach, but to expect a visual approach to the airport. The pilot then explained how to promote KNUTE as the next active waypoint within the flight management system, and how to plan for the descent to the waypoint. At 1611:45, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:07, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 3,000 feet msl.
After receiving the descent clearance to 3,000 feet msl, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "let's power back. let's bring it back to uh -- let's trend toward uh two twenty, two ten." The pilot-rated-passenger acknowledged and the pilot replied "and we'll have to come way out of it to do that." At 1613:30, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. The pilot then verbalized a descent checklist and turned on the seatbelt cabin chime. At 1614:14, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "we gotta get -- just pull -- just pull the power out." At 1614:18, the pilot-rated-passenger asked, "just pull it on down?" The pilot replied, "yeah, let's -- let's get back to two hundred (knots)." At 1614:21, the cockpit area microphone recorded another sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. At 1614:26, the cockpit area microphone recorded the sound of two clicks. At 1614:27, there was a brief interruption in electrical power, an autopilot disconnect chime, and two unidentified tones. According to ATC radar track data, at 1614:28, the final radar return with an accompanying mode-C altitude return was recorded at 6,700 feet msl. At that time, the flight was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport. At 1614:29, the pilot said "uh-oh" and the pilot-rated-passenger replied "what?" At 1614:33, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 3.5 seconds. At 1614:35, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." (The airplane throttle quadrant had a mechanical stop at the flight idle power position, which required lifting finger levers, or pull-up locks, to further retard the throttles into the fuel cut-off position.)
At 1614:43, the pilot said "okay let's see here... boost pumps are on... okay we are dead stick." At 1614:56, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 10.9 seconds. At 1615:01, the approach controller told the pilot to turn five degrees left for runway 9R and to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:02, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter/generator spooling up; however, according to a sound spectrum study, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. At 1615:08, the pilot told the approach controller, "uh... South Bend, we have an emergency, two six delta kilo. dead engines, dead stick, no power." The controller asked if he needed assistance and the pilot replied "affirm." Between 1615:19 and 1615:27, there was a sustained electrical power interruption to the CVR. At 1615:30, the controller asked for the pilot's intentions and the pilot replied "uh, we've lost all power and we have no hydraulics." At 1615:32, there was the sound similar to an altitude alert.
At 1615:38, the controller stated that the airport would have emergency equipment standing-by and asked if the airplane was controllable. At 1615:42, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller told the pilot that all of the runways were available for landing and issued the current wind condition. At 1615:53, the pilot told the controller "uh, we have no navigation. if you could give us a vector please... we have no heading either. which -- you're gonna have to tell us which way to fly." The controller replied that the airplane was about 9 miles from the airport, which was at the 12-o'clock position. At 1616:09, the pilot-rated-passenger stated "there's the airport" and the pilot responded "Where? -- Okay." At 1616:12, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was audible until the end of the CVR recording. At 1616:13, the approach controller told the pilot to turn left 10 degrees. At 1616:16, the pilot replied "two six delta, turning left." At 1616:32, the CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne with both engines still inoperative.
No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:59, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to the runway with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
--- Pilot ---
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was type-rated for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet. His last aviation medical examination was completed on January 22, 2013, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate. The medical certificate had a limitation that it was not valid for any certificate classification after January 31, 2014. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using a partially completed pilot logbook, a spreadsheet flight log, several applications for his FAA pilot certificates and ratings, and a spreadsheet history of the flights that had been completed in the accident airplane. The pilot began his primary flight instruction on January 21, 2011. On April 29, 2011, when he applied for his private pilot certificate, he reported having 71 hours total time. On February 5, 2012, when he applied for his instrument rating, the pilot reported having 314 hours total time. On February 26, 2012, when he applied for his multi-engine rating, the pilot reported having 330 hours total time. On May 4, 2012, when he applied for his type-rating in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390, the pilot reported having 450 hours total time. According to additional flight documentation, after he had received his type-rating, the pilot accumulated an additional 163.7 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot's total flight experience was estimated to be about 613.7 hours, of which at least 171.5 hours were completed in the same make/model as the accident airplane.
According to training records, from April 29, 2012, through May 4, 2012, the pilot attended initial type-rating training for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane at The Jetstream Group, located in Chino, California. The course consisted of 41 hours of ground training, 8 hours of flight briefing/debriefing, and 7.8 hours of flight training in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane. On May 4, 2012, the pilot obtained his type-rating following a 2.1-hour oral examination and a 2.0 hour checkride with a FAA designated pilot examiner.
--- Pilot-Rated-Passenger ---
According to FAA records, the pilot-rated-passenger, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on August 3, 2005, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with the limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
A review of available logbook information indicated that the last recorded flight was completed on September 28, 2008. At that time, the pilot-rated-passenger had accumulated 1,877.2 hours total flight experience, of which 1,705.3 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 1,576.2 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 301 hours in single-engine airplanes. He had accumulated 92.4 hours in actual instrument conditions and 517.6 hours at night. His last recorded flight review and instrument proficiency check was completed on September 19, 2006, in a Beech model 60 twin-engine airplane. A review of available information did not reveal any logged flight experience in turbine-powered business jets.
According to an affidavit provided by the pilot's son following the accident, the pilot-rated-passenger was not an employee of the operator, nor was he employed as a pilot for the accident flight. He was reportedly a friend of the pilot who shared a common interest in aviation. He reportedly did not have an official role on the accident flight, and as such, was considered a pilot-rated-passenger.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident airplane was a 2008 Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, serial number RB-226. Two Williams International model FJ44-2A turbofan engines, each capable of producing 2,300 pounds of thrust at takeoff, powered the airplane. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules and in known icing conditions.
The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on March 13, 2008. According to FAA documentation, 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, purchased the airplane on April 18, 2012. The current FAA registration certificate was issued on May 1, 2012. The airplane was maintained under the provisions of a FAA-approved manufacturer inspection program. The last inspection of the airplane was completed on November 4, 2012, at 419 hours total airframe time. As of the last inspection, both engines also had accumulated 419 hours since new. The static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were last tested on July 7, 2011. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane hour meter indicated 457.5 hours at the accident site.
The primary flight control systems, except the spoilers, were manually operated through control cables, push/pull tubes, and mechanical linkages. The spoilers were electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated. The pitch trim system, roll trim system, and yaw trim system were electrically operated. The speed brake was controlled electrically and operated hydraulically. The flaps were electronically controlled and electrically actuated.
Pitch attitude of the airplane was controlled by the elevators and the variable incidence horizontal stabilizer. The elevator control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control columns. Roll attitude was controlled through the ailerons, spoilers and roll trim. The aileron control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control wheels. The spoiler control system was electrically controlled by movement of the cockpit control wheels and hydraulically actuated. Yaw control was accomplished by the rudder and rudder trim tab. The rudder control system was operated manually by moving the cockpit rudder pedals.
The cockpit engine thrust levers were connected to control cables that extended aft through the fuselage to the power control arm located on the bottom of each hydromechanical fuel control unit (HMU). In addition to the mechanical throttle linkages to the HMUs, each engine had an electronic control unit (ECU) that interfaced with its respective HMU to provide automatic fuel control throughout the normal engine operating envelope. The ECUs were part of the Standby Bus electrical system. Finger levers, or pull-up locks, were installed to prevent the inadvertent movement of the thrust levers from flight idle into the fuel cutoff position.
During normal operation, the Standby Bus is powered by the Essential Bus. The Essential Bus receives electrical power from the main battery and generators (when online). During engine prestart and engine start, the ECUs are powered by the main battery until a generator is brought online. The generators are used as starter motors during normal engine starts and starter-assisted air starts. As such, following an engine start, a generator is "RESET" by selecting the associated toggle switch that is located on the electrical control sub-panel. The momentary "RESET" toggle switch position reestablishes electrical power from the generator to the Essential Bus system. During normal engine operation, the ECUs are powered by the generators through the Essential Bus; however, the ECUs could also be powered by the standby battery, through the Standby Buss, if the standby battery is selected following the depletion of the main battery.
In the event of a loss of engine power during flight, an engine can be restarted in the air by one of two methods: either a windmilling start or a starter-assisted air start. A windmilling start uses residual engine speed, air movement against the fan blades, and engine igniters to restart the engine and regain power. A starter-assisted air start uses electrical power, routed through the generator/starter motor, to increase the N2 shaft to a speed where the igniters can restart the engine. Generally, the flight envelope to accomplish an engine air start is between 130 and 300 knots indicated airspeed and from sea level to 25,000 feet. At lower airspeeds, a starter-assisted air start is recommended and uses the normal engine start switch. At higher airspeeds a windmilling start is recommended and does not use the normal engine start switch. In contrast to the normal ground start procedure, the air start procedure requires that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start.
The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled, hydraulically actuated, retractable landing gear. If hydraulic or electric power is unavailable, an alternate procedure is used to extend the landing gear. When the alternate landing gear extension handle was pulled outward from the stowed position, the landing gear and door up-lock hooks are released, which allows the landing gear to free-fall into the down-and-locked position. The use of the alternate landing gear handle also opens a mechanically actuated recirculation valve that connects the main landing gear retraction and extension hydraulic lines to allow a more positive free-fall of the gear. The landing gear release is sequenced so that the nose gear is released first, followed by the main landing gear inboard doors, and finally the main landing gear. According to the airframe manufacturer, the nose landing gear is released from the up-locks when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The main landing gear inboard doors are released when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-3/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). Finally, the main landing gear are released from their respective up-locks when the alternate extension handle is pulled to 3-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The full stroke length of the alternate extension handle, following a full deployment of the landing gear, is specified to be a minimum of 4 inches.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1620, the SBN automated surface observing system reported: wind 120 degrees at 13 knots, gusting 17 knots; a clear sky; 10 mile surface visibility; temperature 2 degrees Celsius; dew point -8 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury.
COMMUNICATIONS
The accident flight was on an activated instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A review of available ATC information indicated that the accident flight had received normal air traffic control services and handling. A transcript of the voice communications recorded between the accident flight and South Bend Approach Control are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The South Bend Airport (SBN), a public airport located approximately 3 miles northwest of South Bend, Indiana, was owned and operated by the St. Joseph County Airport Authority. The airport was a certificated airport under 14 CFR Part 139 and had on-airport fire and rescue services. The airport field elevation was 799 feet msl. The airport had three runways: runway 9R/27L (8,414 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); runway 18/36 (7,100 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); and runway 9L/27R (4,300 feet by 75 feet, asphalt).
FLIGHT RECORDERS
Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild model FA2100-1010 CVR, serial number 446023. The CVR recording contained about 31 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR was not damaged during the accident and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1545:31 with the airplane established in cruise flight at 41,000 feet (FL410), and the recording stopped about 1616:32 while the airplane was maneuvering toward the destination airport with both engines inoperative. A transcript of the CVR audio information is included with the docket materials associated with the investigation. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane collided with three residential structures during the final impact sequence. A majority of the wreckage was found within one of the structures. There was a noticeable odor of Jet-A fuel at the accident site and the South Bend Fire Department reported that fuel had pooled in the basement of the house. The airplane wreckage was recovered from the house and transported to the South Bend Airport to facilitate a more detailed examination. A postaccident examination of the runway 9R revealed areas of abrasion damage to the grooved asphalt surface. The observed damage was consistent with the accident airplane coming in contact with the runway surface during the accident flight.
