Seven people died in a mid-air collision between two medical helicopters over Flagstaff in 2008. Now, a local Boy Scout is working to make sure those victims are never forgotten.
Scott Gourley, 17, was only 7 years old when two helicopters, each carrying a patient to Flagstaff Medical Center, crashed into each other on the afternoon of June 29, 2008. They hit about a half-mile from the hospital and crashed into a forested area on McMillan Mesa. All seven aboard the two aircraft died.
Classic Lifeguard Aeromedical Services of Page operated one of the helicopters. The other was part of Flagstaff Medical Center’s Guardian Air Transport and operated by Air Methods of Englewood, Colo.
Last Saturday, employees from both Classic Lifeguard Aeromedical Services and Guardian Medical Transport joined Gourley on Sunset Trail, part of the Flagstaff Urban Trails System near Basis Flagstaff, on McMillan Mesa to install two red, custom-made memorial benches — one for each helicopter involved in the crash — along with two plaques listing the victims’ names. The memorial is located on top of a hill that overlooks the site where the Classic helicopter crashed. There is also a view across the meadow to the crash site of the Guardian helicopter.
Gourley did not know any of the victims who died in the 2008 helicopter crash. But he knows someone who did.
“A good friend of ours works for Guardian Air and he told us that there was never a memorial done for the victims of the crash,” Gourley said. “It kind of went off from there that we finally got started doing a memorial for them.”
Gourley is a Life Scout with Boy Scout Troop 31 in Flagstaff and has been involved with the Scouts for 11 years. He created the memorial as his Eagle Scout project, which is a service project every Life Scout has to complete to move up to the Eagle Scout rank within the Boy Scouts organization.
“I believe this project will be beneficial to the victims’ families and the community as it will honor the memory of the brave men that lost their lives in this accident,” Gourley said in his proposal to the Boy Scouts. “It will also provide a place that the members of the Flagstaff community can come and pay their respects.”
Early in the process, Gourley contacted officials with the city of Flagstaff to get permission to construct the memorial.
“They actually were very helpful,” Gourley said. “They laid a lot of the dirt down for us to build in the area that we were working in.”
Gourley and volunteers spent a day in April laying and tamping down the local rocks and other fill material the city provided to create a flat foundation for the benches that matched the existing FUTS trail terrain. He also asked his former Boy Scout troop leader, retired Flagstaff High School wielding teacher Dennis Rust, to construct the metal benches by hand. Then, Iron Horse Coatings powder coated them for free.
“We actually didn’t have to do any fundraising or anything because we got all the materials donated,” Gourley said. “People are very generous to Boy Scouts.”
Last Saturday, Gourley and about a dozen volunteers spent the day digging post holes, laying concrete, and placing the plaques and benches. He said he and his father just have a couple of touch-ups to finish before the memorial will be complete.
Gourley worked closely with representatives from Guardian and Classic throughout the project, and asked the companies to contact the families of the crash victims.
“All the families were really excited about him doing this project,” said Gourley’s father, whose name is also Scott. “In fact, a couple of them came out to the site while we did the work on it and thanked us for it.”
He added that he is proud his son took on the project.
“My son took it and ran with it,” he said. “I’m very proud with how he’s done that.”
Gourley said he will say a few words about the memorial before opening up the ceremony to anyone who would like to share their thoughts or memories about the victims.
“It’s a great Boy Scout project,” said Guardian Medical Transport Executive Director Mark Venuti. “It’s absolutely amazing that they chose that as a project and they put a lot of work into it. I think it’s going to be a beautiful memorial.”
If you go...
There will be a dedication ceremony June 29 at 3 p.m., which will be the seventh anniversary of the crash. Families of the victims and employees of both Guardian and Classic are expected to attend. Parking will be available at Basis Flagstaff, located at 1700 N. Gemini Road, and at the dermatology center, located at 1490 N. Turquoise Drive, which is a roughly 5 minute walk from the memorial on Sunset Trail.
Original article can be found here: http://azdailysun.com
Scott Gourley, 17, an Eagle Scout candidate from Troop 31, digs holes for the installation of a pair of commemorative benches along the FUTS trail near Turquoise Drive. The benches and an accompanying plaque are a memorial for the two medical helicopters that crashed near the area in 2008.
