Ralph E. HicksInvestigator In Charge (IIC)
National Transportation Safety Board
The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.
Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Nashville, Tennessee
Textron Aviation; Wichita, Kansas
Pratt & Whitney Canada; Longueuil, Quebec, Canada
Location: Elizabethton, Tennessee
Accident Number: ERA19FA248
Date & Time: August 15, 2019, 15:37 Local
Registration: N8JR
Aircraft: Textron Aviation Inc 680A
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Runway excursion
Injuries: 3 Minor, 2 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation
Analysis
The pilots were conducting a visual flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers onboard. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. During the initial approach to the airport, the flight crew discussed having some difficulty visually acquiring the airport. They also discussed traffic in the area and were maneuvering around clouds, which may have increased the pilots' workload.
As the approach continued, the airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level (agl), which triggered a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. Further, the flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach. At 1535:57 (about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing), the pilot pulled back the throttles to idle, where they stayed for the remainder of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane for landing, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes when the airplane was below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited in the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), which exceeded the maximum allowed for landing per the AFM of 600 fpm.
When the airplane first touched down, it was traveling about 18 knots above Vref. The pilot did not extend the speedbrakes upon touchdown, which the landing checklist required, but instead attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after touchdown, which was a later item on the landing checklist. However, the thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and was airborne again before the command could be executed, which was consistent with system design and logic: the thrust reversers will not unlock until all three landing gear are on the ground.
The airplane touched down four times total; on the third touchdown (after the second bounce), when all three landing gear contacted the runway, the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded during the first touchdown. Although the pilot subsequently advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the thrust reversers, the airplane had bounced a third time and had already become airborne again before the thrust reversers could stow. When the airplane became airborne, the system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators; thus the reversers would not stow. The thrust reversers were subsequently pulled open due to the aerodynamic forces. The pilot attempted to go around by advancing the throttles when the airplane was airborne. However, the electronic engine controls prevented the increase in engine power because the thrust reversers were not stowed.
When the airplane touched down the fourth and final time, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead on the runway; the airplane touched down hard and the right main landing gear then collapsed under the wing. The airplane departed the paved surface and came to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew eventually evacuated the airplane through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a postaccident fire.
A postaccident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
The airplane's approach was unstabilized: its airspeed during the approach and landing well exceeded Vref and its descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing just seconds before touchdown. Both the pilot and copilot commented on the airplane's high speed several times during the approach. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded, "no." Although the copilot was the director of operations for the flight department and the direct supervisor of the pilot, the pilot stated that the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command nor did it diminish his command authority. Neither the pilot nor copilot called for a go-around before landing despite awareness that the approach was unstabilized.
As the airplane touched down, the pilot failed to follow the AFM guidance and used the thrust reversers before the speedbrakes. According to the airplane manufacturer's calculations, the airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available if the airplane had not bounced and the speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the point of the first touchdown.
After the third touchdown, when the airplane became airborne again, the pilot attempted a go-around; the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after the thrust reversers are deployed. It is critical for pilots to know the point at which they should not attempt a go-around; a committed-to-stop (CTS) point is the point at which a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be bringing the aircraft to a stop. Establishing a CTS point eliminates the ambiguity for pilots making decisions during time-critical events. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009, "Committed-toStop Point on Landings," to inform operators and pilots about the importance of establishing a CTS point; however, the director of operations was not aware of the concept of a CTS point during landing.
Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's continuation of an unstabilized approach despite recognizing associated cues and the flight crew's decision not to initiate a go-around before touchdown, which resulted in a bounced landing, a loss of airplane control, a landing gear collapse, and a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to deploy the speedbrakes during the initial touchdown, which may have prevented the runway excursion, and the pilot's attempt to go around after deployment of the thrust reversers.
Findings
Aircraft Airspeed - Not attained/maintained
Aircraft Descent rate - Not attained/maintained
Personnel issues Decision making/judgment - Pilot
Personnel issues Aircraft control - Pilot
Personnel issues Incorrect action sequence - Pilot
Personnel issues Lack of action - Pilot
Personnel issues Delayed action - Pilot
Factual Information
History of Flight
Landing-flare/touchdown Hard landing
Landing-flare/touchdown Abnormal runway contact
Landing-flare/touchdown Landing gear collapse
Landing Runway excursion (Defining event)
Landing-landing roll Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
Post-impact Fire/smoke (post-impact)
On August 15, 2019, about 1537 eastern daylight time, a Textron Aviation Inc. 680A, N8JR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Elizabethton, Tennessee. The pilot and copilot were not injured and the three passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight.
In postaccident interviews and written statements, the pilot and copilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to drop off one of the three passengers at Elizabethton Municipal Airport (0A9), Elizabethton, Tennessee, before continuing the flight to San Antonio, Texas. The flight departed Statesville Regional
Airport (SVH), Statesville, North Carolina, at 1519 and climbed to 12,500 ft mean sea level (msl). The preflight, departure, and en route portions of the flight were routine. Unless otherwise noted, the following sequence of events was derived from the download and review of data from onboard data and voice recording systems, and all speeds are indicated airspeed.
At 1527 (about 8 minutes after takeoff), the airplane began a descent from 12,500 ft msl to 5,400 ft msl; during the descent, the airplane turned right to varying headings between 325º and 342º. During this time, the flight crew discussed clouds in the area and the best ways to maneuver around them as well as traffic in the area and landmarks, including ridgelines, to help them identify 0A9. About 1530, the copilot announced via the airport's common traffic advisory frequency their intention to land on runway 24. At 1532:11, the pilot stated, "well it wouldn't hurt to slow down." About 33 seconds later, the descent resumed, and the airspeed decreased to 200 knots with the autothrottle engaged.
At 1533:00, the airplane began to turn left, and the crew conversation indicated that they had some difficulty visually acquiring the airport; the airplane then turned right and began to climb. At 1535:02, the descent resumed, and 10 seconds later the terrain avoidance and warning system (TAWS) excessive closure rate caution and warning alerts sounded in the cockpit as the airplane crossed a ridge at 710 ft above ground level (agl). The copilot asked the pilot if he saw the terrain, and the pilot responded, "yeah, I got it."
At 1535:27, the airplane began a shallow left turn to an extended final. As the approach to landing resumed, the descent rate increased; the autothrottle positioned the throttles to their minimum, 6º throttle lever angle, and the airspeed increased to 220 knots. At 1536:12, the pilot asked the copilot to position the flaps to the flaps 1 setting. The crew then manually positioned the throttles to 0º throttle lever angle, which disengaged the autothrottle; the throttles were not moved for the remainder of the approach. At 1536:29, the pilot stated, "slow down." At 1536:31, the pilot asked the copilot to lower the landing gear, and the copilot responded that he would after the airplane slowed down more. At 1536:36, the speedbrake lever was partially extended to a 33º lever angle, and the TAWS excessive descent rate caution alert sounded about 5 seconds later. (See figure 1 for the accident airplane's flight path until the first touchdown.) At 1536:47, about 3 nautical miles from touchdown and at 2,783 ft msl (781 ft agl), the speedbrake lever was extended to 41º for a total of 21 seconds then retracted after the airspeed decreased to 205 knots. At 1536:50, the landing gear were extended, and 7 seconds later, flaps 2 (15°) was selected; these actions were performed when the airplane reached the maximum speeds to perform those functions (205 knots and 195 knots, respectively).
Figure 1: N8JR's approach, including speed and use of speedbrakes (in yellow), landing gear, and flaps.