--- Fuselage ---
The radome had separated from the radome bulkhead, which had separated from the fuselage. The nose baggage and avionics sections had separated forward of the forward pressure bulkhead and the nose wheel well structure had buckled. The cabin area exhibited impact damage; however, portions remained intact from the forward pressure bulkhead to the aft pressure bulkhead. A section of the right cabin sidewall, from the emergency escape hatch opening forward to approximately the right side galley area, had been cut open by first responders to extract the occupants. The aft fuselage had separated from the cabin portion at the aft pressure bulkhead, but remained attached by flight control cables and other conduits. Both engines remained attached to the aft fuselage. The main entry door remained attached at both hinge locations and was found open with the latches in the closed position. The main entry door latching mechanism was actuated and operated as designed. Examination of the fuselage revealed no evidence of an in-flight or post-impact fire. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna had separated from the lower fuselage, and exhibited gouges and scoring of the lower leading edge that were consistent with contact with the runway surface.
--- Wings ---
The wing assembly had separated from the airframe at all mounting points. The left wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces, but remained intact with all flight control surfaces attached. The right wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces and had separated in several locations. The inboard portion of the right wing exhibited minor damage when compared to the outboard wing. The outboard portion of the right wing, outboard of the inboard flap, exhibited impact damage, deformation, and had separated into several pieces. The outboard portion of the right wing, from the aileron outboard, had separated as one piece, with the exception of the composite wing tip assembly. The composite wing tip assembly had separated from the outboard end of the wing and was found amongst the main wreckage. The lower skin of the outboard portion of right wing and the lower skin of the composite wing tip exhibited gouging/scoring that was consistent with contact with the runway surface. The marks made by the gouging/scoring were approximately parallel with the chord of the wing and were aligned with the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. Additional abrasion damage was observed on the lower aft portion of all right wing flap tracks and the aft portion of the wing center keel structure. The trailing edge of the right aileron also exhibited abrasion damage. The wing flaps were observed in the retracted position and the measurement of the individual flap actuators corresponded with fully retracted flap positions. The aileron flight control system displayed multiple separations throughout the circuit; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.
--- Stabilizers ---
The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the rear fuselage and revealed limited impact damage. The elevators remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer at all hinges. The outboard portion of the right elevator, including the balance weight, had separated from the remaining right elevator. The right and left elevator trim tab surfaces remained attached to their respective elevators at their hinges. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and the hinges exhibited no apparent damage. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder at the hinges and did not appear to be damaged. The rudder trim tab surface was visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the rudder. Flight control continuity for the elevator and rudder displayed multiple separations; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.
--- Landing Gear ---
The nose landing gear had separated from the airframe trunnion. The nose landing gear drag brace had separated from the nose landing gear assembly and the airframe supporting structure. The down lock actuator and down lock "pawl" assembly had separated from the drag brace assembly. The nose wheel and tire remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly. The nose wheel exhibited signs of impact damage to a portion of the bead area. The nose landing gear doors had separated from the airframe and were found amongst the main wreckage. The nose landing gear actuator had separated from the airframe in two pieces. The piston portion of the actuator remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly.
The left main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the left wing trunnion. The gear was found in the wheel well; however, the uplock was not engaged to the main landing gear uplock roller. The left main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and to the wing supporting structure. The actuator was found in the retracted position; however, multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by the measurement of the landing gear actuator. The left outboard gear door remained attached to the wing structure and the left main landing gear assembly. The left inboard gear door had separated from the wing and was found in several pieces amongst the main wreckage. The left inboard gear door actuator remained attached to the wing. About 90-percent of the inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The paint on the exterior portions of the door appeared to be eroded, consistent with contact with the runway surface while in the closed position.
The right main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the wing structure. The right wing had separated between the main landing gear trunnion fitting and the main landing gear actuator wing attach fitting. The main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and the wing attach fitting. The right main landing gear actuator was partially extended; the actuator was in neither the fully retracted nor the down-and-locked position. Multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by measurement of the landing gear actuator. The right main landing gear outboard door had separated from the wing and was not recovered during the investigation. About 60-percent of the right inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The reconstructed portion of the door exhibited exterior paint erosion that was consistent with door being abraded in the closed position. Additionally, there was evidence that the left tire had pressed against the interior of the door when the exterior abrasion had occurred. The inboard gear door actuator remained attached the wing.
--- Cockpit Switch and Lever Positions ---
Both engine power levers were in the normal takeoff position. Both levers were bent right and forward approximately 45-degrees. The power levers moved smoothly from the normal takeoff position to the flight idle detent. There was a positive indication at the normal takeoff and flight idle stops. The finger levers, which allow the power levers to be moved aft of the flight idle detent into fuel cut-off, could not be activated/pulled because of damage to both the power levers and the finger levers.
The flap handle was in the 20-degree detent position. Although the flap handle was bent, it could be moved between each flap position detent. A positive detent was noted at each flap position.
The lift dump switch was in the "Unlock" position. The lift dump handle was in the retracted position.
The speed brake was in the "RETRACT" position.
The landing gear position handle located in the cockpit was observed in the "UP" position. The cockpit landing gear circuit breaker was in the closed (not pulled) position. The landing gear alternate extension handle was found partially extended about 1-1/2 inches and was bent toward the instrument panel.
The battery toggle switch was in the "Standby" position.
Both generator toggle switches were in the "ON" position.
Both avionics switches were in the "ON" position.
The left fuel boost switch was in the "ON" position.
The position of the right fuel boost switch could not be determined due to impact damage.
The fuel transfer switch was in the "OFF" position.
Both engine ECU switches were in the "ON" position.
Both engine ignition switches were in the "ARM" position.
Engine synchronization was in the "OFF" position.
--- Engines ---
A postaccident examination of the left engine, serial number 105363, revealed evidence of leading edge foreign object damage to the N1 (Spool) Fan, consistent with the ingestion of debris during the impact sequence. Although damaged, the N1 Fan could still be rotated by hand. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm located at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The Low Pressure (LP) Trip Lever cable exhibited no visible damage, and the fuel cutoff mechanism had not been activated. All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination revealed evidence that the left engine was operating at the time of impact.
A postaccident examination of the right engine, serial number 105364, revealed evidence of attic insulation, pieces of home roofing shingles, pieces of wood, and other unidentified debris within the engine cowling and bypass duct. However, the N1 fan did not reveal visible evidence of leading edge foreign object damage that would be expected from the ingestion of debris in conjunction with engine operation. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The LP Trip Lever cable was found bent and damaged, and the LP Trip Lever fuel cutoff mechanism had been activated. (The LP Shaft Trip Sensor is activated when the LP turbine is forced in the aft direction against the trip lever. Typical scenarios of when a trip sensor would be activated include a LP Shaft separation or when the engine is exposed to significant impact loading.) All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination did not reveal any evidence that the right engine was operating at the time of impact.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
On March 18, 2013, autopsies were performed on the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, located in Mishawka, Indiana. The cause of death for both individuals was attributed to blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during each autopsy.
The pilot's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Losartan, an FAA-accepted high blood pressure medication, was detected in urine and blood samples. The pilot had reported the use of this medication on his most recent FAA medical certificate application.
The pilot-rated-passenger's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
--- Sound Spectrum Study ---
A study was performed to evaluate the sound spectrum of audio recorded by the cockpit area microphone after the loss of engine power at 1614:27. The CVR audio was compared with audio recorded during ground testing of an exemplar Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA). The sound spectrum study indicated that, at 1615:02, the pilot engaged a starter motor in attempt to restart one of the engines. The study further established that the electrical noise from the engine igniters was not present at any point during the CVR recording, including the attempted engine air start. (The air start procedure required that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start) A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine.
--- Surveillance Video Study ---
There were several surveillance videos of the accident airplane during the two landing attempts, and the final descent and impact. A study of airport surveillance footage was completed to determine an average ground speed of the airplane during the second landing attempt. The study determined that the airplane's average ground speed was 127 knots (+/- 4 knots) during the 3.75 seconds of camera footage of the second landing attempt. Additional information concerning the surveillance videos can be found with the docket materials associated with this investigation.
--- Mobile Device Examinations ---
Several mobile devices were recovered from the wreckage and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination.
The pilot's tablet mobile device contained several aviation related applications; however, none of the applications contained flight track data for the accident flight. One application, ForeFlight, depicted the planned route-of-flight for the accident flight. Additionally, the ForeFlight application also contained 160 file-and-brief entries for previous flights. Another application, LogTen Pro, contained a partial flight history log.
The pilot's mobile phone was reviewed and no information pertinent to the investigation was recovered.
The pilot-rated-passenger's mobile phone contained a text message, dated March 13, 2013, concerning a previous flight that he had in the accident airplane with the pilot. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
Another passenger's mobile phone contained multiple out-going text messages with timestamps between 13:45 and 13:53 central daylight time. These text messages noted that the accident flight was about to takeoff and provided the expected time en route to South Bend. At 1505 eastern daylight time, a multi-media text message was sent with a photograph from inside the airplane cabin looking toward the cockpit. At 1612, another photo was taken from inside the cabin looking outside through a cabin window. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
One of the surviving passengers was interviewed by two NTSB Human Performance and Survival Factors investigators. The passenger reported that he loaded his luggage and computer gear on the airplane between 1330 and 1345 central daylight time. After loading, he and the other passenger boarded the airplane and waited for the pilots. Around 1350, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger boarded the airplane. The passengers were not provided a safety briefing. He stated that the takeoff and cruise portion of the flight appeared to be normal; however, while the airplane was on approach to the runway he noticed instrument panel was not illuminated like it had been earlier in the flight. Specifically, he recalled that the cockpit instrument panel appeared to be unpowered. He saw that the pilot was manually flying the airplane. The pilot-rated-passenger turned around and announced that they should prepare for landing. The passenger stated that he became concerned when the airplane flew past the terminal and control tower and had not touched down. He noted that he felt like the airplane was "coming in hot." The airplane then banked right and climbed away from the runway. The passenger heard the pilot tell the pilot-rated-passenger that they were "down to one engine." The airplane continued in the traffic pattern back to the runway. The passenger stated that the cockpit instrument panel still appeared to be unpowered during the second landing attempt; however, he did recall seeing flashing red and yellow cockpit lights. The passenger believed that during the second landing attempt the airplane had a slower groundspeed when compared to the first landing attempt. He noted that the airplane bounced off the runway several times before it entered a nose-high attitude and rolled to the right. He remembered seeing rooftops of homes before he blacked-out. His next memory was after the accident, as first responders attempted to gain access to the cabin.