NTSB Identification: DEN08MA116A
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, June 29, 2008 in Flagstaff, AZ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/07/2009
Aircraft: BELL 407, registration: N407GA
Injuries: 7 Fatal.
NTSB Identification: DEN08MA116B
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, June 29, 2008 in Flagstaff, AZ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/07/2009
Aircraft: BELL 407, registration: N407MJ
Injuries: 7 Fatal.
NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
Both Emergency Medical Services (EMS) helicopters were on approach to the Flagstaff Medical Center (FMC) helipad to drop off patients. During the flights, the N407MJ pilot had established two-way communications with his communications center and provided position reports, and the N407GA pilot had established two-way communications with FMC's communications center (which was his company's communication center and which also monitored and advised all traffic at the helipad) and provided position reports. The FMC communications center transportation coordinator advised the N407GA pilot that N407MJ would also be dropping off a patient at FMC. The coordinator also advised N407MJ's communication center that N407GA would be landing at FMC, but the N407MJ's communication center did not inform the N407MJ pilot nor was it required to do so.
Established arrival and departure procedures for the FMC helipad required pilots to contact the FMC communications center at the earliest opportunity or at a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad. According to the FMC communications center's staff, N407MJ's pilot did not make the required contact with the communications center at any time during the flight.
About 3 minutes before the collision, N407GA dropped off a medical crewmember at the local airport (about 5 miles south of the medical center) to reduce the weight on the aircraft and to improve aircraft performance during landing at the medical center. According to witness information, flight-track data, and a hospital surveillance video, N407GA approached the helipad from the south, flying past or slightly inside the southeast tip of the noise abatement area on a direct line toward a final approach position just east of the helipad. However, according to helipad arrival guidelines and company procedures, N407GA should have approached the helipad from farther to the east. (After the on-scene accident site investigation, the Air Methods regional chief pilot, accompanied by NTSB investigators, flew the accident route in another Air Methods Bell 407 using GPS data retrieved from N407GA. According to the regional chief pilot, the “trained route” was much farther to the east and not in a direct line to the hospital.) N407MJ approached the helipad from the northeast, and it is likely that the pilot would have been visually scanning the typical flight paths, as described in the noise abatement and helipad arrival guidelines, that other aircraft approaching the medical center would have used. Thus, if N407GA had approached from a more typical direction, the pilot of N407MJ may have been more likely to see and avoid it.
At the time of the collision, both pilots were at a point in the approach where their visual attention typically would have been more focused on the helipad in preparation for landing, rather than on scanning the surrounding area for other traffic. The helicopters collided approximately 1/4 mile east of the helipad. There were no communications from either helicopter just prior to or after the collision.
Neither helicopter was equipped with a traffic collision avoidance system, nor was such a system required. Had such a system been on board, it likely would have alerted the pilots to the traffic conflict so they could take evasive action before collision. No radar or air traffic control services were available for the helipad operations to ensure separation. However, if N407MJ's pilot had contacted the FMC communications center, as required, the FMC transportation coordinator likely would have told him directly that another aircraft was expected at the helipad. If the pilot had known to expect another aircraft in the area, he would have been more likely to look for the other aircraft.
Nevertheless, the pilots were responsible for maintaining vigilance and to see and avoid other aircraft at all times. Under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Sections 91.111 and 91.113, all pilots are responsible for keeping a safe distance from other aircraft and for maintaining vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft. Advisory Circular 90-48C, "Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance," amplifies the see-and-avoid concept by stating that all pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within their field of vision and that they should scan the entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure that conflicting traffic would be detected.
Examination of the wreckages revealed that N407MJ's tail rotor contacted the forward fuselage of N407GA, and N407GA's main rotor blades contacted and separated N407MJ's tail boom. The recovered wreckages showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
Both helicopter pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other helicopter on approach to the helipad. Contributing to the accident were the failure of N407GA’s pilot to follow flight arrival route guidelines, and the failure of N407MJ’s pilot to follow communications guidelines requiring him to report his position within a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad.
Just saw this. As a family member of one of those lost we appreciate the effort and memorial - maybe someday I'll be able to sit on the bench and remember. Thank you!
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