As the flaps were extending, the TAWS forward looking terrain alert rate of terrain closure caution alert sounded twice (at 1536:59 and at 1537:09), then a warning alert sounded (at 1537:11). The airplane was at an altitude of 2,159 ft msl (471 ft agl). Following these alerts, the copilot selected full flaps and the descent rate and airspeed decreased. At 1537:26, the copilot stated, "and I don't need to tell ya, we're really fast," and the pilot responded, "I'm at idle." Six seconds later, the pilot asked, "do I need to go around?" and the copilot responded, "no." At 1537:31, about 270 ft agl, the speedbrakes were partially extended for 5 seconds (to 140 ft agl). The pilot then stated, "I got the speed brakes out," to which the copilot responded, "well you should get rid of those because we don't wanna get a CAS [Crew Alerting System] m- or a thing sent to ya." Eight seconds before touchdown, at 1537:41, the pilot stated, "alright, I'll be on the T-Rs [thrust reversers] quickly." For the computed airplane weight, the reference speed (Vref) for the final approach was 108 knots; the airplane's airspeed at the runway's displaced threshold was 126 knots. Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was over 1,500 ft per minute (fpm).
According to airport surveillance video and recorded data, the airplane first briefly touched down with a bounce on the runway designator about 240 ft past the displaced threshold with about 3,860 ft of paved surface remaining. The airplane then touched down two more times, bouncing each time, then continued airborne over the runway until it touched down a fourth time with about 1,120 ft of paved surface remaining. See figure 2 for a depiction of the bounced landing detailing the landing gear touchdowns,
vertical acceleration, and thrust reverser actions (the speedbrakes were not extended after touchdown, although the landing checklist indicated they should be).
Figure 2. Graph depicting the airplane's thrust reverser actions, landing gear touchdowns, and vertical acceleration (bold) during its bounced landing.
When the airplane touched down initially at 1537:49, it was travelling 126 knots (18 knots above Vref) and had a descent rate of 600 fpm (the maximum allowed per the airplane flight manual [AFM]). All three landing gear registered "on-ground" simultaneously with a vertical acceleration of 1.4 gravitational acceleration (g), and thrust reverser deployment was commanded 0.4 second after the landing gear first touched the ground as the throttles were moved to the reverse idle position; however, the airplane bounced after touching down for 0.6 second and was airborne again before the thrust reverser command could be executed.
When the airplane touched down a second time, 1.2 seconds later at 1.6 g, the nose landing gear touched down first, followed immediately by the right main landing gear. The left main landing gear never registered on-ground during the touchdown, and the airplane bounced and became airborne again after 0.4 second.
The airplane touched down a third time, 1.8 seconds later at 1.7 g and about 1,000 ft down the runway with about 3,100 ft of paved surface remaining. The thrust reversers unlocked 0.4 second after all three landing gear registered on-ground because the reverser deployment command from the first touchdown was still active. Almost immediately after the thrust reversers unlocked, the pilot advanced the throttles to idle, sending a thrust reverser stow command at 1537:54; however, the landing gear status changed to "in-air" almost simultaneously when the command was executed.
The airplane bounced after 0.6 second and became airborne a third time, and the in-air landing gear status triggered a cut in hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators, which is intended to prevent the airborne deployment of a thrust reverser. The cut in hydraulic power to the thrust reversers allowed the unlocked thrust reversers to be pulled open by aerodynamic forces. The amber "T/R UNLOCK CAS" message illuminated and the thrust reverser emergency stow switches began to flash. The pilot advanced the throttles to maximum takeoff power 0.7 second later in an attempt to go around; however, the thrust reversers reached full deployment 0.4 second after that. The airplane's full authority digital engine controls (FADEC), by design, prevented an increase in engine power while the thrust reversers were deployed. The red "T/R DEPLOY CAS" message was displayed in the cockpit, indicating that the thrust reversers were deployed, and the thrust reverser emergency stow switches continued to flash.
The pilots later reported that they attempted to conduct a go-around; however, the engines did not respond as expected, so they landed straight ahead on the runway. While the airplane was airborne, the crew partially retracted the flaps as the airspeed decreased from 119 knots to 91 knots. The pilot retarded the throttles partially but not to idle, then pushed the throttles forward again with no effect because the FADEC continued to prevent an increase in thrust; the pilot then pulled back the throttles to idle. While airborne for 9.6 seconds, the airplane reached an altitude of about 24 ft agl.
The stick shaker activated 0.5 second before the airplane touched down for the fourth and final time at 1538:03, warning of an imminent stall. The airplane touched down hard with a peak acceleration of 3.2 g on the left and right main landing gear, then the left main landing gear came off the ground then contacted the ground again. The nose gear contacted the ground about 0.5 second later. The left inboard wheel brake pressure increased to near maximum after the left main gear touched down; however, the left outboard and right wheel brake pressure did not increase significantly, indicating that only the left inboard tire was firmly contacting the runway. When all three landing gear touched down on the runway at 1538:06, the thrust reverser system was reenergized and the thrust reversers stowed 0.9 second later because the throttles were at idle.
Airport surveillance video showed that the right main landing gear collapsed at 1538:04 and that the outboard section of the right wing contacted the runway immediately thereafter. The airplane then departed the 97-ft-long paved surface beyond the end of the runway and traveled through a 400-ft-long open area of grass, down an embankment, through a creek, through a chain-link fence, and up an embankment. Photographs of the accident scene showed that the airplane came to rest on the edge of a four-lane highway about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. In postaccident interviews with the flight crew, they reported that they secured the engines after the airplane came to a stop and assisted the passengers with the evacuation through the main entry door as a postaccident fire erupted, which eventually destroyed the airplane.
Pilot Information
Certificate: Airline transport; Commercial
Age: 56, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine land; Single-engine sea; Multi-engine land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 5-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane single-engine
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 1 With waivers/limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: June 19, 2019
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: October 24, 2018
Flight Time: 5800 hours (Total, all aircraft), 765 hours (Total, this make and model)
Co-pilot Information
Certificate: Airline transport; Commercial
Age: 52, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine land; Multi-engine land
Seat Occupied: Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 5-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 2 Without waivers/limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: December 5, 2018
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: October 24, 2018
Flight Time: 11000 hours (Total, all aircraft), 1165 hours (Total, this make and model)
The pilot, seated in the left cockpit seat and acting as the pilot-in-command, and the copilot, seated in the right cockpit seat, both held a type rating in the accident airplane.
Both the pilot and copilot completed their most recent recurrent training together at TRU Simulation, Tampa, Florida. A review of the TRU Simulation syllabus for recurrent training revealed that the thrust reverser system was covered in ground training. In postaccident interviews, both the pilot and co-pilot reported that the thrust reverser system was adequately covered in initial and recurrent training.
According to the copilot, who also served as the director of operations for the airplane operator, he and the pilot were the only pilots who flew the accident airplane. Both the pilot and copilot were qualified to act as pilot-in-command. The normal procedure for the crew was to "switch seats" often, with the pilot in the left seat always acting as pilot-in-command. As the director of operations, the copilot on the accident flight was also the direct supervisor of the pilot in the left seat. The pilot reported that this relationship neither influenced his decisions as pilot-in-command nor diminished his command authority. When asked if he thought there may have been repercussions from the copilot if he had discontinued the approach, the pilot responded "absolutely not."
The pilot and copilot stated in postaccident interviews that they did not think that their maneuvers around clouds and traffic and identification of landmarks near 0A9 distracted them or increased their workload. In addition, the pilot and copilot said there was no pressure from the passengers to land rather than go around, and the copilot added that the airplane left SVH on time and that there were no other time constraints. The pilot recalled hearing the TAWS excessive closure rate warning alert on short final; however, he did not think that the alert contributed to the outcome. In retrospect, he felt the initial touchdown was too hard, possibly from an inadequate landing flare between final approach and touchdown, which would have slowed the descent rate and created a softer touchdown.