=============
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal,3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures and terrain following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Regional Airport (KSBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger occupying the cockpit seats were fatally injured. An additional two passengers and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (KRVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1358 central daylight time.
According to preliminary air traffic control information, at 1610:31, the accident pilot established radio communications with South Bend Approach Control while at 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The air traffic controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE intersection and told the pilot to expect a visual approach to runway 9R. At 1611:44, the flight was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:06, the flight was cleared to 3,000 feet msl. At 1615:00, the approach controller told the pilot to make a 5-degree left turn to align with runway 9R and asked the pilot to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:07, the pilot declared an emergency because of a lack of engine power, reporting that they were "dead stick" and without any power. About 23 seconds later, at 1615:30, the pilot transmitted "we've lost all power, and we have no hydraulics." When the controller asked if the airplane remained controllable, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller advised that all runways at KSBN were available for landing and issued the current winds, which were 130-degrees at 10 knots. At 1615:22, the pilot transmitted that the airplane’s navigational systems were inoperative and requested a radar vector toward the airport. The controller replied that the airport was 9 miles directly ahead of the airplane’s current position. At 1616:12, the controller told the pilot to turn 10-degrees left to intersect runway 9R. At 1616:15, the pilot replied "26DK, turning left." No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:58, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to runway 9R with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low descent into a nearby residential community.
SOUTH BEND, INDIANA - A plane that crashed into several homes in South Bend, Indiana on Sunday, killing two people on board, was registered in Helena, but didn't originate from here.
According to FAA registration records, the Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA plane that crashed into several homes in South Bend, Indiana, on March 17 was registered in Montana. Although the plane was registered in Helena, the flight did not originate in Montana, and neither of the occupants were from Montana.
The Montana Aeronautics Division is responsible for the licensing and registration of aircraft statewide. Officials there say the aircraft was registered here under a Limited Liability Corporation name and business address.
Debbie Alke, administrator of the Montana Aeronautics Division, said, "The aircraft was registered to the 7700 Enterprises at 302 North Last Chance Gulch and stating that the aircraft was based at the Helena Airport."
"There are aircraft that are registered in Montana that maybe rarely or never do get here, I'm sure of that," Helena Regional Airport director Ron Mercer said.
The business behind the LLC is located on the fourth floor of a building at 302 North Last Chance Gulch. It is an agency that works on behalf of the LLC, as well as about 1,000 others, in order to benefit from Montana's licensing system. A website under the name Montana Corporate Professional Business Services teaches people from other states and even other countries how to form an LLC in order to cheaply license and register their planes, boats, vehicles or RVs.
In checking with the Secretary of State's Office, there was no record under the airplane's LLC's name. However, it appears the company working on behalf of the LLC is registered, just under a different name.
Paulette DeHart, the Lewis & Clark County Clerk and Recorder/Treasurer, says the county receives numerous registrations each year which come from third party entities.
"We have at least three corporations here in our community and they have full time employees that do nothing but register vehicles," she said.
While these practices may appear to be harmless, they are actually making the state of Montana money.
"So if we've got people coming from all over the country registering through these LLC's, Montana's getting that revenue," DeHart said.
Montana isn't the only state that accepts these practices which allow people to avoid higher taxes in their own states and communities where they truly reside.
While it is legal, its ethics are questionable; several legislative proposals over the years have failed to change the common practice.
According to FAA reports, the Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA plane has fractional ownership. It was last registered in Helena on May 5, 2012.
Before that it was registered in Manchester, New Hampshire.
Source: http://www.kxlf.com
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/14/2016
Aircraft: HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), during cruise flight, the unqualified pilot-rated passenger was manipulating the aircraft controls, including the engine controls, under the supervision and direction of the private pilot. After receiving a descent clearance to 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the pilot told the pilot-rated passenger to reduce engine power to maintain a target airspeed. The cockpit area microphone subsequently recorded the sound of both engines spooling down. The pilot recognized that the pilot-rated passenger had shutdown both engines after he retarded the engine throttles past the flight idle stops into the fuel cutoff position. Specifically, the pilot stated "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." According to air traffic control (ATC) radar track data, at the time of the dual engine shutdown, the airplane was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport and was descending through 6,700 feet msl. The pilot reported to the controller that the airplane had experienced a dual loss of engine power, declared an emergency, and requested radar vectors to the destination airport. As the flight approached the destination airport, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter spooling up; however, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine. The CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne, with both engines still inoperative, while on an extended base leg to the runway. Subsequently, the controller told the pilot to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern to make another landing approach. Witness accounts indicated that only the nose landing gear was extended during the second landing approach. The witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community. The postaccident examinations and testing did not reveal any anomalies or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.
Although the CVR did not record a successful engine restart, the pilot was able to initiate a go-around during the initial landing attempt, which implies that he was able to restart at least one engine during the initial approach. The investigation subsequently determined that only the left engine was operating at impact. Following an engine start, procedures require that the respective generator be reset to reestablish electrical power to the Essential Bus. If the Essential Bus had been restored, all aircraft systems would have operated normally. However, the battery toggle switch was observed in the Standby position at the accident site, which would have prevented the Essential Bus from receiving power regardless of whether the generator had been reset. As such, the airplane was likely operating on the Standby Bus, which would preclude the normal extension of the landing gear. However, the investigation determined that the landing gear alternate extension handle was partially extended. The observed position of the handle would have precluded the main landing gear from extending (only the nose landing gear would extend). The investigation determined that it is likely the pilot did not fully extend the handle to obtain a full landing gear deployment. Had he fully extended the landing gear, a successful single-engine landing could have been accomplished.
In conclusion, the private pilot's decision to allow the unqualified pilot-rated passenger to manipulate the airplane controls directly resulted in the inadvertent dual engine shutdown during cruise descent. Additionally, the pilot's inadequate response to the emergency, including his failure to adhere to procedures, resulted in his inability to fully restore airplane systems and ultimately resulted in a loss of airplane control.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The private pilot's inadequate response to the dual engine shutdown during cruise descent, including his failure to adhere to procedures, which ultimately resulted in his failure to maintain airplane control during a single-engine go-around. An additional cause was the pilot's decision to allow the unqualified pilot-rated passenger to manipulate the airplane controls, which directly resulted in the inadvertent dual engine shutdown.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger, who were occupying the cockpit seats, were fatally injured. An additional two passengers, who were seated in the cabin area, and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed the Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1356 central daylight time.
According to air traffic control (ATC) information, after departing RVS, the accident flight proceeded toward the intended destination while receiving normal ATC services. The flight was eventually cleared to a final cruise altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410). The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contained about 31 minutes of cockpit conversation/audio and radio communications. At 1545:31, the beginning of the CVR recording, the pilot was discussing the airplane's fuel status and how much fuel would be required for the return flight. The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate various flight management system functions to the pilot-rated-passenger. At 1546:08, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked "a lot of stuff to learn." The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate the features of the flight management system, the use of his mobile tablet as an electronic flight bag, and the airplane's various weight limitations.
At 1552:17, the pilot established contact with Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and reported being level at FL410. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to descend to 24,000 feet (FL240). After receiving the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger discussed how to initiate a descent using the autopilot's vertical speed mode. The pilot explained how to use airplane pitch and engine power and to maintain a desired airspeed during the descent. At 1555:22, the pilot stated "we're up more speed, so we got to get our power back. gettin' ready to start beeping at us. got to bring it back." At 1555:27, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning for 13.5 seconds. At 1555:31, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot, "just pull it way back?" The pilot replied, "well, just get it out of the line. and we got to get it so, that it trends -- there you go -- there you go -- now give it -- it ends, there you go." The pilot continued to explain how to maintain a desired airspeed. At 1555:55, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked, "I just hate chasin' the darn thing." The pilot replied, "huh, how many hours you got flying this jet?" The pilot-rated-passenger stated, "well, I know, but I'm just saying it's just, you know, uncomfortable. Creates alarm in the back -- throttle up, throttle down."
The pilot then explained how to setup a descent while maintaining a specified airspeed. At 1557:29, the pilot-rated passenger stated, "so, pull back?" The pilot replied, "little bit. little bit. keep working it back 'cause that tells you where you're gonna be in six seconds. so, right now, you're going to be at the line in six seconds, so you want to continue to trend back. so yeah. so, just take two seventy or something like that." At 1557:53, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to "just keep us out the red."
At 1558:08, the controller cleared the flight direct to South Bend. After acknowledging the direct clearance, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger how to program the flight management system to proceed direct to the destination airport. The pilot then discussed the airplane's indicated airspeed, ground speed, and how to cross-check the airplane's flight attitude with the backup cockpit instrumentation. At 1559:24, the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) recording is audible over the radio channel. At 1559:42, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot if they needed to engage engine heat. The pilot replied that they would wait until they get an ice indication light. At 1600:34, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot "okay. pull back on the power?"
At 1601:35, the controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 20,000 feet (FL200). At 1602:13, the pilot discussed the current weather conditions that he had obtained from the ATIS recording, the expected wind correction during the approach and landing, the minimum descent altitude during the instrument approach, and the landing reference speed. At 1603:22, the controller asked the pilot to expedite a descent to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). At 1603:51, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "watch your speed" and "very good, very good. great speed management."
At 1605:08, a sound similar to the altitude alert was heard, the pilot announced "thousand away" and told the pilot-rated-passenger "okay, now we can come nose back up." At 1605:29, the pilot stated "let's go to the stop... to the click (detent)... MCT (maximum continuous thrust)." At 1606:14, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning that lasted for 11.4 seconds. At 1606:20, the pilot stated "that's what a check pilot will do, is he'll give you three things to do... when he knows you're trending in the wrong direction." At 1606:32, the pilot said "your throttles."
At 1606:49, the controller cleared the flight to expedite a descent to maintain 11,000 feet msl. After acknowledging the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated passenger continued to discuss how to maintain airspeed during a cruise descent. At 1607:23, the controller asked the pilot for a ride report. The pilot replied that the weather conditions had been "smooth all the way." At 1607:52, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to maintain 290 knots. The pilot-rated-passenger replied "okay, where is it?" The pilot responded "two ninety would be more power." At 1608:44, the controller issued a heading change for traffic sequencing. The pilot then explained how to promote a waypoint using the flight management system and how to plan for a descent to the selected waypoint. At 1610:11, the controller cleared the flight direct the destination airport and to contact South Bend Approach Control.
At 1610:32, the pilot established communications with South Bend Approach Control and reported being level at 11,000 feet msl. The approach controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE, the outer marker for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 9R instrument approach, but to expect a visual approach to the airport. The pilot then explained how to promote KNUTE as the next active waypoint within the flight management system, and how to plan for the descent to the waypoint. At 1611:45, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:07, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 3,000 feet msl.