When the copilot was asked in postaccident interviews if he thought the approach was stabilized, he responded "no."
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Make: Textron Aviation Inc
Registration: N8JR
Model/Series: 680A
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2015
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Transport
Serial Number: 680A0010
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle
Seats: 11
Date/Type of Last Inspection: July 26, 2019 Continuous airworthiness
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 31025 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection: 17 Hrs
Engines: 2 Turbo fan
Airframe Total Time: 1165 Hrs at time of accident
Engine Manufacturer: P&W Canada
ELT: C126 installed, activated, did not aid in locating accident
Engine Model/Series: 306D1
Registered Owner:
Rated Power: 5907 Lbs thrust
Operator:
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
The airplane, also known as a Citation Latitude, had a low-wing, cruciform tail design with twin, fuselage-mounted engines. It was equipped with two cockpit seats and nine passenger seats.
The pilots reported that the airplane departed SVH with about 1,312 gallons of fuel on board. According to the AFM, the maximum certified landing weight was 27,575 lbs, and the crew reported that the airplane weighed 27,508 lbs at the time of the accident and required 3,000 ft of runway for landing.
According to the AFM, speedbrakes must be stowed before 500 ft agl and remain stowed until landing. The maximum landing descent rate was 600 fpm.
The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), a Garmin G5000 advanced integrated flight deck with flat screen displays and touch screen controls, a Textron Aircraft Recording System (AReS), and a Pratt and Whitney Canada FADEC on each engine. The CVR and G5000 memory card were removed from the airplane and sent for analysis to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Division, Washington, DC. Textron reviewed the AReS data and provided a report to the NTSB.
According to the airplane manufacturer, speedbrake extension at touchdown has a "significantly greater effect" than thrust reverser use. The manufacturer calculated the landing distance of the accident airplane model if it had been traveling at an airspeed of 126 knots at touchdown, which was 18 knots above Vref and was the speed of the accident airplane at the displaced threshold. According to the manufacturer's calculations, an airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available to the accident airplane if only speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used during the first touchdown and the airplane did not bounce.
The AFM included three checklists to be completed during approach and landing: the approach checklist, the before landing checklist, and the landing checklist. The before landing checklist included lowering the landing gear, selecting full flaps, and confirming Vref; the landing checklist included extending speedbrakes at touchdown then deploying thrust reversers after nosewheel touchdown.
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: Visual (VMC)
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: K0A9,1592 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 15:35 Local
Direction from Accident Site: 70°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Scattered / 4700 ft AGL
Visibility: 10 miles
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 7000 ft AGL
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: None / None
Wind Direction:
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: N/A / N/A
Altimeter Setting: 29.96 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: 29°C / 19°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Statesville, NC (SVH)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: Elizabethton, TN (0A9)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 15:19 Local
Type of Airspace: Class G
Airport Information
Airport: Elizabethton Muni 0A9
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 1592 ft msl
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 24
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 5001 ft / 75 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Full stop; Traffic pattern
The airport's runway surface was in excellent condition. Runway 24 had a 902 ft displaced threshold and runway 6 had a 97 ft displaced threshold.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries: 2 None
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 3 Minor
Aircraft Fire: On-ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 3 Minor, 2 None
Latitude, Longitude: 36.367221,-82.181663
The airplane came to rest upright but rolled toward the left about 42°; it was on a true heading of 285º and at an elevation of 1,551 ft msl. The fuselage aft of the main entry door, the right wing, the empennage, and most of the fuel system were destroyed by the postaccident fire.
The left and right thrust reverser actuators, located in the engine nacelles, were found in the stowed positions.
The flap handle in the cockpit and the flap actuators were found in the flaps 2 position. The speedbrake handle in the cockpit was found in the midrange position, neither stowed nor extended. Flight control cable continuity was not established on scene; however, the AReS data did not reveal any evidence of a flight control issue nor did the flight crew report one.
Both engines were heavily damaged by fire and soot. Visual and borescope examinations of the engines did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies or failures that would have precluded normal engine operation. The oil and fuel filters on both engines were unobstructed. Review of the AReS data revealed normal engine parameters throughout the flight and accident sequence; the engines operated as commanded by the crew.
The nose landing gear and the left main landing gear were impact-separated during the collision with the creek bed and embankment and were found adjacent to the main wreckage. The right main landing gear remained attached to the right wing by the hydraulic landing gear actuator and remained under the wing during the postaccident fire. The right main landing gear trunnion pin, located on the forward side of the trunnion, remained attached to the trunnion assembly. The trunnion bearing in the wing structure was separated from the wing and was not found. The forward trunnion pin-bearing installation hole in the wing structure was elongated. The aft trunnion pin was not observed because the aft trunnion assembly sustained postaccident fire damage and was melted. The aft trunnion bearing remained in place in the aft wing spar and was unremarkable. The upper bolt used to install the right main landing gear oleo strut to the trunnion assembly was sheared (the oleo strut absorbs shock in the landing gear during landing). The inboard hole of the upper oleo and trunnion installation knuckle attachment was elongated. The threaded portion of its bolt and nut, with the cotter key installed to keep the upper oleo and trunnion connected, was found on the runway. The fracture surface of the bolt exhibited metallurgical signatures consistent with overstress; the head of the bolt was not located during the wreckage examination.
The examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preaccident anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Additional Information
A committed-to-stop (CTS) point is a point in the landing sequence beyond which a go-around should not be attempted. The NTSB has previously addressed the need for airplane manufacturers to incorporate CTS points in their AFMs. On July 31, 2008, a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 125-800A airplane crashed near Owatonna, Minnesota, after the captain failed to immediately deploy the lift-dump system after touchdown, then attempted a go-around late in the landing sequence with insufficient runway remaining. A review of operator and manufacturer guidance found that neither had identified a CTS point beyond which a go-around should not be attempted. As a result, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-11-18, which asked the FAA to require manufacturers to incorporate in their AFMs
a CTS point in the landing sequence. The NTSB also issued Safety Recommendation A-11-19, which asked the FAA to require Part 121, 135, and 91K operators and Part 142 training schools to incorporate the information from the revised manufacturers' AFMs into their manuals and training.
During the FAA's evaluation of these recommendations, it found that operational factors were too numerous and varied to establish a single CTS point to be included in the manufacturers' AFMs. The FAA believed that operators were in a better position to make the determination based on their aircraft and operation. Thus, the FAA issued Information for Operators (InFO) 17009, "Committed-to-Stop
Point on Landings," which informs turbine-powered aircraft operators about the importance of establishing a point during landing where a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be stopping the aircraft. The InFO encourages operators to include a CTS point in the approach briefing and in their standard operating procedures, flight operations manual, initial and recurrent training, and crew resource management training program. As a result, the NTSB classified the A-11-18 as "Closed—Reconsidered" and A-11-19 as "Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action."
A review of the accident airplane's AFM revealed that it did not include information about a CTS point and it did not specify that a go-around should not be attempted after use of thrust reversers; the AFM did state that the use of thrust reversers is prohibited during touch-and-go landings.
The copilot stated that he had not heard of a CTS point.
Survival Aspects
The airplane was equipped with two exits: a cabin entry door on the left side of the fuselage and an emergency over-wing escape hatch located near the lavatory (rear) on the right side of the fuselage.
According to postaccident pilot and passenger statements, the pilots attempted to open the cabin entry door after the airplane came to a stop but could not open it. Around the same time, one of the passengers attempted to open the emergency escape hatch but had difficulty opening it. Both the pilot and copilot came to the back of the airplane to assist in opening the emergency escape hatch, but they could not open it either.
The pilots and passenger continued to struggle with the emergency escape hatch and observed heavy smoke coming from the lavatory, followed by flames. The copilot attempted to open the cabin entry door a second time, and he was able to push the door partially open with enough clearance to get all the occupants out. In a postaccident interview, the copilot reported that the exterior handle was likely pushing against the ground at the time, preventing it from opening fully.
At the airplane's final attitude, the exterior paddle-type handle on the cabin entry door impinged on the ground, preventing full extension of the handle. When the fuselage was lifted during the recovery of the wreckage, investigators opened and closed the cabin entry door fully without restrictions. During the examination of the emergency exit at the accident site, investigators noted that a metal post from the chain-link fence was impaled into the emergency escape hatch near the round hatch window (see figure 3). Although there was extensive postaccident fire damage to the hatch, the latching pin was found in the closed and latched position. After investigators removed the hatch from its frame and the pole pinning it in place, the handle operated in a normal manner with full range of motion.
Figure 3: Emergency escape hatch impaled by a metal fence post.
Location: Elizabethton, TN
Accident Number: ERA19FA248
Date & Time: 08/15/2019, 1537 EDT
Registration: N8JR
Aircraft: Textron Aviation Inc 680A
Injuries: 3 Minor, 2 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Business
On August 15, 2019, about 1537 eastern daylight time, a Textron Aviation Inc. 680A, N8JR, was destroyed during a runway excursion after landing at Elizabethton Municipal Airport (0A9), Elizabethton, Tennessee. The airline transport-rated pilot and copilot were not injured. The three passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane was registered to JRM Air LLC and operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight. The flight originated at Statesville Regional Airport (SVH), Statesville, North Carolina at 1519 and was destined for 0A9.
According to the flight crew, the flight departed SVH under visual flight rules and climbed to 12,500 ft. No air traffic control services were requested. The preflight, departure, and en route portions of the flight were routine. Approaching 0A9, the crew announced their intentions to land on runway 24 via the airport's common traffic advisory frequency.
Airport surveillance video captured the initial touchdown, which occurred near the runway touchdown zone, and portions of the accident sequence. The airplane bounced twice, then continued airborne down runway 24 until it touched down a third time with about 1,000 ft of paved surface remaining. The video revealed that the right main landing gear collapsed and the outboard section of the right wing contacted the runway shortly after the third touchdown. The airplane departed the paved surface beyond the runway 24 departure end threshold, through an open area of grass, down an embankment, through a chain-link fence, and up an embankment, coming to rest on the edge of Tennessee Highway 91.
The pilots' account of the landing was generally consistent with the video. The pilots also reported that, following the second bounce, a go-around was attempted; however, the airplane did not respond as expected, so they landed straight-ahead on the runway and could not stop the airplane prior to the excursion. After the airplane came to a stop, the flight crew secured the engines and assisted the passengers with the evacuation. The main entry door was utilized to exit the airplane. A postaccident fire was in progress during the evacuation.
The airplane came to rest upright, on a true heading of 285º. The fuselage aft of the main entry door, the right wing, and the empennage were consumed by the postaccident fire. The left main and nose landing gear were separated from the airframe during the impact sequence. The right main landing gear remained under the right wing and was heavily fire damaged.
The airplane, also known as the Citation Latitude, was a low wing, cruciform tail design with twin, fuselage-mounted Pratt and Whitney Canada 360D turbofan engines. It was equipped with two cockpit seats and nine passenger seats. The airplane was built in 2015 and the owner purchased the airplane new. The total time of the airframe was about 1,165 hours. The maximum takeoff weight was 31,025 lbs. The cockpit, which was undamaged by fire, was equipped with a Garmin G5000 advanced integrated flight deck (flat screen displays and touch screen controls) that recorded numerous flight and systems parameters. The data was successfully downloaded following the accident. The airplane was also equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The CVR was damaged by the postaccident fire and was sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC for examination and download.
The pilot, seated in the left cockpit seat and acting as the flying pilot and pilot-in-command, held an airline transport pilot certificate and a type rating in the accident airplane. He reported 5,800 hours total flight experience, including 765 hours in the accident airplane. His latest recurrent training occurred in October 2018.
The copilot, seated in the right cockpit seat, held an airline transport pilot certificate and a type rating in the accident airplane. He reported 11,000 hours total flight experience, including 1,165 hours in the accident airplane. His latest recurrent training occurred in October 2018.
The reported weather at 0A9 at 1535 included calm wind, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 4,700 and 5,500 ft, broken clouds at 7,000 ft, and altimeter setting 29.97 inches of mercury.
The wreckage was retained for further examination.
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Make: Textron Aviation Inc
Registration: N8JR
Model/Series: 680A
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built:No
Operator: JRM Air LLC
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: K0A9, 1592 ft msl
Observation Time: 1535 EDT
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Temperature/Dew Point: 29°C / 19°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Scattered / 4700 ft agl
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: Calm / ,
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 7000 ft agl
Visibility: 10 Miles
Altimeter Setting: 29.97 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Departure Point: Statesville, NC (SVH)
Destination: Elizabethton, TN (0A9)
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries: 2 None
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 3 Minor
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion:None
Total Injuries: 3 Minor, 2 None
Latitude, Longitude: 36.367222, -82.181667
Accident Number: ERA19FA248
Date & Time: 08/15/2019, 1537 EDT
Registration: N8JR
Aircraft: Textron Aviation Inc 680A
Injuries: 3 Minor, 2 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Business
On August 15, 2019, about 1537 eastern daylight time, a Textron Aviation Inc. 680A, N8JR, was destroyed during a runway excursion after landing at Elizabethton Municipal Airport (0A9), Elizabethton, Tennessee. The airline transport-rated pilot and copilot were not injured. The three passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane was registered to JRM Air LLC and operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight. The flight originated at Statesville Regional Airport (SVH), Statesville, North Carolina at 1519 and was destined for 0A9.
According to the flight crew, the flight departed SVH under visual flight rules and climbed to 12,500 ft. No air traffic control services were requested. The preflight, departure, and en route portions of the flight were routine. Approaching 0A9, the crew announced their intentions to land on runway 24 via the airport's common traffic advisory frequency.
Airport surveillance video captured the initial touchdown, which occurred near the runway touchdown zone, and portions of the accident sequence. The airplane bounced twice, then continued airborne down runway 24 until it touched down a third time with about 1,000 ft of paved surface remaining. The video revealed that the right main landing gear collapsed and the outboard section of the right wing contacted the runway shortly after the third touchdown. The airplane departed the paved surface beyond the runway 24 departure end threshold, through an open area of grass, down an embankment, through a chain-link fence, and up an embankment, coming to rest on the edge of Tennessee Highway 91.
The pilots' account of the landing was generally consistent with the video. The pilots also reported that, following the second bounce, a go-around was attempted; however, the airplane did not respond as expected, so they landed straight-ahead on the runway and could not stop the airplane prior to the excursion. After the airplane came to a stop, the flight crew secured the engines and assisted the passengers with the evacuation. The main entry door was utilized to exit the airplane. A postaccident fire was in progress during the evacuation.
The airplane came to rest upright, on a true heading of 285º. The fuselage aft of the main entry door, the right wing, and the empennage were consumed by the postaccident fire. The left main and nose landing gear were separated from the airframe during the impact sequence. The right main landing gear remained under the right wing and was heavily fire damaged.