After receiving the descent clearance to 3,000 feet msl, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "let's power back. let's bring it back to uh -- let's trend toward uh two twenty, two ten." The pilot-rated-passenger acknowledged and the pilot replied "and we'll have to come way out of it to do that." At 1613:30, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. The pilot then verbalized a descent checklist and turned on the seatbelt cabin chime. At 1614:14, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "we gotta get -- just pull -- just pull the power out." At 1614:18, the pilot-rated-passenger asked, "just pull it on down?" The pilot replied, "yeah, let's -- let's get back to two hundred (knots)." At 1614:21, the cockpit area microphone recorded another sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. At 1614:26, the cockpit area microphone recorded the sound of two clicks. At 1614:27, there was a brief interruption in electrical power, an autopilot disconnect chime, and two unidentified tones. According to ATC radar track data, at 1614:28, the final radar return with an accompanying mode-C altitude return was recorded at 6,700 feet msl. At that time, the flight was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport. At 1614:29, the pilot said "uh-oh" and the pilot-rated-passenger replied "what?" At 1614:33, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 3.5 seconds. At 1614:35, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." (The airplane throttle quadrant had a mechanical stop at the flight idle power position, which required lifting finger levers, or pull-up locks, to further retard the throttles into the fuel cut-off position.)
At 1614:43, the pilot said "okay let's see here... boost pumps are on... okay we are dead stick." At 1614:56, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 10.9 seconds. At 1615:01, the approach controller told the pilot to turn five degrees left for runway 9R and to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:02, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter/generator spooling up; however, according to a sound spectrum study, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. At 1615:08, the pilot told the approach controller, "uh... South Bend, we have an emergency, two six delta kilo. dead engines, dead stick, no power." The controller asked if he needed assistance and the pilot replied "affirm." Between 1615:19 and 1615:27, there was a sustained electrical power interruption to the CVR. At 1615:30, the controller asked for the pilot's intentions and the pilot replied "uh, we've lost all power and we have no hydraulics." At 1615:32, there was the sound similar to an altitude alert.
At 1615:38, the controller stated that the airport would have emergency equipment standing-by and asked if the airplane was controllable. At 1615:42, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller told the pilot that all of the runways were available for landing and issued the current wind condition. At 1615:53, the pilot told the controller "uh, we have no navigation. if you could give us a vector please... we have no heading either. which -- you're gonna have to tell us which way to fly." The controller replied that the airplane was about 9 miles from the airport, which was at the 12-o'clock position. At 1616:09, the pilot-rated-passenger stated "there's the airport" and the pilot responded "Where? -- Okay." At 1616:12, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was audible until the end of the CVR recording. At 1616:13, the approach controller told the pilot to turn left 10 degrees. At 1616:16, the pilot replied "two six delta, turning left." At 1616:32, the CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne with both engines still inoperative.
No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:59, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to the runway with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
--- Pilot ---
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was type-rated for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet. His last aviation medical examination was completed on January 22, 2013, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate. The medical certificate had a limitation that it was not valid for any certificate classification after January 31, 2014. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using a partially completed pilot logbook, a spreadsheet flight log, several applications for his FAA pilot certificates and ratings, and a spreadsheet history of the flights that had been completed in the accident airplane. The pilot began his primary flight instruction on January 21, 2011. On April 29, 2011, when he applied for his private pilot certificate, he reported having 71 hours total time. On February 5, 2012, when he applied for his instrument rating, the pilot reported having 314 hours total time. On February 26, 2012, when he applied for his multi-engine rating, the pilot reported having 330 hours total time. On May 4, 2012, when he applied for his type-rating in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390, the pilot reported having 450 hours total time. According to additional flight documentation, after he had received his type-rating, the pilot accumulated an additional 163.7 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot's total flight experience was estimated to be about 613.7 hours, of which at least 171.5 hours were completed in the same make/model as the accident airplane.
According to training records, from April 29, 2012, through May 4, 2012, the pilot attended initial type-rating training for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane at The Jetstream Group, located in Chino, California. The course consisted of 41 hours of ground training, 8 hours of flight briefing/debriefing, and 7.8 hours of flight training in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane. On May 4, 2012, the pilot obtained his type-rating following a 2.1-hour oral examination and a 2.0 hour checkride with a FAA designated pilot examiner.
--- Pilot-Rated-Passenger ---
According to FAA records, the pilot-rated-passenger, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on August 3, 2005, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with the limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
A review of available logbook information indicated that the last recorded flight was completed on September 28, 2008. At that time, the pilot-rated-passenger had accumulated 1,877.2 hours total flight experience, of which 1,705.3 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 1,576.2 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 301 hours in single-engine airplanes. He had accumulated 92.4 hours in actual instrument conditions and 517.6 hours at night. His last recorded flight review and instrument proficiency check was completed on September 19, 2006, in a Beech model 60 twin-engine airplane. A review of available information did not reveal any logged flight experience in turbine-powered business jets.
According to an affidavit provided by the pilot's son following the accident, the pilot-rated-passenger was not an employee of the operator, nor was he employed as a pilot for the accident flight. He was reportedly a friend of the pilot who shared a common interest in aviation. He reportedly did not have an official role on the accident flight, and as such, was considered a pilot-rated-passenger.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident airplane was a 2008 Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, serial number RB-226. Two Williams International model FJ44-2A turbofan engines, each capable of producing 2,300 pounds of thrust at takeoff, powered the airplane. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules and in known icing conditions.
The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on March 13, 2008. According to FAA documentation, 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, purchased the airplane on April 18, 2012. The current FAA registration certificate was issued on May 1, 2012. The airplane was maintained under the provisions of a FAA-approved manufacturer inspection program. The last inspection of the airplane was completed on November 4, 2012, at 419 hours total airframe time. As of the last inspection, both engines also had accumulated 419 hours since new. The static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were last tested on July 7, 2011. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane hour meter indicated 457.5 hours at the accident site.
The primary flight control systems, except the spoilers, were manually operated through control cables, push/pull tubes, and mechanical linkages. The spoilers were electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated. The pitch trim system, roll trim system, and yaw trim system were electrically operated. The speed brake was controlled electrically and operated hydraulically. The flaps were electronically controlled and electrically actuated.
Pitch attitude of the airplane was controlled by the elevators and the variable incidence horizontal stabilizer. The elevator control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control columns. Roll attitude was controlled through the ailerons, spoilers and roll trim. The aileron control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control wheels. The spoiler control system was electrically controlled by movement of the cockpit control wheels and hydraulically actuated. Yaw control was accomplished by the rudder and rudder trim tab. The rudder control system was operated manually by moving the cockpit rudder pedals.
The cockpit engine thrust levers were connected to control cables that extended aft through the fuselage to the power control arm located on the bottom of each hydromechanical fuel control unit (HMU). In addition to the mechanical throttle linkages to the HMUs, each engine had an electronic control unit (ECU) that interfaced with its respective HMU to provide automatic fuel control throughout the normal engine operating envelope. The ECUs were part of the Standby Bus electrical system. Finger levers, or pull-up locks, were installed to prevent the inadvertent movement of the thrust levers from flight idle into the fuel cutoff position. To access the fuel cutoff position, the pull-up locks are lifted as the thrust levers are moved aft into the fuel cutoff position. During normal flight, with the engines operating, placing the thrust levers into the fuel cutoff position will shut off fuel flow to the engine and cause the engines to shut down.
During normal operation, the Standby Bus is powered by the Essential Bus. The Essential Bus receives electrical power from the main battery and generators (when online). During engine prestart and engine start, the ECUs are powered by the main battery until a generator is brought online. The generators are used as starter motors during normal engine starts and starter-assisted air starts. As such, following an engine start, a generator is reset by selecting the associated toggle switch that is located on the electrical control sub-panel. The momentary reset toggle switch position reestablishes electrical power from the generator to the Essential Bus system. During normal engine operation, the ECUs are powered by the generators through the Essential Bus; however, the ECUs could also be powered by the standby battery, through the Standby Bus, if the standby battery is selected following the depletion of the main battery.
The airplane's main battery was a 24-volt direct current (DC), maintenance free lead-acid battery with a minimum performance capacity of 42 ampere-hours. The battery provides power for self-contained engine starts and is a backup power source for the Essential Bus components.
The standby battery was a 5 ampere-hour, lead-acid battery. The standby battery was used to supply 24-volts DC to the Standby Bus and 5 volts DC for lighting of selected components during abnormal power conditions. The standby bus supplies electrical power to dedicated airplane components to sustain safe operation of the airplane when no other source of power is available. According to the airframe manufacturer, the standby battery was designed to supply 150 watts of power for a minimum of 30 minutes or until the cutoff voltage of 20 volts DC is reached.
In abnormal power situations, the main battery is used to provide airplane power until a generator is reset and brought back online. Furthermore, if a starter/generator is inoperative due to a loss of engine power, the main battery is designed to power the starter/generator to reignite the affected engine. In the event the battery switch is selected to Standby, regardless if the generators have been reset, electrical power would not be available to the essential bus (only the Standby bus would be powered). Additional information concerning the airplane electrical system, including a list of components found on the Essential and Standby Buses, is included with the docket materials associated with this investigation.
In the event of a loss of engine power during flight, an engine can be restarted in the air by one of two methods: either a windmilling start or a starter-assisted air start. A windmilling start uses residual engine speed, air movement against the fan blades, and engine igniters to restart the engine and regain power. A starter-assisted air start uses electrical power, routed through the generator/starter motor, to increase the N2 shaft to a speed where the igniters can restart the engine. Generally, the flight envelope to accomplish an engine air start is between 130 and 300 knots indicated airspeed and from sea level to 25,000 feet. At lower airspeeds, a starter-assisted air start is recommended and uses the normal engine start switch. At higher airspeeds a windmilling start is recommended and does not use the normal engine start switch. In contrast to the normal ground start procedure, the air start procedure requires that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start.
The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled, hydraulically actuated, retractable landing gear. If hydraulic or electric power is unavailable, an alternate procedure is used to extend the landing gear. When the alternate landing gear extension handle, located at the base of the left-side control column, is pulled outward from the stowed position, the landing gear and door up-lock hooks are released, which allows the landing gear to free-fall into the down-and-locked position. The use of the alternate landing gear handle also opens a mechanically actuated recirculation valve that connects the main landing gear retraction and extension hydraulic lines to allow a more positive free-fall of the gear. The landing gear release is sequenced so that the nose gear is released first, followed by the main landing gear inboard doors, and finally the main landing gear. According to the airframe manufacturer, the nose landing gear is released from the up-locks when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The main landing gear inboard doors are released when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-3/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). Finally, the main landing gear are released from their respective up-locks when the alternate extension handle is pulled to 3-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The full stroke length of the alternate extension handle, following a full deployment of the landing gear, is specified to be a minimum of 4 inches.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1620, the SBN automated surface observing system reported: wind 120 degrees at 13 knots, gusting 17 knots; a clear sky; 10 mile surface visibility; temperature 2 degrees Celsius; dew point -8 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury.