The airplane, also known as the Citation Latitude, was a low wing, cruciform tail design with twin, fuselage-mounted Pratt and Whitney Canada 360D turbofan engines. It was equipped with two cockpit seats and nine passenger seats. The airplane was built in 2015 and the owner purchased the airplane new. The total time of the airframe was about 1,165 hours. The maximum takeoff weight was 31,025 lbs. The cockpit, which was undamaged by fire, was equipped with a Garmin G5000 advanced integrated flight deck (flat screen displays and touch screen controls) that recorded numerous flight and systems parameters. The data was successfully downloaded following the accident. The airplane was also equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The CVR was damaged by the postaccident fire and was sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC for examination and download.
The pilot, seated in the left cockpit seat and acting as the flying pilot and pilot-in-command, held an airline transport pilot certificate and a type rating in the accident airplane. He reported 5,800 hours total flight experience, including 765 hours in the accident airplane. His latest recurrent training occurred in October 2018.
The copilot, seated in the right cockpit seat, held an airline transport pilot certificate and a type rating in the accident airplane. He reported 11,000 hours total flight experience, including 1,165 hours in the accident airplane. His latest recurrent training occurred in October 2018.
The reported weather at 0A9 at 1535 included calm wind, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 4,700 and 5,500 ft, broken clouds at 7,000 ft, and altimeter setting 29.97 inches of mercury.
The wreckage was retained for further examination.
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Make: Textron Aviation Inc
Registration: N8JR
Model/Series: 680A
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built:No
Operator: JRM Air LLC
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: K0A9, 1592 ft msl
Observation Time: 1535 EDT
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Temperature/Dew Point: 29°C / 19°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Scattered / 4700 ft agl
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: Calm / ,
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 7000 ft agl
Visibility: 10 Miles
Altimeter Setting: 29.97 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Departure Point: Statesville, NC (SVH)
Destination: Elizabethton, TN (0A9)
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries: 2 None
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 3 Minor
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion:None
Total Injuries: 3 Minor, 2 None
Latitude, Longitude: 36.367222, -82.181667
Elizabethton Fire Department put out booms in a nearby lake to contain the water.
"First responders, when they first got the call, absolutely did a fantastic job of containing everything and mitigating everything at that point in time,” Carter County EMA Director Gary Smith said. “That's why this is going to be a much easier process."
Smith said fuel will likely seep out of the storm drains for quite some time. Booms will remain in place to catch that extra fuel, but it will not affect traffic.
Meanwhile, the NTSB was still on scene Saturday cutting up sections of the airplane. They will take those to Griffin, Georgia, for further analysis and investigation.
TDOT crews were also on scene assessing the safety of the road to make sure it is still structurally sound. Police Chief Jason Shaw said the road could open as early as midday Monday, but it could take longer.
Original article can be found here ➤ https://wcyb.com
Dan Cogan told News 5 that the plane had previously been to the Elizabethton airport and its pilots had flown into the airport at both day and night.
"Day-to-day, we land jets, mid-sized jets, light jets regularly," Cogan said. "It's not an anomaly or unusual circumstance."
The Elizabethton Municipal Airport can see between 50-70 operations daily, which includes take-offs and landings. Cogan said most customers are taking advantage of the airport for the region's mountain tourism, while only a small number use the airport for race week.
On Thursday, only one driver flew into the airport, though it is the closest runway to Bristol Motor Speedway.
Unlike the much larger Tri-Cities Airport, Elizabethton Municipal Airport doesn't have a control tower, requiring pilots to communicate with each other upon approach.
Gene Cossey, executive director of the Tri-Cities Airport Authority, said he communicates with the Elizabethton Municipal Airport staff regularly and it's important to not rush to cast blame.
"I know the guys down in Elizabethton, they do a great job at making sure that that is a perfectly safe airport," Cossey said.
Landing planes at smaller airports requires extra focus and larger planes have to land further down the runway, according to flight instructor Bill Powley.
He said the situation could have been much worse if Earnhardt's plane would have reached the ditch across Highway 91.
"Somebody is looking out after Dale and his family," Powley said. "Unlike baseball, where you can be a hero batting .260, in this game, you have to bat 1.000 all the time."
The Elizabethton Municipal Airport staff is working with the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board as they carry out investigations.
As of Thursday evening, the Elizabethton Municipal Airport is fully operational once again.
Story and video ➤ https://wcyb.com
Earnhardt, his wife and their 1-year-old daughter were on board with two pilots during the accident and they all escaped without serious injuries, officials said.
The Cessna 680A Citation Latitude took off from Statesville, North Carolina, for a 20-minute afternoon flight before it crashed while landing at Elizabethton Municipal Airport in Elizabethton, Tennessee, Ralph Hicks of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said at a news conference on Friday.
The crash was captured on surveillance video, Hicks said, which showed the plane bounce "at least twice before coming down hard on the right main landing gear."
"You can actually see the right main landing gear collapsing on the video," he said.
The plane then continued down the runway, went through a fence, and came to a stop on a highway, Hicks said.
The Earnhardts were able to evacuate before the plane erupted in flames, Hicks said, adding that the fire appeared to start after the crash.
Elizabethton Fire Chief Barry Carrier attributed the blaze to fuel from the aircraft.
The former race car driver was taken to Johnson City Medical Center with cuts and abrasions. He was the only person on board who was hospitalized, according to the sheriff.
A spokesman for NBC Sports, where Earnhardt works as a NASCAR analyst, later said that Earnhardt was discharged from the hospital.
Elizabethton Mayor Curt Alexander said it's extremely lucky that no cars were involved in the accident.
"We're just happy everyone walked away and no one on the ground was injured as well," Alexander said at Friday's news conference.
Both pilots on board were professionally-trained, Hicks said, and when interviewed by the NTSB they provided information consistent with the surveillance video.
The Earnhardts were interviewed and their comments were also consistent with the video, said Hicks.
The surveillance footage of the accident will eventually be released to the public, he added.
The plane had a cockpit voice recorder which will be sent to NTSB headquarters in Washington, DC., Hicks said.
Story and video ➤ https://abcnews.go.com
First Responders
"We had a great time with our first responder family at the Bristol Motor Speedway night race! A big thank you to NASCAR for giving us and all the agencies that responded to Dale Jr.'s plane crash free tickets!"
-Carter County Tennessee Sheriff's Office
First Responders
Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Nashville, Tennessee
Textron Aviation; Wichita, Kansas
P&W Canada; Longueuil, Quebec, Canada
Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms
Aviation Accident Preliminary Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf
https://registry.faa.gov/N8JR
Location: Elizabethton, TN
Accident Number: ERA19FA248
Date & Time: 08/15/2019, 1537 EDT
Registration: N8JR
Aircraft: Textron Aviation Inc 680A
Injuries: 3 Minor, 2 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Business
On August 15, 2019, about 1537 eastern daylight time, a Textron Aviation Inc. 680A, N8JR, was destroyed during a runway excursion after landing at Elizabethton Municipal Airport (0A9), Elizabethton, Tennessee. The airline transport-rated pilot and copilot were not injured. The three passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane was registered to JRM Air LLC and operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight. The flight originated at Statesville Regional Airport (SVH), Statesville, North Carolina at 1519 and was destined for 0A9.
According to the flight crew, the flight departed SVH under visual flight rules and climbed to 12,500 ft. No air traffic control services were requested. The preflight, departure, and en route portions of the flight were routine. Approaching 0A9, the crew announced their intentions to land on runway 24 via the airport's common traffic advisory frequency.