COMMUNICATIONS
The accident flight was on an activated instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A review of available ATC information indicated that the accident flight had received normal air traffic control services and handling. A transcript of the voice communications recorded between the accident flight and South Bend Approach Control are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The South Bend Airport (SBN), a public airport located approximately 3 miles northwest of South Bend, Indiana, was owned and operated by the St. Joseph County Airport Authority. The airport was a certificated airport under 14 CFR Part 139 and had on-airport fire and rescue services. The airport field elevation was 799 feet msl. The airport had three runways: runway 9R/27L (8,414 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); runway 18/36 (7,100 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); and runway 9L/27R (4,300 feet by 75 feet, asphalt).
FLIGHT RECORDERS
Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild model FA2100-1010 CVR, serial number 446023. The CVR recording contained about 31 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR was not damaged during the accident and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1545:31 with the airplane established in cruise flight at 41,000 feet (FL410), and the recording stopped about 1616:32 while the airplane was maneuvering toward the destination airport with both engines inoperative. A transcript of the CVR audio information is included with the docket materials associated with the investigation. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane collided with three residential structures during the final impact sequence. A majority of the wreckage was found within one of the structures. There was a noticeable odor of Jet-A fuel at the accident site and the South Bend Fire Department reported that fuel had pooled in the basement of the house. The airplane wreckage was recovered from the house and transported to the South Bend Airport to facilitate a more detailed examination. A postaccident examination of the runway 9R revealed areas of abrasion damage to the grooved asphalt surface. The observed damage was consistent with the accident airplane coming in contact with the runway surface during the accident flight.
--- Fuselage ---
The radome had separated from the radome bulkhead, which had separated from the fuselage. The nose baggage and avionics sections had separated forward of the forward pressure bulkhead and the nose wheel well structure had buckled. The cabin area exhibited impact damage; however, portions remained intact from the forward pressure bulkhead to the aft pressure bulkhead. A section of the right cabin sidewall, from the emergency escape hatch opening forward to approximately the right side galley area, had been cut open by first responders to extract the occupants. The aft fuselage had separated from the cabin portion at the aft pressure bulkhead, but remained attached by flight control cables and other conduits. Both engines remained attached to the aft fuselage. The main entry door remained attached at both hinge locations and was found open with the latches in the closed position. The main entry door latching mechanism was actuated and operated as designed. Examination of the fuselage revealed no evidence of an in-flight or post-impact fire. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna had separated from the lower fuselage, and exhibited gouges and scoring of the lower leading edge that were consistent with contact with the runway surface. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna was recovered from the runway by airport personnel following the accident.
--- Wings ---
The wing assembly had separated from the airframe at all mounting points. The left wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces, but remained intact with all flight control surfaces attached. The right wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces and had separated in several locations. The inboard portion of the right wing exhibited minor damage when compared to the outboard wing. The outboard portion of the right wing, outboard of the inboard flap, exhibited impact damage, deformation, and had separated into several pieces. The outboard portion of the right wing, from the aileron outboard, had separated as one piece, with the exception of the composite wing tip assembly. The composite wing tip assembly had separated from the outboard end of the wing and was found amongst the main wreckage. The lower skin of the outboard portion of right wing and the lower skin of the composite wing tip exhibited gouging/scoring that was consistent with contact with the runway surface. The marks made by the gouging/scoring were approximately parallel with the chord of the wing and were aligned with the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. Additional abrasion damage was observed on the lower aft portion of all right wing flap tracks and the aft portion of the wing center keel structure. The trailing edge of the right aileron also exhibited abrasion damage. The wing flaps were observed in the retracted position and the measurement of the individual flap actuators corresponded with fully retracted flap positions. The aileron flight control system displayed multiple separations throughout the circuit; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure. The roll trim actuators remained attached to their respective aileron and were observed to be extended 1.3 inches. The roll trim tabs were visually aligned (faired) with the aileron trailing edge, consistent with a neutral position.
--- Stabilizers ---
The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the rear fuselage and revealed limited impact damage. The pitch trim actuator remained attached to its mounting location in the vertical stabilizer and was attached to the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. The pitch trim actuator extension was observed to be extended 17-5/8 inches. The elevators remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer at all hinges. The outboard portion of the right elevator, including the balance weight, had separated from the remaining right elevator. The right and left elevator trim tab surfaces remained attached to their respective elevators at their hinges. Both elevator trim tab surfaces were visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the respective elevator. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and the hinges exhibited no apparent damage. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder at the hinges and did not appear to be damaged. The rudder trim tab surface was visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the rudder. Flight control continuity for the elevator and rudder displayed multiple separations; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure or had been cut to facilitate wreckage recovery.
--- Landing Gear ---
The nose landing gear had separated from the airframe trunnion. The nose landing gear drag brace had separated from the nose landing gear assembly and the airframe supporting structure. The down lock actuator and down lock "pawl" assembly had separated from the drag brace assembly. The nose wheel and tire remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly. The nose wheel exhibited signs of impact damage to a portion of the bead area. The nose landing gear doors had separated from the airframe and were found amongst the main wreckage. The nose landing gear actuator had separated from the airframe in two pieces. The piston portion of the actuator remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly.
The left main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the left wing trunnion. The gear was found in the wheel well; however, the uplock was not engaged to the main landing gear uplock roller. The left main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and to the wing supporting structure. The actuator was found in the retracted position; however, multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by the measurement of the landing gear actuator. The left outboard gear door remained attached to the wing structure and the left main landing gear assembly. The left inboard gear door had separated from the wing and was found in several pieces amongst the main wreckage. The left inboard gear door actuator remained attached to the wing. About 90-percent of the inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The paint on the exterior portions of the door appeared to be eroded, consistent with contact with the runway surface while in the closed position.
The right main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the wing structure. The right wing had separated between the main landing gear trunnion fitting and the main landing gear actuator wing attach fitting. The main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and the wing attach fitting. The right main landing gear actuator was partially extended; the actuator was in neither the fully retracted nor the down-and-locked position. Multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by measurement of the landing gear actuator. The right main landing gear outboard door had separated from the wing and was not recovered during the investigation. About 60-percent of the right inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The reconstructed portion of the door exhibited exterior paint abrasion that was consistent with door in the closed position. The inboard gear door actuator remained attached the wing.
--- Cockpit Switch and Lever Positions ---
Both engine power levers were in the normal takeoff position. Both levers were bent right and forward approximately 45-degrees. The power levers moved smoothly from the normal takeoff position to the flight idle detent. There was a positive indication at the normal takeoff and flight idle stops. The finger levers, which allow the power levers to be moved aft of the flight idle detent into fuel cut-off, could not be activated/pulled because of damage to both the power levers and the finger levers.
The flap handle was in the 20-degree detent position. Although the flap handle was bent, it could be moved between each flap position detent. A positive detent was noted at each flap position.
The lift dump switch was in the "Unlock" position. The lift dump handle was in the retracted position.
The speed brake was in the "RETRACT" position.
The landing gear position handle located in the cockpit was observed in the "UP" position. The cockpit landing gear circuit breaker was in the closed (not pulled) position. The landing gear alternate extension handle was found partially extended about 1-1/2 inches and was bent toward the instrument panel.
The battery toggle switch was in the "Standby" position.
Both generator toggle switches were in the "ON" position.
Both avionics switches were in the "ON" position.
The left fuel boost switch was in the "ON" position.
The position of the right fuel boost switch could not be determined due to impact damage.
The fuel transfer switch was in the "OFF" position.
Both engine ECU switches were in the "ON" position.
Both engine ignition switches were in the "ARM" position.
Engine synchronization was in the "OFF" position.
Additional cockpit switch positions are included in the docket materials associated with this investigation.
--- Engines ---
A postaccident examination of the left engine, serial number 105363, revealed evidence of leading edge foreign object damage to the N1 (Spool) Fan, consistent with the ingestion of debris during the impact sequence. Although damaged, the N1 Fan could still be rotated by hand. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm located at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The Low Pressure (LP) Trip Lever cable exhibited no visible damage, and the fuel cutoff mechanism had not been activated. All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination revealed evidence that the left engine was operating at the time of impact.
A postaccident examination of the right engine, serial number 105364, revealed evidence of attic insulation, pieces of home roofing shingles, pieces of wood, and other unidentified debris within the engine cowling and bypass duct. However, the N1 fan did not reveal visible evidence of leading edge foreign object damage that would be expected from the ingestion of debris in conjunction with engine operation. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The LP Trip Lever cable was found bent and damaged, and the LP Trip Lever fuel cutoff mechanism had been activated. (The LP Shaft Trip Sensor is activated when the LP turbine is forced in the aft direction against the trip lever. Typical scenarios of when a trip sensor would be activated include a LP Shaft separation or when the engine is exposed to significant impact loading.) All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination did not reveal any evidence that the right engine was operating at the time of impact.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
On March 18, 2013, autopsies were performed on the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, located in Mishawka, Indiana. The cause of death for both individuals was attributed to blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during each autopsy.
The pilot's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Losartan, an FAA-accepted high blood pressure medication, was detected in urine and blood samples. The pilot had reported the use of this medication on his most recent FAA medical certificate application.
The pilot-rated-passenger's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
--- Sound Spectrum Study ---
A study was performed to evaluate the sound spectrum of audio recorded by the cockpit area microphone after the loss of engine power at 1614:27. The CVR audio was compared with audio recorded during ground testing of an exemplar Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA). The sound spectrum study indicated that, at 1615:02, the pilot engaged a starter motor in attempt to restart one of the engines. The study further established that the electrical noise from the engine igniters was not present at any point during the CVR recording, including the attempted engine air start. (The air start procedure required that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start) A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine.
--- Surveillance Video Study ---
There were several surveillance videos of the accident airplane during the two landing attempts, and the final descent and impact. A study of airport surveillance footage was completed to determine an average ground speed of the airplane during the second landing attempt. The study determined that the airplane's average ground speed was 127 knots (+/- 4 knots) during the 3.75 seconds of camera footage of the second landing attempt. Additional information concerning the surveillance videos can be found with the docket materials associated with this investigation.
--- Mobile Device Examinations ---
Several mobile devices were recovered from the wreckage and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination.
The pilot's tablet mobile device contained several aviation related applications; however, none of the applications contained flight track data for the accident flight. One application, ForeFlight, depicted the planned route-of-flight for the accident flight. Additionally, the ForeFlight application also contained 160 file-and-brief entries for previous flights. Another application, LogTen Pro, contained a partial flight history log.
The pilot's mobile phone was reviewed and no information pertinent to the investigation was recovered.
The pilot-rated-passenger's mobile phone contained a text message, dated March 13, 2013, concerning a previous flight that he had in the accident airplane with the pilot. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
Another passenger's mobile phone contained multiple out-going text messages with timestamps between 13:45 and 13:53 central daylight time. These text messages noted that the accident flight was about to takeoff and provided the expected time en route to South Bend. At 1505 eastern daylight time, a multi-media text message was sent with a photograph from inside the airplane cabin looking toward the cockpit. At 1612, another photo was taken from inside the cabin looking outside through a cabin window. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
--- Starter-Generator Examinations ---
An initial visual examination of both starter-generators determined that their drive shafts were intact and the armatures rotated. The brush covers were removed and the brushes were observed to be in a good condition. The starter-generators were examined and tested at the manufacturer and no failures or anomalies were noted that would have prevented normal operation.
--- Generator Control Unit Examinations ---
Visual examination revealed the outer dust sleeve for the left generator control unit (GCU) was dented; however, further disassembly revealed no internal damage. The right GCU appeared to be undamaged. Both devices were examined and tested at the manufacturer and no failures or anomalies were noted that would have prevented normal operation.
--- Battery Examinations ---
During the on-site investigation, the no-load voltage of the main battery was 25 volts. Additional examination, at the manufacturer, confirmed that the battery was electrically intact and exceeded the acceptance test standards for a new battery. The standby battery was visually inspected at the accident site and no additional testing was completed.
--- Throttle Quadrant Assembly Examinations ---
The throttle quadrant assembly was removed from the airplane and examined at the manufacturer. A visual inspection revealed that both throttle levers were bent to the right and the fuel cutoff pull-up locks were jammed. There was foreign object debris, mostly loose attic insulation, found within the throttle quadrant assembly. To facilitate additional testing, the throttle arms were straightened to a vertical position. A partial Acceptance Test Procedure was completed because of existing damage to the throttle quadrant assembly. An electrical continuity check confirmed proper function of the throttle quadrant at each switch location.
--- Engine Electronic Control Unit Examinations ---
Both engine electronic control units (ECU) were examined and tested at the manufacturer on a Williams FJ44-2A engineering test cell. After a successful bit check at power-up, the contents of the ECU's non-volatile memory were downloaded. The examination of the recorded fault codes from each ECU determined no faults were recorded during the last flight in memory. Additionally, neither device contained any information regarding the engine operation during the last recorded flight.
Additional component examination summaries are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
One of the surviving passengers was interviewed by two NTSB Human Performance and Survival Factors investigators. The passenger reported that he loaded his luggage and computer gear on the airplane between 1330 and 1345 central daylight time. After loading, he and the other passenger boarded the airplane and waited for the pilots. Around 1350, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger boarded the airplane. The passengers were not provided a safety briefing. He stated that the takeoff and cruise portion of the flight appeared to be normal; however, while the airplane was on approach to the runway he noticed instrument panel was not illuminated like it had been earlier in the flight. Specifically, he recalled that the cockpit instrument panel appeared to be unpowered. He saw that the pilot was manually flying the airplane. The pilot-rated-passenger turned around and announced that they should prepare for landing. The passenger stated that he became concerned when the airplane flew past the terminal and control tower and had not touched down. He noted that he felt like the airplane was "coming in hot." The airplane then banked right and climbed away from the runway. The passenger heard the pilot tell the pilot-rated-passenger that they were "down to one engine." The airplane continued in the traffic pattern back to the runway. The passenger stated that the cockpit instrument panel still appeared to be unpowered during the second landing attempt; however, he did recall seeing flashing red and yellow cockpit lights. The passenger believed that during the second landing attempt the airplane had a slower groundspeed when compared to the first landing attempt. He noted that the airplane bounced off the runway several times before it entered a nose-high attitude and rolled to the right. He remembered seeing rooftops of homes before he blacked-out. His next memory was after the accident, as first responders attempted to gain access to the cabin.
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The following is an INTERIM FACTUAL SUMMARY of this accident investigation. A final report that includes all pertinent facts, conditions, and circumstances of the accident will be issued upon completion, along with the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause of the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger, who were occupying the cockpit seats, were fatally injured. An additional two passengers, who were seated in the cabin area, and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed the Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1356 central daylight time.
According to air traffic control (ATC) information, after departing RVS, the accident flight proceeded toward the intended destination while receiving normal ATC services. The flight was eventually cleared to a final cruise altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410). The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contained about 31 minutes of cockpit conversation/audio and radio communications. At 1545:31, the beginning of the CVR recording, the pilot was discussing the airplane's fuel status and how much fuel would be required for the return flight. The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate various flight management system functions to the pilot-rated-passenger. At 1546:08, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked "a lot of stuff to learn." The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate the features of the flight management system, the use of his mobile tablet as an electronic flight bag, and the airplane's various weight limitations.
At 1552:17, the pilot established contact with Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and reported being level at FL410. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to descend to 24,000 feet (FL240). After receiving the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger discussed how to initiate a descent using the autopilot's vertical speed mode. The pilot explained how to use airplane pitch and engine power and to maintain a desired airspeed during the descent. At 1555:22, the pilot stated "we're up more speed, so we got to get our power back. gettin' ready to start beeping at us. got to bring it back." At 1555:27, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning for 13.5 seconds. At 1555:31, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot, "just pull it way back?" The pilot replied, "well, just get it out of the line. and we got to get it so, that it trends -- there you go -- there you go -- now give it -- it ends, there you go." The pilot continued to explain how to maintain a desired airspeed. At 1555:55, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked, "I just hate chasin' the darn thing." The pilot replied, "huh, how many hours you got flying this jet?" The pilot-rated-passenger stated, "well, I know, but I'm just saying it's just, you know, uncomfortable. Creates alarm in the back -- throttle up, throttle down."
The pilot then explained how to setup a descent while maintaining a specified airspeed. At 1557:29, the pilot-rated passenger stated, "so, pull back?" The pilot replied, "little bit. little bit. keep working it back 'cause that tells you where you're gonna be in six seconds. so, right now, you're going to be at the line in six seconds, so you want to continue to trend back. so yeah. so, just take two seventy or something like that." At 1557:53, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to "just keep us out the red."
At 1558:08, the controller cleared the flight direct to South Bend. After acknowledging the direct clearance, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger how to program the flight management system to proceed direct to the destination airport. The pilot then discussed the airplane's indicated airspeed, ground speed, and how to cross-check the airplane's flight attitude with the backup cockpit instrumentation. At 1559:24, the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) recording is audible over the radio channel. At 1559:42, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot if they needed to engage engine heat. The pilot replied that they would wait until they get an ice indication light. At 1600:34, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot "okay. pull back on the power?"
At 1601:35, the controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 20,000 feet (FL200). At 1602:13, the pilot discussed the current weather conditions that he had obtained from the ATIS recording, the expected wind correction during the approach and landing, the minimum descent altitude during the instrument approach, and the landing reference speed. At 1603:22, the controller asked the pilot to expedite a descent to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). At 1603:51, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "watch your speed" and "very good, very good. great speed management."
At 1605:08, a sound similar to the altitude alert was heard, the pilot announced "thousand away" and told the passenger-rated-pilot "okay, now we can come nose back up." At 1605:29, the pilot stated "let's go to the stop... to the click (detent)... MCT (maximum continuous thrust)." At 1606:14, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning that lasted for 11.4 seconds. At 1606:20, the pilot stated "that's what a check pilot will do, is he'll give you three things to do... when he knows you're trending in the wrong direction." At 1606:32, the pilot said "your throttles."
At 1606:49, the controller cleared the flight to expedite a descent to maintain 11,000 feet msl. After acknowledging the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated passenger continued to discuss how to maintain airspeed during a cruise descent. At 1607:23, the controller asked the pilot for a ride report. The pilot replied that the weather conditions had been "smooth all the way." At 1607:52, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to maintain 290 knots. The pilot-rated-passenger replied "okay, where is it?" The pilot responded "two ninety would be more power." At 1608:44, the controller issued a heading change for traffic sequencing. The pilot then explained how to promote a waypoint using the flight management system and how to plan for a descent to the selected waypoint. At 1610:11, the controller cleared the flight direct the destination airport and to contact South Bend Approach Control.
At 1610:32, the pilot established communications with South Bend Approach Control and reported being level at 11,000 feet msl. The approach controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE, the outer marker for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 9R instrument approach, but to expect a visual approach to the airport. The pilot then explained how to promote KNUTE as the next active waypoint within the flight management system, and how to plan for the descent to the waypoint. At 1611:45, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:07, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 3,000 feet msl.
After receiving the descent clearance to 3,000 feet msl, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "let's power back. let's bring it back to uh -- let's trend toward uh two twenty, two ten." The pilot-rated-passenger acknowledged and the pilot replied "and we'll have to come way out of it to do that." At 1613:30, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. The pilot then verbalized a descent checklist and turned on the seatbelt cabin chime. At 1614:14, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "we gotta get -- just pull -- just pull the power out." At 1614:18, the pilot-rated-passenger asked, "just pull it on down?" The pilot replied, "yeah, let's -- let's get back to two hundred (knots)." At 1614:21, the cockpit area microphone recorded another sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. At 1614:26, the cockpit area microphone recorded the sound of two clicks. At 1614:27, there was a brief interruption in electrical power, an autopilot disconnect chime, and two unidentified tones. According to ATC radar track data, at 1614:28, the final radar return with an accompanying mode-C altitude return was recorded at 6,700 feet msl. At that time, the flight was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport. At 1614:29, the pilot said "uh-oh" and the pilot-rated-passenger replied "what?" At 1614:33, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 3.5 seconds. At 1614:35, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." (The airplane throttle quadrant had a mechanical stop at the flight idle power position, which required lifting finger levers, or pull-up locks, to further retard the throttles into the fuel cut-off position.)
At 1614:43, the pilot said "okay let's see here... boost pumps are on... okay we are dead stick." At 1614:56, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 10.9 seconds. At 1615:01, the approach controller told the pilot to turn five degrees left for runway 9R and to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:02, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter/generator spooling up; however, according to a sound spectrum study, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. At 1615:08, the pilot told the approach controller, "uh... South Bend, we have an emergency, two six delta kilo. dead engines, dead stick, no power." The controller asked if he needed assistance and the pilot replied "affirm." Between 1615:19 and 1615:27, there was a sustained electrical power interruption to the CVR. At 1615:30, the controller asked for the pilot's intentions and the pilot replied "uh, we've lost all power and we have no hydraulics." At 1615:32, there was the sound similar to an altitude alert.
At 1615:38, the controller stated that the airport would have emergency equipment standing-by and asked if the airplane was controllable. At 1615:42, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller told the pilot that all of the runways were available for landing and issued the current wind condition. At 1615:53, the pilot told the controller "uh, we have no navigation. if you could give us a vector please... we have no heading either. which -- you're gonna have to tell us which way to fly." The controller replied that the airplane was about 9 miles from the airport, which was at the 12-o'clock position. At 1616:09, the pilot-rated-passenger stated "there's the airport" and the pilot responded "Where? -- Okay." At 1616:12, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was audible until the end of the CVR recording. At 1616:13, the approach controller told the pilot to turn left 10 degrees. At 1616:16, the pilot replied "two six delta, turning left." At 1616:32, the CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne with both engines still inoperative.