Airport surveillance video captured the initial touchdown, which occurred near the runway touchdown zone, and portions of the accident sequence. The airplane bounced twice, then continued airborne down runway 24 until it touched down a third time with about 1,000 ft of paved surface remaining. The video revealed that the right main landing gear collapsed and the outboard section of the right wing contacted the runway shortly after the third touchdown. The airplane departed the paved surface beyond the runway 24 departure end threshold, through an open area of grass, down an embankment, through a chain-link fence, and up an embankment, coming to rest on the edge of Tennessee Highway 91.
The pilots' account of the landing was generally consistent with the video. The pilots also reported that, following the second bounce, a go-around was attempted; however, the airplane did not respond as expected, so they landed straight-ahead on the runway and could not stop the airplane prior to the excursion. After the airplane came to a stop, the flight crew secured the engines and assisted the passengers with the evacuation. The main entry door was utilized to exit the airplane. A postaccident fire was in progress during the evacuation.
The airplane came to rest upright, on a true heading of 285º. The fuselage aft of the main entry door, the right wing, and the empennage were consumed by the postaccident fire. The left main and nose landing gear were separated from the airframe during the impact sequence. The right main landing gear remained under the right wing and was heavily fire damaged.
The airplane, also known as the Citation Latitude, was a low wing, cruciform tail design with twin, fuselage-mounted Pratt and Whitney Canada 360D turbofan engines. It was equipped with two cockpit seats and nine passenger seats. The airplane was built in 2015 and the owner purchased the airplane new. The total time of the airframe was about 1,165 hours. The maximum takeoff weight was 31,025 lbs. The cockpit, which was undamaged by fire, was equipped with a Garmin G5000 advanced integrated flight deck (flat screen displays and touch screen controls) that recorded numerous flight and systems parameters. The data was successfully downloaded following the accident. The airplane was also equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The CVR was damaged by the postaccident fire and was sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC for examination and download.
The pilot, seated in the left cockpit seat and acting as the flying pilot and pilot-in-command, held an airline transport pilot certificate and a type rating in the accident airplane. He reported 5,800 hours total flight experience, including 765 hours in the accident airplane. His latest recurrent training occurred in October 2018.
The copilot, seated in the right cockpit seat, held an airline transport pilot certificate and a type rating in the accident airplane. He reported 11,000 hours total flight experience, including 1,165 hours in the accident airplane. His latest recurrent training occurred in October 2018.
The reported weather at 0A9 at 1535 included calm wind, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 4,700 and 5,500 ft, broken clouds at 7,000 ft, and altimeter setting 29.97 inches of mercury.
The wreckage was retained for further examination.
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information
Aircraft Make: Textron Aviation Inc
Registration: N8JR
Model/Series: 680A
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built:No
Operator: JRM Air LLC
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: K0A9, 1592 ft msl
Observation Time: 1535 EDT
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Temperature/Dew Point: 29°C / 19°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Scattered / 4700 ft agl
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: Calm / ,
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 7000 ft agl
Visibility: 10 Miles
Altimeter Setting: 29.97 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Departure Point: Statesville, NC (SVH)
Destination: Elizabethton, TN (0A9)
Wreckage and Impact Information
Crew Injuries: 2 None
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 3 Minor
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion:None
Total Injuries: 3 Minor, 2 None
Latitude, Longitude: 36.367222, -82.181667
Ralph E. Hicks
Investigator In Charge (IIC)
National Transportation Safety Board
an "eyewitness" reported he landed half way down the 4500' strip. Has anyone else seen the video of the wheel/tire assembly lying on the runway burning?
ReplyDeleteThey said today that they bounced twice.
ReplyDeleteHmmm... possibly landed half way down a relatively short runway, bounced (possibly more than once), right main gear torn off, and thrust reversers are stowed.
ReplyDelete... seems like perfect circumstances for a Go Around
ReplyDelete#NotAPilot
Thank you cunn9305.
ReplyDeleteI don't understand why this isn't ingrained in EVERY pilots brain. SIMPLY PUT: one bounce, just freakin' go around. It's not rocket science.
In this case, if indeed they were halfway down the runway, don't even try to land. Natural instinct is to try to rush it to the ground since you've floated too far down the runway.
Throughout my life I have heard of and seen so many general aviation aircraft crashes, I think this is the only one that was instantaneously engulfed in flames and had survivors (fire and survivors). I am guessing there are others but I do not know what happens more ... small plane crashes or Pit Bull attacks ... it seems they are both always in the news. The odds that all people (and canine) walked and ran away from this is literally an insane miracle of epic proportions. This is inexplicable. Anomalous.
ReplyDeleteDon't get it, TRI has rwy 23 8,000' and closer to Bristol speedway...so very thankful that door was able to extend and all were able to run away from that inferno, seconds mattered.
ReplyDeleteNot to mention better ARFF at TRI
ReplyDeleteI don't get it either. I know this was a landing accident, but why would anyone(or in this case two professionally trained pilots as stated by the NTSB) land this type aircraft at an airport with only 4500' of runway. According to Cessna specs on the latitude, it needs about 2500' for landing, which should have been ok if everything went just right, but it didn't. The even greater concern would have been on takeoff. according to Cessna specs the latitude needs about 3600' of runway for takeoff, leaving only 900' of runway to abort a takeoff when approaching V-1. Those numbers just don't add up. How could anyone expect to abort a takeoff approaching V-1 with only 900' to stop and not expect to scream off the end of the runway if something did go wrong. As the previous post above TRI would have been a Much safer choice with an 8000' runway leaving a good margin for safety for either landing or takeoff.
ReplyDeleteOvershoot the landing? Then, go around.
ReplyDeleteOvershoot the landing and the runway is fairly short to begin with? Then, go around.
Halfway down the runway before first touching down? Then, go around.
Bounce on the landing? Then, go around.
Bounce twice on the landing? Then, go around.
This was a very preventable accident. More then likely there was pressure on he pilots to land at that airport and get the pax to their destination. Sounds like a classic case of get-there-itis. The pilots probably tried to wrestle it down to the ground after a botched landing, so as to avoid the embarrassment of a go-around. Unclear why they didn't just go-around after they started to notch the landing. In the future these pilots will have trouble getting jobs more then likely because they were involved in an accident .
ReplyDeleteInteresting to hear what the CVR/FDR says if available. Would be interesting to see if either PIC or SIC called for a go-around. And to see the coordination between them. They are very lucky that they didn't get killled in this accident. Pretty severe accident.
Oh YES! All walked away. Miracle doesn't really fit here, it's beyond that. Now about the insurance....
ReplyDeletePilot's Boss: "Gotta get them VIPs to their destination no matter what!"
ReplyDelete4500' runway is well within the capability of that airplane. The 3600' number stated earlier is balanced field length, which includes distance for an abort.
ReplyDeleteUmmm. The pilot's boss was on board.
ReplyDeleteThey have it on video that he bounced it twice and then collapsed the gear. I’ve been a private pilot for 44 years and it’s how you handle an airplane over the runway after you flare that separates the men from the boys. Also, a bad landing is usually preceded by a bad approach. There is no VASI on 24 at Elizabethton, VASI is another crutch used by pilots who can’t judge their glide paths. No crutch = lousy approach, likely too high and too fast. Clearly pilot error, he should have swallowed his pride and gone around without even attempting to touch down. My theory, today’s young pilots rely too much on the auto pilot and many are lousy stick and rudder guys after they disengage it on final. No need to wait for the NTSB report to see who was at fault here.
ReplyDeleteThis runway is more than adequate for this airplane.
ReplyDelete"-larger planes have to land further down the runway, according to flight instructor Bill Powley." ........WHY? The touchdown zone is the same for all aircraft.
"One bounce go around"... even more so in a tailwheel.