No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:59, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to the runway with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
--- Pilot ---
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was type-rated for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet. His last aviation medical examination was completed on January 22, 2013, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate. The medical certificate had a limitation that it was not valid for any certificate classification after January 31, 2014. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using a partially completed pilot logbook, a spreadsheet flight log, several applications for his FAA pilot certificates and ratings, and a spreadsheet history of the flights that had been completed in the accident airplane. The pilot began his primary flight instruction on January 21, 2011. On April 29, 2011, when he applied for his private pilot certificate, he reported having 71 hours total time. On February 5, 2012, when he applied for his instrument rating, the pilot reported having 314 hours total time. On February 26, 2012, when he applied for his multi-engine rating, the pilot reported having 330 hours total time. On May 4, 2012, when he applied for his type-rating in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390, the pilot reported having 450 hours total time. According to additional flight documentation, after he had received his type-rating, the pilot accumulated an additional 163.7 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot's total flight experience was estimated to be about 613.7 hours, of which at least 171.5 hours were completed in the same make/model as the accident airplane.
According to training records, from April 29, 2012, through May 4, 2012, the pilot attended initial type-rating training for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane at The Jetstream Group, located in Chino, California. The course consisted of 41 hours of ground training, 8 hours of flight briefing/debriefing, and 7.8 hours of flight training in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane. On May 4, 2012, the pilot obtained his type-rating following a 2.1-hour oral examination and a 2.0 hour checkride with a FAA designated pilot examiner.
--- Pilot-Rated-Passenger ---
According to FAA records, the pilot-rated-passenger, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on August 3, 2005, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with the limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
A review of available logbook information indicated that the last recorded flight was completed on September 28, 2008. At that time, the pilot-rated-passenger had accumulated 1,877.2 hours total flight experience, of which 1,705.3 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 1,576.2 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 301 hours in single-engine airplanes. He had accumulated 92.4 hours in actual instrument conditions and 517.6 hours at night. His last recorded flight review and instrument proficiency check was completed on September 19, 2006, in a Beech model 60 twin-engine airplane. A review of available information did not reveal any logged flight experience in turbine-powered business jets.
According to an affidavit provided by the pilot's son following the accident, the pilot-rated-passenger was not an employee of the operator, nor was he employed as a pilot for the accident flight. He was reportedly a friend of the pilot who shared a common interest in aviation. He reportedly did not have an official role on the accident flight, and as such, was considered a pilot-rated-passenger.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident airplane was a 2008 Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, serial number RB-226. Two Williams International model FJ44-2A turbofan engines, each capable of producing 2,300 pounds of thrust at takeoff, powered the airplane. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules and in known icing conditions.
The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on March 13, 2008. According to FAA documentation, 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, purchased the airplane on April 18, 2012. The current FAA registration certificate was issued on May 1, 2012. The airplane was maintained under the provisions of a FAA-approved manufacturer inspection program. The last inspection of the airplane was completed on November 4, 2012, at 419 hours total airframe time. As of the last inspection, both engines also had accumulated 419 hours since new. The static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were last tested on July 7, 2011. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane hour meter indicated 457.5 hours at the accident site.
The primary flight control systems, except the spoilers, were manually operated through control cables, push/pull tubes, and mechanical linkages. The spoilers were electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated. The pitch trim system, roll trim system, and yaw trim system were electrically operated. The speed brake was controlled electrically and operated hydraulically. The flaps were electronically controlled and electrically actuated.
Pitch attitude of the airplane was controlled by the elevators and the variable incidence horizontal stabilizer. The elevator control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control columns. Roll attitude was controlled through the ailerons, spoilers and roll trim. The aileron control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control wheels. The spoiler control system was electrically controlled by movement of the cockpit control wheels and hydraulically actuated. Yaw control was accomplished by the rudder and rudder trim tab. The rudder control system was operated manually by moving the cockpit rudder pedals.
The cockpit engine thrust levers were connected to control cables that extended aft through the fuselage to the power control arm located on the bottom of each hydromechanical fuel control unit (HMU). In addition to the mechanical throttle linkages to the HMUs, each engine had an electronic control unit (ECU) that interfaced with its respective HMU to provide automatic fuel control throughout the normal engine operating envelope. The ECUs were part of the Standby Bus electrical system. Finger levers, or pull-up locks, were installed to prevent the inadvertent movement of the thrust levers from flight idle into the fuel cutoff position.
During normal operation, the Standby Bus is powered by the Essential Bus. The Essential Bus receives electrical power from the main battery and generators (when online). During engine prestart and engine start, the ECUs are powered by the main battery until a generator is brought online. The generators are used as starter motors during normal engine starts and starter-assisted air starts. As such, following an engine start, a generator is "RESET" by selecting the associated toggle switch that is located on the electrical control sub-panel. The momentary "RESET" toggle switch position reestablishes electrical power from the generator to the Essential Bus system. During normal engine operation, the ECUs are powered by the generators through the Essential Bus; however, the ECUs could also be powered by the standby battery, through the Standby Buss, if the standby battery is selected following the depletion of the main battery.
In the event of a loss of engine power during flight, an engine can be restarted in the air by one of two methods: either a windmilling start or a starter-assisted air start. A windmilling start uses residual engine speed, air movement against the fan blades, and engine igniters to restart the engine and regain power. A starter-assisted air start uses electrical power, routed through the generator/starter motor, to increase the N2 shaft to a speed where the igniters can restart the engine. Generally, the flight envelope to accomplish an engine air start is between 130 and 300 knots indicated airspeed and from sea level to 25,000 feet. At lower airspeeds, a starter-assisted air start is recommended and uses the normal engine start switch. At higher airspeeds a windmilling start is recommended and does not use the normal engine start switch. In contrast to the normal ground start procedure, the air start procedure requires that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start.
The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled, hydraulically actuated, retractable landing gear. If hydraulic or electric power is unavailable, an alternate procedure is used to extend the landing gear. When the alternate landing gear extension handle was pulled outward from the stowed position, the landing gear and door up-lock hooks are released, which allows the landing gear to free-fall into the down-and-locked position. The use of the alternate landing gear handle also opens a mechanically actuated recirculation valve that connects the main landing gear retraction and extension hydraulic lines to allow a more positive free-fall of the gear. The landing gear release is sequenced so that the nose gear is released first, followed by the main landing gear inboard doors, and finally the main landing gear. According to the airframe manufacturer, the nose landing gear is released from the up-locks when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The main landing gear inboard doors are released when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-3/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). Finally, the main landing gear are released from their respective up-locks when the alternate extension handle is pulled to 3-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The full stroke length of the alternate extension handle, following a full deployment of the landing gear, is specified to be a minimum of 4 inches.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1620, the SBN automated surface observing system reported: wind 120 degrees at 13 knots, gusting 17 knots; a clear sky; 10 mile surface visibility; temperature 2 degrees Celsius; dew point -8 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury.
COMMUNICATIONS
The accident flight was on an activated instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A review of available ATC information indicated that the accident flight had received normal air traffic control services and handling. A transcript of the voice communications recorded between the accident flight and South Bend Approach Control are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The South Bend Airport (SBN), a public airport located approximately 3 miles northwest of South Bend, Indiana, was owned and operated by the St. Joseph County Airport Authority. The airport was a certificated airport under 14 CFR Part 139 and had on-airport fire and rescue services. The airport field elevation was 799 feet msl. The airport had three runways: runway 9R/27L (8,414 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); runway 18/36 (7,100 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); and runway 9L/27R (4,300 feet by 75 feet, asphalt).
FLIGHT RECORDERS
Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild model FA2100-1010 CVR, serial number 446023. The CVR recording contained about 31 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR was not damaged during the accident and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1545:31 with the airplane established in cruise flight at 41,000 feet (FL410), and the recording stopped about 1616:32 while the airplane was maneuvering toward the destination airport with both engines inoperative. A transcript of the CVR audio information is included with the docket materials associated with the investigation. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane collided with three residential structures during the final impact sequence. A majority of the wreckage was found within one of the structures. There was a noticeable odor of Jet-A fuel at the accident site and the South Bend Fire Department reported that fuel had pooled in the basement of the house. The airplane wreckage was recovered from the house and transported to the South Bend Airport to facilitate a more detailed examination. A postaccident examination of the runway 9R revealed areas of abrasion damage to the grooved asphalt surface. The observed damage was consistent with the accident airplane coming in contact with the runway surface during the accident flight.
--- Fuselage ---
The radome had separated from the radome bulkhead, which had separated from the fuselage. The nose baggage and avionics sections had separated forward of the forward pressure bulkhead and the nose wheel well structure had buckled. The cabin area exhibited impact damage; however, portions remained intact from the forward pressure bulkhead to the aft pressure bulkhead. A section of the right cabin sidewall, from the emergency escape hatch opening forward to approximately the right side galley area, had been cut open by first responders to extract the occupants. The aft fuselage had separated from the cabin portion at the aft pressure bulkhead, but remained attached by flight control cables and other conduits. Both engines remained attached to the aft fuselage. The main entry door remained attached at both hinge locations and was found open with the latches in the closed position. The main entry door latching mechanism was actuated and operated as designed. Examination of the fuselage revealed no evidence of an in-flight or post-impact fire. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna had separated from the lower fuselage, and exhibited gouges and scoring of the lower leading edge that were consistent with contact with the runway surface.
--- Wings ---
The wing assembly had separated from the airframe at all mounting points. The left wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces, but remained intact with all flight control surfaces attached. The right wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces and had separated in several locations. The inboard portion of the right wing exhibited minor damage when compared to the outboard wing. The outboard portion of the right wing, outboard of the inboard flap, exhibited impact damage, deformation, and had separated into several pieces. The outboard portion of the right wing, from the aileron outboard, had separated as one piece, with the exception of the composite wing tip assembly. The composite wing tip assembly had separated from the outboard end of the wing and was found amongst the main wreckage. The lower skin of the outboard portion of right wing and the lower skin of the composite wing tip exhibited gouging/scoring that was consistent with contact with the runway surface. The marks made by the gouging/scoring were approximately parallel with the chord of the wing and were aligned with the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. Additional abrasion damage was observed on the lower aft portion of all right wing flap tracks and the aft portion of the wing center keel structure. The trailing edge of the right aileron also exhibited abrasion damage. The wing flaps were observed in the retracted position and the measurement of the individual flap actuators corresponded with fully retracted flap positions. The aileron flight control system displayed multiple separations throughout the circuit; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.
--- Stabilizers ---
The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the rear fuselage and revealed limited impact damage. The elevators remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer at all hinges. The outboard portion of the right elevator, including the balance weight, had separated from the remaining right elevator. The right and left elevator trim tab surfaces remained attached to their respective elevators at their hinges. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and the hinges exhibited no apparent damage. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder at the hinges and did not appear to be damaged. The rudder trim tab surface was visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the rudder. Flight control continuity for the elevator and rudder displayed multiple separations; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.
--- Landing Gear ---
The nose landing gear had separated from the airframe trunnion. The nose landing gear drag brace had separated from the nose landing gear assembly and the airframe supporting structure. The down lock actuator and down lock "pawl" assembly had separated from the drag brace assembly. The nose wheel and tire remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly. The nose wheel exhibited signs of impact damage to a portion of the bead area. The nose landing gear doors had separated from the airframe and were found amongst the main wreckage. The nose landing gear actuator had separated from the airframe in two pieces. The piston portion of the actuator remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly.
The left main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the left wing trunnion. The gear was found in the wheel well; however, the uplock was not engaged to the main landing gear uplock roller. The left main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and to the wing supporting structure. The actuator was found in the retracted position; however, multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by the measurement of the landing gear actuator. The left outboard gear door remained attached to the wing structure and the left main landing gear assembly. The left inboard gear door had separated from the wing and was found in several pieces amongst the main wreckage. The left inboard gear door actuator remained attached to the wing. About 90-percent of the inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The paint on the exterior portions of the door appeared to be eroded, consistent with contact with the runway surface while in the closed position.
The right main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the wing structure. The right wing had separated between the main landing gear trunnion fitting and the main landing gear actuator wing attach fitting. The main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and the wing attach fitting. The right main landing gear actuator was partially extended; the actuator was in neither the fully retracted nor the down-and-locked position. Multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by measurement of the landing gear actuator. The right main landing gear outboard door had separated from the wing and was not recovered during the investigation. About 60-percent of the right inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The reconstructed portion of the door exhibited exterior paint erosion that was consistent with door being abraded in the closed position. Additionally, there was evidence that the left tire had pressed against the interior of the door when the exterior abrasion had occurred. The inboard gear door actuator remained attached the wing.
--- Cockpit Switch and Lever Positions ---
Both engine power levers were in the normal takeoff position. Both levers were bent right and forward approximately 45-degrees. The power levers moved smoothly from the normal takeoff position to the flight idle detent. There was a positive indication at the normal takeoff and flight idle stops. The finger levers, which allow the power levers to be moved aft of the flight idle detent into fuel cut-off, could not be activated/pulled because of damage to both the power levers and the finger levers.
The flap handle was in the 20-degree detent position. Although the flap handle was bent, it could be moved between each flap position detent. A positive detent was noted at each flap position.
The lift dump switch was in the "Unlock" position. The lift dump handle was in the retracted position.
The speed brake was in the "RETRACT" position.
The landing gear position handle located in the cockpit was observed in the "UP" position. The cockpit landing gear circuit breaker was in the closed (not pulled) position. The landing gear alternate extension handle was found partially extended about 1-1/2 inches and was bent toward the instrument panel.
The battery toggle switch was in the "Standby" position.
Both generator toggle switches were in the "ON" position.
Both avionics switches were in the "ON" position.
The left fuel boost switch was in the "ON" position.
The position of the right fuel boost switch could not be determined due to impact damage.
The fuel transfer switch was in the "OFF" position.
Both engine ECU switches were in the "ON" position.
Both engine ignition switches were in the "ARM" position.
Engine synchronization was in the "OFF" position.
--- Engines ---
A postaccident examination of the left engine, serial number 105363, revealed evidence of leading edge foreign object damage to the N1 (Spool) Fan, consistent with the ingestion of debris during the impact sequence. Although damaged, the N1 Fan could still be rotated by hand. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm located at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The Low Pressure (LP) Trip Lever cable exhibited no visible damage, and the fuel cutoff mechanism had not been activated. All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination revealed evidence that the left engine was operating at the time of impact.
A postaccident examination of the right engine, serial number 105364, revealed evidence of attic insulation, pieces of home roofing shingles, pieces of wood, and other unidentified debris within the engine cowling and bypass duct. However, the N1 fan did not reveal visible evidence of leading edge foreign object damage that would be expected from the ingestion of debris in conjunction with engine operation. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The LP Trip Lever cable was found bent and damaged, and the LP Trip Lever fuel cutoff mechanism had been activated. (The LP Shaft Trip Sensor is activated when the LP turbine is forced in the aft direction against the trip lever. Typical scenarios of when a trip sensor would be activated include a LP Shaft separation or when the engine is exposed to significant impact loading.) All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination did not reveal any evidence that the right engine was operating at the time of impact.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
On March 18, 2013, autopsies were performed on the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, located in Mishawka, Indiana. The cause of death for both individuals was attributed to blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during each autopsy.
The pilot's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Losartan, an FAA-accepted high blood pressure medication, was detected in urine and blood samples. The pilot had reported the use of this medication on his most recent FAA medical certificate application.
The pilot-rated-passenger's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
--- Sound Spectrum Study ---
A study was performed to evaluate the sound spectrum of audio recorded by the cockpit area microphone after the loss of engine power at 1614:27. The CVR audio was compared with audio recorded during ground testing of an exemplar Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA). The sound spectrum study indicated that, at 1615:02, the pilot engaged a starter motor in attempt to restart one of the engines. The study further established that the electrical noise from the engine igniters was not present at any point during the CVR recording, including the attempted engine air start. (The air start procedure required that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start) A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine.
--- Surveillance Video Study ---
There were several surveillance videos of the accident airplane during the two landing attempts, and the final descent and impact. A study of airport surveillance footage was completed to determine an average ground speed of the airplane during the second landing attempt. The study determined that the airplane's average ground speed was 127 knots (+/- 4 knots) during the 3.75 seconds of camera footage of the second landing attempt. Additional information concerning the surveillance videos can be found with the docket materials associated with this investigation.
--- Mobile Device Examinations ---
Several mobile devices were recovered from the wreckage and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination.
The pilot's tablet mobile device contained several aviation related applications; however, none of the applications contained flight track data for the accident flight. One application, ForeFlight, depicted the planned route-of-flight for the accident flight. Additionally, the ForeFlight application also contained 160 file-and-brief entries for previous flights. Another application, LogTen Pro, contained a partial flight history log.
The pilot's mobile phone was reviewed and no information pertinent to the investigation was recovered.
The pilot-rated-passenger's mobile phone contained a text message, dated March 13, 2013, concerning a previous flight that he had in the accident airplane with the pilot. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
Another passenger's mobile phone contained multiple out-going text messages with timestamps between 13:45 and 13:53 central daylight time. These text messages noted that the accident flight was about to takeoff and provided the expected time en route to South Bend. At 1505 eastern daylight time, a multi-media text message was sent with a photograph from inside the airplane cabin looking toward the cockpit. At 1612, another photo was taken from inside the cabin looking outside through a cabin window. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
One of the surviving passengers was interviewed by two NTSB Human Performance and Survival Factors investigators. The passenger reported that he loaded his luggage and computer gear on the airplane between 1330 and 1345 central daylight time. After loading, he and the other passenger boarded the airplane and waited for the pilots. Around 1350, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger boarded the airplane. The passengers were not provided a safety briefing. He stated that the takeoff and cruise portion of the flight appeared to be normal; however, while the airplane was on approach to the runway he noticed instrument panel was not illuminated like it had been earlier in the flight. Specifically, he recalled that the cockpit instrument panel appeared to be unpowered. He saw that the pilot was manually flying the airplane. The pilot-rated-passenger turned around and announced that they should prepare for landing. The passenger stated that he became concerned when the airplane flew past the terminal and control tower and had not touched down. He noted that he felt like the airplane was "coming in hot." The airplane then banked right and climbed away from the runway. The passenger heard the pilot tell the pilot-rated-passenger that they were "down to one engine." The airplane continued in the traffic pattern back to the runway. The passenger stated that the cockpit instrument panel still appeared to be unpowered during the second landing attempt; however, he did recall seeing flashing red and yellow cockpit lights. The passenger believed that during the second landing attempt the airplane had a slower groundspeed when compared to the first landing attempt. He noted that the airplane bounced off the runway several times before it entered a nose-high attitude and rolled to the right. He remembered seeing rooftops of homes before he blacked-out. His next memory was after the accident, as first responders attempted to gain access to the cabin.
=============
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal,3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures and terrain following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Regional Airport (KSBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger occupying the cockpit seats were fatally injured. An additional two passengers and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (KRVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1358 central daylight time.
According to preliminary air traffic control information, at 1610:31, the accident pilot established radio communications with South Bend Approach Control while at 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The air traffic controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE intersection and told the pilot to expect a visual approach to runway 9R. At 1611:44, the flight was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:06, the flight was cleared to 3,000 feet msl. At 1615:00, the approach controller told the pilot to make a 5-degree left turn to align with runway 9R and asked the pilot to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:07, the pilot declared an emergency because of a lack of engine power, reporting that they were "dead stick" and without any power. About 23 seconds later, at 1615:30, the pilot transmitted "we've lost all power, and we have no hydraulics." When the controller asked if the airplane remained controllable, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller advised that all runways at KSBN were available for landing and issued the current winds, which were 130-degrees at 10 knots. At 1615:22, the pilot transmitted that the airplane’s navigational systems were inoperative and requested a radar vector toward the airport. The controller replied that the airport was 9 miles directly ahead of the airplane’s current position. At 1616:12, the controller told the pilot to turn 10-degrees left to intersect runway 9R. At 1616:15, the pilot replied "26DK, turning left." No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:58, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to runway 9R with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low descent into a nearby residential community.
SOUTH BEND, INDIANA - A plane that crashed into several homes in South Bend, Indiana on Sunday, killing two people on board, was registered in Helena, but didn't originate from here.
According to FAA registration records, the Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA plane that crashed into several homes in South Bend, Indiana, on March 17 was registered in Montana. Although the plane was registered in Helena, the flight did not originate in Montana, and neither of the occupants were from Montana.
The Montana Aeronautics Division is responsible for the licensing and registration of aircraft statewide. Officials there say the aircraft was registered here under a Limited Liability Corporation name and business address.
Debbie Alke, administrator of the Montana Aeronautics Division, said, "The aircraft was registered to the 7700 Enterprises at 302 North Last Chance Gulch and stating that the aircraft was based at the Helena Airport."
"There are aircraft that are registered in Montana that maybe rarely or never do get here, I'm sure of that," Helena Regional Airport director Ron Mercer said.
The business behind the LLC is located on the fourth floor of a building at 302 North Last Chance Gulch. It is an agency that works on behalf of the LLC, as well as about 1,000 others, in order to benefit from Montana's licensing system. A website under the name Montana Corporate Professional Business Services teaches people from other states and even other countries how to form an LLC in order to cheaply license and register their planes, boats, vehicles or RVs.
In checking with the Secretary of State's Office, there was no record under the airplane's LLC's name. However, it appears the company working on behalf of the LLC is registered, just under a different name.
Paulette DeHart, the Lewis & Clark County Clerk and Recorder/Treasurer, says the county receives numerous registrations each year which come from third party entities.
"We have at least three corporations here in our community and they have full time employees that do nothing but register vehicles," she said.
While these practices may appear to be harmless, they are actually making the state of Montana money.
"So if we've got people coming from all over the country registering through these LLC's, Montana's getting that revenue," DeHart said.
Montana isn't the only state that accepts these practices which allow people to avoid higher taxes in their own states and communities where they truly reside.
While it is legal, its ethics are questionable; several legislative proposals over the years have failed to change the common practice.
According to FAA reports, the Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA plane has fractional ownership. It was last registered in Helena on May 5, 2012.
Before that it was registered in Manchester, New Hampshire.
Source: http://www.kxlf.com
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