ReplyDeleteThis is why tailwheel training and owning a tailwheel makes one such a better pilot. A lost art in superior proficiency against the crop of "bare standard minimums" ATPs now pouring from those puppy mills 141 schools and operating planes with a thousand gadgets. They won't help in the one phase that will always require good manu skills i.e landing.
It is no accident the first tricycles were advertised as "automatic landing gear", and just like automatic transmissions on cars, they didn't reduce the accident rates.
In fact they dumbed down the pool of pilots so that the ADM for a go around is now very limited and the pressure to salvage a landing when the cost is 5k an hour to operate the bird very high.
Landing distance for the Falcon 900 I fly is about 2500-2800 feet, and, the Falcon only has 1 thrust reverser. This Cessna is fully capable of operating in and out of this airport safely.
ReplyDeleteYou'll never have to answer for why you went around.....you may have to answer for why you didn't go around!
ReplyDeleteHeard from a very experienced pilot friend that the scuttlebutt is not that there was something wrong with the gear that cause the aircraft to bounce. I call BS. High DA, short runway and pressure to get it right the first time. The only possible mechanical issue I can even imagine is the speed brakes being set on auto and for some odd reason deploying before touchdown. There is a short video floating around which I cannot locate at this points, that appears to short the aircraft on short final, and the sink rate looks extremely high. One the infamous surveillance video is released, we will all know much more. Oddly, in most crashes or incidents, the pilot's names and experienced are released, but in this case, all that is being said is they were "professionally trained". No names, no hours, no time in type. Why the secrecy ?
ReplyDeletesorry for all the typos. Intent is obvious.
ReplyDeleteIn fairness, the spool-up time for jet engines make a go-around difficult, especially if you are bouncing down a 4500 foot runway. The fact the aircraft skidded another 1000 feet past the threshold, on its belly, across turf and a ditch would indicate excess speed, or a very long TD point.
ReplyDelete"If you don't believe in God after this mess....you may be truly lost."
ReplyDeleteSupernatural forces don't keep airplanes flying. If you have to rely on a magic sky wizard to keep you safe then you are truly lost. There's a phenomenon called apophenia where people assign meaning to patterns. When a favorable result arises from an accident like this, some will bias the outcome in favor of a benevolent entity. If the result was unfavorable, like ten people die, it remains some sort of mystery and the entity is not biased against.
Apophenia, selection bias, and wishful thinking are the tools of magic, not reason.
0A9 runway is 4529 feet long with a 429 foot displaced threshold for landing on RWY 24, the runway N8JR was landing on. Available landing distance was 4100 feet and meteorological data indicated hot temperatures and gusty tailwinds landing on RWY 24 during that time frame. Witness reports and security camera videos indicating the C680 touching down well beyond normal touchdown zone coupled with gusty tailwinds doesn't leave much room for stopping a turbojet moving at 120 knots with maybe 2000 feet of runway remaining. Sounds like another classic unstabilized approach leading to touchdown beyond normal touchdown zone leading to off runway excursion like we've read about many times before. Thank goodness no lives were lost and a lesson learned from this, abort any unstabilized approach and go around, pride be damned!
ReplyDeleteSince everyone survived, it is relegated to the VEL category. (Very Expensive Landing)
ReplyDeleteAny landing you walk away from, crawl away from, are extracted by the jaws of life to be put in a stretcher barely alive, is a good landing.
ReplyDeleteFrom what I saw on Flightaware, all other aircraft on that day landed in the opposite direction.
ReplyDeleteThe travel path through the turf grass after the end of the runway can be seen in youtube video "RAW VIDEO: Chopper 9 over scene of Earnhardt plane crash" at about the 1:00 minute mark as the camera pans toward the end of the runway. Looks like the pilots were able to keep fairly straight and did not gouge up the turf (while dealing with reportedly collapsed main gear on one side) until the ditch crossing, uphill dirt bank and fence dissipated the remaining energy.
ReplyDeleteI also noticed on flightaware that most aircraft t/o's and landings that day were on rwy 060,
ReplyDeletenot 240. After I heard about this accident, I looked at the weather data for 0A9.
Wind was variable 060 @ 11 knots at the time of the accident. Landing downwind with an 11 kt tailwind is a definite set up for an unstable, high, and fast approach, that eats up a lot of runway in an already fast airplane. They were lucky!
Possibly momentary lapse of pilot judgement y’all.
ReplyDeleteNTSB senior investigator Ralph Hick said that the wind was calm at the time of the accident.
ReplyDeleteSee, e.g.: https://www.flyingmag.com/dale-earnhardt-jr-crash-ntsb-details/
Historic METARS also indicate that Runway 24 was appropriate for landing:
201908151935 METAR K0A9 151935Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM SCT047 SCT055 BKN070
29/19 A2997 RMK AO2=
201908151955 METAR K0A9 151955Z AUTO 26008KT 10SM FEW048 FEW075 SCT090
31/19 A2996 RMK AO2=
See, e.g.: https://www.ogimet.com/display_metars2.php?lang=en&lugar=K0A9&tipo=ALL&ord=DIR&nil=SI&fmt=txt&ano=2019&mes=08&day=15&hora=18&anof=2019&mesf=08&dayf=15&horaf=20&minf=59&send=send
There is a video out there that the FAA has. It might help to clear up the speculation if it could be posted sooner than later.
ReplyDeleteHats Off to Dale Jr for having 2 pilots on board his jet, and not flying it solo or just with a safety pilot as many other highly successful individuals with a predilection for fast complicated vehicles are prone to do.
ReplyDeleteWhatever led to this accident, I'm glad Earnhardt has the good sense to leave the flying to the pros when it's his family on board.
^^^^^ LOL
ReplyDeleteI want better 'Pros' than these guys.
The crew did not file a flight plan. That suggests a cavalier attitude that does not comport with a higher commercial-like standard when lying the boss, his wife, and their precious child (and Gus, the dog).
ReplyDeleteCan't say that I would file either for a flight this short.
ReplyDeleteATC nor a flight plan would have helped with the landing.
Any chance Dale was flying? Short trip, no flight plan, just the family?
ReplyDeleteThe NTSB Preliminary Report indicates that ATP pilots were in the left and right seats. That assertion is probably based on flight-crew (and perhaps passenger) interviews rather than objective evidence. Ralph "Dale" Earnhardt, III, does not appear to have even a student pilot certificate;
ReplyDeleteso, if he were flying, that would be highly irregular (but possible, of course).
Given the purported failure of a go-around attempt ("the airplane did not respond as expected"), and the resultant crash, give cause to wonder whether evaluations for impairment were performed.
Whatever actually happened, kudos to the flight crew for getting everybody out alive.
ReplyDelete"Given the purported failure of a go-around attempt ("the airplane did not respond as expected"), and the resultant crash, give cause to wonder whether evaluations for impairment were performed.
Whatever actually happened, kudos to the flight crew for getting everybody out alive."
Really,
Yes I agree. It was miraculous that everyone got out alive, but, you have to remember,
It was the flight crew that caused this accident in the first place. Poor planning ,poor judgement, poor piloting. Botching the landing twice, smashed the gear, trying to do a go around, and then trying to land with only 1000' of runway left. The outcome was inevitable.
Blasting off the end of the runway across the grass, through the fence, and onto the highway. They were very Lucky!
If I were a betting man I would put my money on that Dale was in the left seat. The “ATP” rated pilot in the right probably did not possess the skills of a CFI. Just sayin’ ……
ReplyDeleteAn ATP with experience in that jet, even without a CFI would certainly know things were going to hell fast and boss flying or not would have taken over. The CVR recording should answer this troubling question.
ReplyDelete“airplane did not perform as expected “ is an interesting statement. Reminds me of the Emirates 777 in DXB that landed gear up on a go around after a bounced landing. Something in the auto throttle logic prevented the jet from going into TOGA (Take Off/Go Around) mode and the throttles never advanced as expected. I think the TOGA switch was activated while the jet was in contact with the ground on the bounce and inhibited its function. Gear was retracted on the bounce but the throttles were at idle and the jet settled onto the runway gear up. “Trust But Verify” is essential when it come to aircraft automation.
ReplyDeleteIn VMC on a visual approach - between 1,000 to 500 feet AGL, stabilized, final items completed and “all automation off please” will possibly prevent such situations. Sometimes, a good ol FAA landing on a shorter runway will get the best of ya. Did here unfortunately. Wasn’t there – don’t know for sure. So sorry for this mishap!
ReplyDeleteWell, it is incredible easy to play Monday Morning Quarterback on the info provided. Yes, many factors suggest this was a totally avoidable accident. The accident started before this crew ever left the ground. I suspect this jet performance numbers were in the parameters of landing on a 4500’ airport. But, was that the best choice in an around the area or was it just picked based on someones convenience? A longer runway would have promoted a much greater safety margin. Next, in my humble professional opinion, they should have filed a flight plan. Again, this just increases the margin of safety but may have not been a factor. Here are some very good key questions. Was this a stable visual approach? In other words, during the last 500’ from touchdown, were they fully configured, on glide slope indicator with PAPI/VASI, and +10 knots or less from Vref? I’m guessing they were not. Do they even have Standard Operating Procedure defining what a stable approach is? If so, what are the procedures if they are out of these guidelines? Do they go around? Who can call for a go around? Is is just the captain, the first officer, or can it be any crew member? A pretty soft landing on a short runway is NOT the goal regardless who is on board the aircraft. Putting all 3 tires firmly on the ground on the Touchdown Zone (or slightly before when safety permits) and using max breaking is best. In conclusion and in my professional opinion, a longer runway would have been better, an IFR flight plane should have been filed, a stable approach flown (regardless of runway length), and to use and follow short runway procedures.
ReplyDelete^^^^^^^
ReplyDeleteWell said!
"In my humble professional opinion, they should have filed a flight plan."
ReplyDeleteYes I agree on the flight plan, but, what you're implying is that if they would have filed a flight plan this accident would not have happened. You have no clue. Since this is an uncontrolled field, they would have canceled well in advance of entering the traffic pattern.
You might be a professional, but hopefully not a pilot.. And if you are, I would never fly with you. If you were a professional, You would know there is no Papi/Vasi on runway 24. This is not an aircraft carrier landing. you do not slam the aircraft down and hope you can stop in time. Bad advice. Well beyond your pay grade
One thing to notice in the approach to runway 24, would be to follow the circle to land maneuvers. The rising terrain to the NW is so very apparent in the approach to a runway that is downhill with no VASI or other guidance. This downhill runway appears in a pilots eye as he needs to be higher than a normal flat 3 degree approach.
ReplyDeleteThat coupled with the dip and bowlout of the middle of the runway, leads me to believe that there was now consideration for the class of plane, along with the lack of using the circle to lady altitudes on the approach plate, to establish a means to position this plane in the proper field of view for a safe, above normal glide slope towards a downhill visually deceptive runway with a bowl in the middle impeding a flare while observing the far end of the runway.
Thus the terrible bounce without a call by any pilot to go around.
Just my two cents.
One thing to notice in the approach to runway 24, would be to follow the circle to land maneuvering for the runway. The rising terrain to the NorthEast is so very apparent with very high mountains. Now to the the approach to a runway that is positioned downhill with no VASI or other vertical guidance. This downhill runway appears in a pilots eye to be higher than a normal flat runway 3 degree approach. In other words, he thinks he would be low with the falling runway and thus to stay where the normal runway view will be the correct one.
ReplyDeleteThis is very bad as it created a higher than normal approach.
That coupled with the dip and bowl out of the middle of the runway, leads me to believe that there was no consideration for the class approach speed of the plane, along with the lack of using the circle to land altitudes on the approach plate, and to establish a means to position this plane in the proper runway field of view with the bowling in the middle lading area, a safe, above normal glide slope towards a downhill visually deceptive runway with a bowl in the middle and thus impeding a flare while observing the higher far end of the runway.
Thus the terrible bounce without a call by any pilot for go around in the resultant planting at a high rate, the descent of the jet upon the dip in the runway.
Just my two cents.
“Yes I agree on the flight plan, but, what you're implying is that if they would have filed a flight plan this accident would not have happened.”
ReplyDeleteNo, what he’s implying is that in an airplane that requires a type rating, one should act like a “type rated” pilot 100% of the time, no matter how short, long or inconsequential the flight is. A professional should act like a professional AND FILE A FLIGHT PLAN! Additionally, as a professional aviator since 1980 (11 of them as a Naval Aviator and 33+ as a major airline pilot) I agree completely with the guy you quoted and all of his comments regarding a stable approach. NO WHERE did he say “slam the aircraft down.” He said that a firm landing in the touchdown zone was called for. The fact that you think that means an “aircraft carrier landing” means that YOU are in fact a moron and have no idea what YOU are talking about. Rant over... Sorry to the rest of those reading this.
Anyone find it odd that 2 months after this crash, the NTSB has still not released the airport security camera footage of the crash, not the CVR audio or transcript. The NTSB spokesman said, in an interview the day after the crash, that the footage would be released to the public in a nominal length of time. Why the delay and secrecy ? Even though the NTSB is far from a final determination, the footage and CVR being made public with have no effect on the investigation. The "Miracle on the Hudson" security camera footage was broadcast within a matter of days, as was the actual ATC audio even thought the NTSB was investigating the accident and interviewing Sully and Jeffry. Why is this crash worthy of such a protracted withholding of factual evidence. There is also a rumor that perhaps Dale was in the right seat.
ReplyDeleteNTSB puts information in a docket for public access when the investigation gets to the factual or final report stage. Not a protracted delay or secrecy thing, just normal work flow.
DeleteThe airport security camera video showed up 18 September on FB.
https://www.facebook.com/AviationAccidentsThisDayInHistory/videos/825367641194117/
I find it odd that you can't find the aircraft on the NTSB page anymore.
ReplyDeleteYou are referring to the N number being de-registered, which is the FAA's record. There is a listing for JRM AIR LLC among the de-registered entries further down the page. Nothing is missing from NTSB pages related to the accident.
DeleteThe aircraft is crashed, not repairable, so de-registration is not a surprise.
Here's Dale Jr's new N number N38AD. It's a 2019 Cessna 560XL.
DeleteYou could track it for awhile but, now he has it blocked.
The 3 stands for his dad's car number, the 8 for his number, and the A=Amy, the D=Dale.
A short airstrip, with a very famous passenger.
ReplyDeleteAnd you clowns think that it is unusual that there is a coverup?
Scores of millions in lawsuits are involved here.
Until the government servants' Cayman island accounts have been set up and
sufficiently engorged, the "FACTS" will remain under investigation.
It will take years to elucidate the bad decision of the captain.
Hard to envision big lawsuits and a coverup, since everyone walked away. A fence had to be put back, airplane replaced and county had some expenses doing emergency response. That's all.
DeleteThe NTSB preliminary report and the video from midfield security camera describes a bouncy landing that exceeded the ability to get stopped. Some combination of how the approach was flown and aircraft performed messed up the plane and the fence. Probably was not caused by alien spaceships or directed energy weapons this time.